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I 
Abstract 
Over the last four decades Sierra Leone established several credit schemes to 
help farmers increase production, productivity and incomes. This was motivated by 
several factors including the high proportion of the population in agriculture, the relative 
poverty of farmers and their subsistence level of production. Cheap credit was seen as 
the appropriate instrument to achieve market-oriented production. But these schemes 
failed due mainly to concessionary interest rates, high default, lack of savings 
mobilisation, mismanagement and poor economic policies. 
In March, 1985, a rural banking scheme was launched to replace these failed 
schemes; and by 1994, eight rural banks were in operation. The main objectives were to 
mobilise savings and to provide credit to agriculture and other rural enterprises. In early 
1990), it was realised that these banks were far from achieving these objectives. 
This study examines and identifies the factors responsible for their low levels of 
achievement. The study reveals that huge losses were made due to several reasons 
among which are low interest rates for savings and loans which were typically below 
market rates and inflation suggesting negative returns on interest income, high default, 
poor economic environment and poor market infrastructure. These factors made rural 
banks unsustainable and highly subsidy dependent. The study further reveals that 
informal financial sources (i. e. moneylenders and osusu clubs) have been rendering 
services for which rural banks were not designed, In addition, rural banks and their 
clients were incurring relatively higher transaction costs compared to the informal 
sources and their clients. 
The study therefore recommends a restructuring of rural banks and suggests 
policies to improve their operations. In the main, institution-building is recommended, 
and that the operational flexibility of the informal financial sector be incorporated into 
the policies of rural banks. 
We recognise that Sierra Leone is going through a period of internal conflict. But 
these recommendations need to be urgently implemented to forestall the collapse of these 
rural banks. 
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INSTITUTIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF RURAL BANKS IN SIERRA LEONE 
I 
PART I RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOG) 
Chapter I MTRODUCTION 
1.00. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
1.10. The Setting 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the background and methodology used 
in this study. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first gives the background 
and describes the setting of the research. Section two explains the objectives, 
justification and hypothesis of the research. The third section discusses the expected 
contribution of the study to improve the operations of rural banks. Section four deals 
with the methodology, from the survey design to the analysis of the data and the fifth 
section explains how the study is organised. 
Sieffa Leone is located on the west coast of Affica. It has a land area of 
approximately 72,000 square kilometres and a coastline that is approximately 570 
kilometres along the Atlantic ocean. It is bordered by the Republic of Guinea on the 
north, north-east and north-west and by Liberia on the south-east. The average 
temperature is about 27 degrees Celsius, with marked variations between the coolest 
areas in the north-east and the hottest areas in the north-central interior plains. There 
are two distinct seasons. The wet or rainy season runs from May to October and the dry 
season from November to April. The average rainfall varies between 80 inches in the 
north and 200 inches in the south-east. The vegetation ranges from tropical savannah, 
mainly in the north-central plain to tropical rain forest in the east and south and riverrain 
a 
2 
grasslands and mangrove swamps in the south-east and north-east. Although 75 per 
cent of the geographical area is considered arable, yet only about II per cent of this is 
under cultivation each year using the bush fallow system' (CSO, 1970/71). 
Table 1.1 Some Indicators of Development since Independence in 1961 
0 Indicator 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 11985 1989 1990 
Population (m) 2.08 2.37 2.69 3.05 3.3 3.6 3.8 4.2 
GDP growth rate (real) N/A 4.8 6.4 3 3.2 -2.6 -0.4 2.3 
Real GDP per capita 280 297 354 388 320 350 220 260 
Exports to GDP N/A 25.6 23.5 19.9 16.9 17.5 15 20 
Imports to GDP N/A 31.2 27.4 29.2 34.7 20.3 17.3 25 
Adult literacy N/A 7.7 13 13 13 13.3 16.3 21 
male N/A 10 18 19 19.2 1 21 17 31 
female N/A 4 8 12 11 6 9 11 
Life expectancy 31.5 32.5 34 34.6 35 40 41 42 
Infant mortality 225 220 225 227 200 175 151 154 
Primary school enrolment 
ratio 30 29 32 38 52 45 53 61 
Note: - N/A = not available. 
Source: - Annual Statistical Diggest, (CSO, 1922z) 
The population is estimated at 3.76 million (1985 census), growing at a rate of 
2.5 per cent per annum (CSO, 1986 and World Bank, 1989). An estimated 70 per cent 
of the population lives in the rural areas, of which about 80 per cent are small farmers 
(CSO, 1992). Per capita annual income which was US$338 (constant prices) in 1984/85 
fell by 23 per cent to US$260 in 1989/90 due mainly to a fall in production and increase 
in population. The literacy rate, defined as the ability to read in English, is very low at 
1 The bush fallow system is a system of farming in which the land is left idle to regenerate its own 
fertility (fallow) for a period of years. The fallow period can be as long as 20 years. In Sierra Leone, the 
fallow period has been shortened from 15 - 20 years (1950-60) to 8-10 years (1%1-1980) mainly due to 
population pressure and the demands of the market (FAO, 1990). 
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21 per cent level in 1990 (Table 1.1). Less than 50 per cent of the population has access 
to health and social services including electricity, education, sanitation and water. 
Sierra Leone became independent in 1961 and adopted a Republican Constitution 
with an executive President. The country is divided into four administrative regions - 
the Western Area, in which the capital, Freetown, is situated and three Provinces, 
namely: Northern, Southern and Eastern (Map 1). The provinces are subdivided into 
twelve Districts and these are further subdivided into one hundred and forty Chiefdoms., 
each headed by a Paramount Chief (pC)2. 
The economy is dominated by the agricultural sector which is largely small-scale, 
employing about 62 per cent of the total labour force (CSO, 1986; FAO, 1992). 
Between 1984/85 and 1990/91 the agricultural sector accounted for an average of 45 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices, and 6.5 per cent of 
exports (Chapter Three, Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The industrial sector, including mining, 
accounted for 17.3 per cent of GDP and 21 per cent of the labour force. Nfineral 
endowment includes diamonds,, gold, bauxite, iron ore and rutile. Their production, up 
till 1990, accounted for about 15 per cent of GDP and about 78.7 per cent of export 
eamings (Table 3.2). 
Rice is the staple food crop and is grown by over 80 per cent of the farmers in 
the country (CSO, 1991). This high proportion of farmers has been unable to produce 
enough to satisfy domestic demand. Annual domestic demand for rice in Sierra Leone 
has been estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 tons (CSO, 1991). Production has, 
2The Paramount Chief (PC) is the head of the Chiefdom administration, custodian of all land under 
the customary land tenure system and custodian of all tribal rites. It,, A'as a hereditary position until 1973, 
when it became necessary for him or her to be elected by popular vote. 
however, been under 400,000 tons per annum on average since 1981 (MAFF, 1992). 
The deficit is filled by imports. Rice imports have risen steadfly from 11,000 tons in 1983 
to 2873.000 tons in 1992 (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 Rice Production and Imports (000 tons) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Production 641 556 515 498 326 415 451 314 109* 107 
Imports 
- 
11 74 108 119 99 96.7 80 124 251 ** 287**., 
Note: - * Estimate (MAFF, 1993). 
Includes relief supplies for refugees fleeing the war in Liberia and 'rebel' war 
zones M Sierra Leone. 
Source: - CSO (199 1) and BSL Economic Review (1990). 
One of the goals of government since independence in 1961 has been to achieve 
self-sufficiency in rice and other foodstuff production. But this goal has not been 
realised. The numerous small farmers still produce at subsistence level. The major 
reasons forwarded for low agricultural output and the lack of progress towards market- 
oriented production are poor farming technology, poor market infrastructure and the 
lack of finance. Farmers were deemed to lack savings which would enable them 
purchase new and improved technology. Government was also keen to compensate 
them for urban-biased pricing policies. Thus one of the main agricultural policies has 
been the provision of cheap credit to help the farmers move from subsistence to market- 
oriented production by the adoption of new technology, 
1.11. Statement of the Problem. 
Over the past four decades, more than five kinds of credit programmes ranging 
from direct to indirect government intervention have been instituted to supply credit, 
particularly to small farmers, in the rural areas. The majority of these credit programmes 
have failed. The reasons for their failure include high default rates, lower than 
6 
equilibrium interest rates charged on loans, negative real interest rates returns on loan, --,, 
lack of savings mobilisation, shortage of well trained and qualified staff, poor appraisal 
of projects, inadequate loan supervision, poor market infrastructure (poor roads, poor 
or non-existent market centres and storage facilities), poor extension and research 
services, misappropriation of funds and inappropriate econon-k policies. The overall 
outcome has been limited access to credit for the farmers for whom these credit 
programmes were created and poor financial intermediation. Consequently, the small 
farmers have had to turn to informal credit sources. These informal sources include 
relatives,, friends, the Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) i. e. the 
Osusu' clubs, and moneylenders4. 
Researchers concerned with rural financial markets in developing countries, over 
the last two decades agree that informal credit sources have continued to operate 
successfully in the rural areas even when formal credit programmes have floundered 
(USAID, 1973; Bouman, 1977; Adams, 1983; Bell, 1990; Floro and Yotopoulos, 
1991). In developing countries, informal credit sources still meet 50-80 per cent of the 
credit needs of rural people (World Bank, 1975). In Sierra Leone, for example, the 
percentage of rural people receiving credit from informal sources was estimated at 
between 70-80 per cent in the mid-seventies (Taylor, 1979). Our survey, hereafter 
referred to as the Survey, showed that no fewer than 73 per cent of respondents are stifl 
receiving credit from informal sources in Sierra Leone. 
3 OSUSU is the local name for the type of ROSCA common in Sierra Leone. 
4 Credit needed by farmers include both consumption and production credit. It has been established that 
although the main credit flow is directed at consumption, moneylenders and osusu clubs do grant loans 
, which can be used for production actiNrities (Bouman, 1995, pp. 373) 
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Governments in some developing countries have been hosti-le to moneylenders 
and have viewed them as exploiters of helpless peasants (Bell, 1990). The interest rates 
charged by them have been perceived as usurious and exploitative (World Bank, 1975, 
Bouman, 1979). Some governments have gone as far as legislating against them (Bell, 
1990). Regardless of this hostility, moneylenders have survived in the developing world. 
This suggests that they have been more adaptable to rural conditions and more 
acceptable to rural people than formal sector credit agencies (Bell, 1990). 
In Sierra Leone, the government has been silent on the matter of informal sources 
of credit. Attention has,, however,, been focused on the establishment of credit schemes 
including the Agricultural and Credit Loans Scheme (ACLS), the Registrar of Co- 
operatives Loan Fund (RCLF), the Integrated Agricultural Development Projects 
QADPs) and the Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) for smafl farmers. These programmes 
have failed to meet their objectives and most have collapsed due to the reasons 
mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, in 1985, a rural banking scheme was launched. Rural 
banks (RBs) were established to replace these failed schemes with a view to, among 
other objectives, mobilising savings and providing credit to rural residents. But these 
rural banks are in danger of suffering the same fate as their predecessor institutions. 
Meanwhile, moneylenders and osusu clubs (ROSCAS) have continued to coexist 
with formal credit institutions and have even survived them. In this study, the terms 
Omisu and ROSCAS will be used interchangeably. 
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1.20. THE OBJECTIVES AND JUSTWICATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The objectives of the research are: 
(a) to examine the operations of RBs with a view to determining their viability, using 
Outreach and Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) analysis and to identify the factors that 
hinder their operations and contribute to their nonviability. 
(b) to analyse factors which have made moneylenders and ROSCAS viable in the rural 
areas of Sierra Leone. Moneylenders' operations will be analysed to determine the costs 
they incur for screening borrowers, administrative and opportunity costs of time and 
capital and pursuing delinquent loans. A regression model using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) will be used to determine factors which influenced the level of interest rates 
observed. 
(c) to discuss the operations of the osusu clubs, highlighting their adaptability and 
pervasiveness in the rural areas, as well as their advantages in some respects over other 
forms of informal credit sources. 
(d) to use the knowledge gained from these analysis of the modes of operation of RBs, 
moneylenders and the osusu clubs as a basis for suggesting a model which will enhance 
rural banks' financial intennediation role in the rural areas of Sierra Leone and also 
improve their self-sustainability. 
The rural banking scheme in Sierra Leone is a response to the failure of previous 
formal credit schemes introduced under the institution-elasticity or "supply-leading" 
approach to rural finance. The "supply-leading" phenomenon, according to Patrick 
(1966), "is the creation of financial institutions and the supply of their financial assets, 
liabdities and related financial services in advance of demand for them in the modem 
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growth-inducing sectors". The credit schemes that were introduced, using this 'supply- 
leading' approach, failed not only to meet their objectives of providing credit to a large 
proportion of the rural population for whom they were set up, but also proved to be 
unviable due to high default rates, negative real returns on loans, high transaction costs 
and lack of savings mobifisation (Adams, 1983). These credit schemes also failed to 
attract rural borrowers from informal financial intermediaries (IFM), especially 
moneylenders (op. cit. ). 
Following evaluations of credit schemes in LICs (USAID, 1974), most donor 
agencies including the World Bank and USAID began to review past credit policies. 
The USAID report, "Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit" (op. cit. ), concluded that 
these policies were not only faulty but also counterproductive. Less than 5 per cent of 
farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, benefited from credit programmes 
established in accordance with these policies (World Bank, 1975). Following the 
failures of the credit schemes the Sierra Leone Government (SLG) also reviewed its 
credit policies and programmes and concluded that most had not met their objectives. 
They were unviable and depended heavily on annual budgetary appropriations which the 
goverment could ill afford (Deen, 1977). Consequently, a new policy on credit was 
adopted (BSL, 1980). It involved the setting up of RBs when it was certified that the 
demand for this kind of institution existed. In short, the "supply-leading" approach 
appeared to have been abandoned in favour of the "demand-following" approach, 
which, according to Patrick (1966), "is the creation of modem financial institutions, 
their financial assets and liabilities, and related financial services in response to the 
demand for these services by investors and savers in the real economy". A rural bank 
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was set up only after the residents had demonstrated a demand for it and the micro- 
economic climate was certified to be conducive for a rural bank. A decision on this last 
issue has usually been taken after a socio-economic study and evaluation of the 
potential of the area have been undertaken by the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL), the 
Central bank. The participation of the rural population to be serviced by the RB has 
been secured by encouraging them to buy shares as well as to take a keen interest in the 
running of the RB. In other words a sense of belonging and ownership have been 
encouraged. 
The rural banking programme was launched in March, 1985 and by the end of 
1993, eight RBs had been established (Table 6.1). It is becoming clear, however, that 
some of the factors which affected the previous credit schemes were still present and 
the collapse of some of these RBs is imminent. There is heavy reliance on central bank 
funds. Default rates and transaction costs are also high. In addition, mismanagement and 
fraud are common. All of these factors have rendered the RBs unviable and 
unsustainable. The main question now is, why are the RBs encountering the same 
problems that plagued the old schemes? The answer to this question is explored in 
Chapter Six. 
It has been established by a number of studies (Moinuddhin, 1969; CSO, 
1970/71; Kamara and Turay, 1972; Deen, 1977; Richards and Karimu, 1981; Johnny, 
1985), that informal credit sources have typically operated alongside formal credit 
institutions and provided useful services to rural residents. They are still operating today 
while most of the official credit schemes have coflapsed. It is therefore important to 
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examine these informal credit sources and use the lessons learned as a basis for helping 
DU 
R13s to operate viably and to provide the kinds of services rural residents require. 
1.21. Significance of the study 
Evaluation of the impact of RBs on the rural economy in Sierra Leone is limited. 
In particular, the operations of the eight RBs have yet to be critically and 
comprehensively analysed. Much of what is known tends to be anecdotal and requires 
more empirical data and analysis to provide a more reliable basis for policy changes. 
This research is designed to fill this gap and to assist policy makers, both in 
government and in the private sector, in developing appropriate policies to enhance the 
operations of RBs. The study is also expected to supplement and complement past and 
on-going research work geared towards the improvement and monetisation of the rural 
areas and, in particular, the agricultural sector. 
By analysing the performance of RBs it may be possible for the management of 
these institutions and the BSL to formulate poficies and actions that will control some 
of the operating costs and enhance their viability. The result of the outreach and 
viability analysis will also help in identiýdng the factors that have caused RBs to be 
unviable and ineffective in their financial intermediation role and to highlight those 
factors which have hampered the achievement of their objectives. In addition, the 
information can also be used to evaluate the performance trends of RBs. An analysis of 
the performance of the informal credit sources wil-I help to determine the reasons for 
their survival and such reasons wi. 11 in turn be invaluable in proposing a model for 
successful rural financial intermediation in Sierra Leone. 
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The results, conclusions and recommendations that will emerge from this study 
will make a modest contribution towards a better understanding of the operations of 
rural financial markets (RFMs) not only in Sierra Leone but in West Afhca and vAll add 
to the growing literature on rural financial markets and their impact on the development 
of rural areas in Low Income Countries (LICs). 
1.22. Working Hypotheses 
The analysis will be based on three main hypotheses: 
(a) that rural banks are unlikely to be viable and sustainable sources of credit for rural 
residents given their present operational (internal) and external constraints. 
(b) that RBs wiff perform better if some of the operational mechanisms of the informal 
sector (particularly moneylenders), such as market interlinkage, flexible loans 
procedures and low transactions costs for borrowers are incorporated into their policies 
and 
(c) that credit by itself would be ineffective if supporting services such as the road 
network, market infrastructure, research and extension services are poor or absent. 
1.30. Expected Contribution of the Research 
This research is expected to contribute to a better understanding of the rural 
financial market (RFM) in Sierra Leone in a number of ways. 
First, the research is expected to contribute to a growing body of work on RFMs. 
Extant knowledge about RBs at the organisational and operational levels in Sierra Leone 
is linýited largely because of the paucity of data 14iking overall economic policies to 
operations of RBs. 
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Second7 this research aims at deepening our knowledge about the organisation, 
modes of operation and practices of both the formal and informal credit sources in Sierra 
Leone and at providing some evidence on factors influencing success or othervAse of 
rural financial intermediaries (RFIs). 
Third, this research is expected to provide a basis for policy changes in the field 
of credit with a view to improving financial intermediation, accessibility and viability of 
rural banks in Sierra Leone. 
In summary, this research will try to advance the general knowledge about RFMs 
and factors influencing their performance. A better understanding of how government 
policies and regulations affect the operations of the RFM in general is important for the 
design of appropriate credit policies. 
1.40, Survey Design. 
1.41. The Survey 
Sierra Leone is divided into four major administrative regions with RBs 
distributed as shown in Map 1. The Nor-them Province is the largest both in terms of 
size and population and has four RBs located within it. The second largest is the 
Eastern Province with three RBs, followed by the Southern Province with just one RB. 
The Western Area has no RB at present; but there are plans to establish one at 
Waterloo, 17 miles from Freetown. It should be noted that the Western Area is over 80 
per cent urban and the agricultural activities taking place in it are small compared to the 
provinces. 
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The study uses secondary (published) data and official sources, especially the 
audited statements of account of RBs, to assess how viable RBs have been and what 
can be done to eliminate or minimise their problems. In addition, use is made of data 
from a survey involving three questionnaires, a household questionnaire, an informal 
sources questionnaire and an institutional sources questionnaire, which were 
administered in the service areas of the selected RBs (see below). The survey was 
conducted from late February to the end of March, 1994, a period during which farmers 
were beginning to prepare for the next cropping season and were applying for loans. 
Four RBs were selected for study out of the eight that have been established 
(Table 6.1). These are, (1) Yoni Rural Bank (YRB), (2) Marampalmasimera Rural 
Bank (MNIRB), (3) Mattru. Rural Bank (NM) and (4) Kunike Rural Bank (KRB) 
(Map 2). The choice of the RBs was influenced by several factors. Among them was 
our intention to cover the main occupations Mi the country i. e. agriculture, fishing, trade, 
mining, and some cottage industries (basket making, cloth dyeing, blacksmithery, 
tailoring etc. ). Rural Banking in Sierra Leone commenced in March, 1985 and each of 
the selected RBs has operated for more than six years and generated enough data to 
facilitate some meaningful analysis (Table 6.1). Of those not selected two, Sewama rural 
bank (SRB) and Bombali rural bank (BRB), have been operating for less than three 
years (Table 6.1). The other two, the Daru rural bank (DRB) and the Moarnale rural 
bank (MOARB) suspended operations in 1992 due to the on-going rebel war which has 
affected their areas of operation. While not selected for the survey, they are, however, 
included in the analysis where data on them are available. 
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The YRB was the first to be established and has become a training ground for all 
RB staff. In consequence, any mistakes made at YRB may have been replicated in other 
RBs, given that the operations and structures of all RBs in Sierra Leone are similar. The 
YRB is located at Nfile 91 ,a market town situated 
91 miles from the capital, Freetown, 
and services a predotninantly agricultural area, producing a variety of crops including 
chillies (pepper), maize, sweet potatoes, cassava, vegetables and rice (the nation's staple 
food). Some poultry and pigs are also reared in this area. In addition, the YRB is 
located in an area that was serviced by the Magbosi Integrated Agricultural 
Development Pro ect (MIAW). When this project was closed down in 1985, the j 
YRB's establishment was intended to bridge the credit gap created by its closure. Thus 
the YRB's choice provides an opportunity to compare the operations of the MIADP to 
the YRB in relation to meeting farmers' credit needs. 
The Marampa/Masimera RB is located at Lunsar, a mining town for iron ore and 
the Headquarters of the joint Chiefdoms of Marampa and Masimera. It is about 66 miles 
from Freetown. Since the closure of these mines in 1975, agricultural activities and 
trade have become the dominant occupations. Rice is also produced mainly in the inland 
valley swamps. Some oil palm, citrus plantations and animal husbandry enterprises are 
also undertaken in this area. 
The MRB is located at Mattru, about 200 miles from Freetown. The 
predominant economic activities in the area it services include mining (Bauxite), fishing, 
agriculture and trade. Agricultural products include rice, oil palm, coffee and cocoa. 
The last three are mainly export crops. The mining of bauxite is carried by a 
5 The Magbosi Integrated Agricultural Development Prqjectý like all lADPs in Sierra Leone, has as one 
of its components a credit re, %roh-ing fund to provide loans to farmers. 
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Multinational company, Sieromco. The MRB is the only RB in the Southern Province at 
the moment. 
The KRB is located at Makali in the Tonkofili District. This area is more famous 
for its gold mining than for its agriculture and it adjoins the main diamond mining area, 
the Kono District. Young and able-bodied men and women move in between these two 
mining areas in search of gold and diamonds. Thus mining activities make it very costly 
to attract labour into agriculture in these areas. In addition, because Islam is the 
predominant religion in this area, women are required to obtain permission from their 
husbands or fathers (who are usual-ly accepted as guarantors) in order to contract loans. 
Although this custom is widespread in rural Sierra Leone, it is strongest in the Northern 
Province. The agricultural sector in this area produces rice, cassava, maize and 
vegetables. The rearing of cattle and chickens also takes place. 
1.42. Sampling Technique 
A random sampling technique was used for the household questionnaire, with the 
sampling frame being the list of customers of selected RBs. A random selection of 50 
customers from each of the RBs' ledger cards was made. The cards were recorded and 
addresses noted. Twenty five non-customers, as a control sample, from the areas 
serviced by each selected RB were also randomly selected. For this purpose, the 
sampling frame was the chiefdom taxpayers' list acquired from the District Councils 
Offices. The list was cross-checked with the RBs' records and management teams to 
ensure that those selected are not customers of the RB. It should be noted that each RB 
services a specific number of chiefdoms (Table 6.1), located within a twenty-five-mile 
radius, as a rural banking policy (BSL, 1980). In the NUVM operational area, for 
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example, a random selection of non-customers was done as shown in the Table 1.3. 
This method was adopted for all enumeration areas for the random selection of the non- 
customers of the RBs in order to minimise location bias. The household questionnaire 
was administered to a total of 50 customers and to 25 non-customers within the service 
area of each RB so that in all, 200 customers and 100 non-customers of rural banks 
were interviewed. 
The Informal sources questionnaire was administered to 20 moneylenders (five 
each from the areas serviced by the four RBs selected for the survey). The 
moneylenders were identified through information from RB Management teams and 
from respondents to the household questionnaire. It should be noted that obtaining a 
statistically random sample of moneylenders was impossible, given the size of the areas 
selected, the reluctance of most moneylenders to identify themselves to, or discuss their 
operations with, 'strangers' as well as financial constraints. We were, therefore, forced 
to choose interviewees on the grounds of availability and access rather than 
representativeness. 
The Institutional questionnaire was administered using the RB's manager and/or 
the loans officer as respondents. The questionnaire was distributed to managers of RBs 
Table 1.3. Selection of Respqndents (non-customers) 
for MMRIB Service area. 
Chiefdom No. of Taxpayers % of Total 
Taxpayers 
No. Randomly 
Selected 
Marampa 32245 37 10 
Masimera 30985 36 9 
Buya Romende 24013 27 6 
Total 87243 100 25 
Source: - The Survey (1994). 
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and discussed with the managers and or loans officers'. The discussion took the form of 
explaining the objectives of the survey, the type and importance of the data required and 
a brief discussion with the responding officials to test the kinds of response one might 
receive. After a week or two, the questionnaires were collected and cross-checked with 
the published audited statements of accounts to ascertain correctness and consistency. 
The purpose of the institutional questionnaire was to collect information on the 
operations of the RBs, including data on issues relating to viability, factors influencing 
operations, new policies (if any) and new directions. In addition to these questionnaires, 
discussions were held with officials of the Bank of Sierra Leone (central bank) given that 
it has the responsibility not only of influencing the establishment of RBs but also 
monitoring and supervising their operations. Discussions were also held with officials of 
two commercial banks (Barclays and Standard Chattered Banks) and the National 
Development Bank (NDB) in order to get a feel of the impact of macro-econon-tic 
policies on their credit operations. 
1.43. The Questionnaires 
The purpose of this survey was to collect empirical data on the informal sources 
of credit i. e. moneylenders and the osusu and the formal credit sources i. e. the RBs in the 
rural areas. It was intended to gauge the impact of transactions costs, outreach, 
sustainability or viability, flexibility Of operations, as well as, the influence of RFMs in 
Sierra Leone. It was also intended to obtain an impression of the reaction of rural 
residents to rural credit sources and to determine whether these credit sources are 
providing the services needed by rural residents. 
6 Respondents were Manager, Manager and Loans officer; Loans Officer, and Manager and Loans 
Officer for YRB. MMRB. MRB. and KRB respectively 
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The principal topics covered in the questionnaires are the following. 
1.431. The Institutional Questionnaire: 
General information: A brief background of the RBs i. e. name, location, number 
of years in operation, ownership and contribution to employment in the rural areas was 
o taine . 
Emplo3qpent: This section was designed to collect information on the various 
manpower categories, their shortage or surplus situation and the reasons for such. 
Training: this section was intended to assess the extent to which RBs in Sierra 
Leone develop and utilise human resources through training and retraining and to what 
extent training policies contribute to the enhancement of operations. 
Operations: information was also collected on the overall operations of RBs 
including the quantum of loans granted, the level of outreach (achievement) in savings 
mobilisation, lending, the proportion of paid-up share capital by the class of shares and 
outreach. 
1.432. The Household Questionnaire 
General Information: A brief background of the respondents (customers and non- 
customers) was elicited. This section was intended to provide information on age, date 
of birth, educational attainment, religion, position in the community and occupation(s). 
Relationship with the RBs: Information was elicited on the type of relationship 
with the RBs, the number of years as customer, number and type of loans secured, 
flexibility of loan procedure, reasons for RB customers' default, connection with other 
sources of credit, especially moneylenders and osusu clubs, and the general impression of 
respondents about the operations of RBs. 
1.433. The Moneylenders Questionnaire 
General information-. Information on occupation(s), date of birth, the level of 
education, and location was elicited. 
Operations: this section was intended to elicit information on modes of operation, 
i. e. how borrowers are selected to reduce risk, how loans are granted, modes of 
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repayment, cost of operations (transactions costs), and to gauge their relationship Arith 
rural residents and RBs. 
The design of the questionnaires was guided by several principles, the first of 
which was brevity. The aim was to minimise the response burden and yet be sufficiently 
specific to elicit information needed for the analysis. The second was the inclusion of 
some open-ended questions to provide respondents the opportunity to express their 
opinion. Attempts were made to ask fbHow-up questions when the need arose. 
1.434. Interviews and Problems 
Socio-economic research in developing countries is fraught with many 
difficulties. One problem we faced in this study was the paucity of data and the absence 
of benchmark or baseline studies. Spencer (1977), describes this problem in regard to 
his field work on employment in Sierra Leone by noting that: "the scarcity of data for 
anything but the most rudimentary analysis is still a problem for scholars and policy 
makers". A similar situation is also observed in Nigeria by Stopler (1966), who calls it 
"planning without facts. " A second problem experienced was the number of customers 
of RBs who had absconded. Some of these were captured by our RB customer samples. 
When the issue was raised with management teams of the various RBs, the reply was 
that it was one of the problems faced by the RBs in Sierra Leone. However, note was 
made of the proportion which absconded and the gap was filled by re-selection from the 
ledger cards. 
A third problem was inaccessibility of some of the enumeration areas. 
Enumerators had to walk long distances to contact respondents at their homesteads or 
farms because some of the roads were not motorable. During the interview proper, a 
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fourth problem was encountered. Due to the high level of illiteracy, which is about 70 
percent (Table 1.1), most respondents relied on memory recall instead of written 
records. Richards and Johnny (1981a) also reported a farmers' memory recall of ± 25 
percent of measured figures related to farm size in their field work in Sierra Leone. 
Apart from the RB passbooks which are issued to customers for their deposits, 
respondents had few if any written records of their own. Cross-checking with RB 
records and reference to market prices was done to put answers in proper perspective 
and to minimise, errors. 
Interviews with moneylenders were particularly difficult partly because of their 
concern that information offered might be passed on to government authorities. 
Assurances had to be given to allay such fears. Confidence building, probing and 
enumerator's familiarity with the local language and the socio-cultural settings were 
very helpful in dealing with this problem. Regardless of the above problems enough data 
were generated from the survey which could be useful to policy makers who are 
interested in creating a conducive economic environment for the successful operations 
of credit institutions in Sierra Leone. 
1.435. Data Analysis 
The raw data collected from the survey was analysed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 6.0. Several runs were made to ascertain 
that both the data and the programme files were effor-free and to check for 
consistencies in the responses. Frequency distribution and tabulation were generated on 
salient variables. 
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The secondary data, which is mostly published audited statements of accounts 
and financial statements of RBs, has been used to carry out the Outreach and the Subsidy 
Dependence Index (SDI) analysis. 
1.50. Organisation of the Study 
The thesis is organised in three parts. Part One examines the research 
methodology, the relevant literature and the recent economic policies with a brief 
discussion of the history of credit in Sierra Leone. Part Two reports the findings of the 
field studies on the RFM particularly moneylenders, RBs and the osusu in Sierra Leone. 
Part Three reviews the findings and introduces a model for improving the financial 
intermediation role of RBs in the rural areas of Sierra Leone and outlines suggestions for 
further research. 
The study begins in chapter two with a review of the literature comprising, inter 
alia, works by Patrick (1966), Gonzalez-Vegas (1984), Stiglitz (1990) and the New 
Institutional Economics. The behaviour of RFMs in relation to the provision of credit is 
emphasised with the objective of providing the necessary background to the research and 
placing the research in proper context. 
Chapter three traces the policy environment within which RBs and moneylenders 
operate and emphasises some policies which have direct links with the provision of credit 
to the rural sector. It also provides an overview of past credit programmes as a 
background to the present rural banking scheme in Sierra Leone. 
Chapter four discusses the operations of the moneylenders, addressing the issues 
of monopoly profit, transactions costs,, credit interlinkage and their impact on rural 
credit arrangements. A regression analysis is used to determine factors which influence 
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the indicative interest rates observed at the moneylender level of operations. The view is 
advanced that the informal sector should be allowed to operate without hindrance and 
be provided with better competition by formal institutions. 
The fifth chapter is devoted to the local ROSCA, commonly known as ouisu, in 
Sierra Leone. Its organisation and different modes of operation are discussed, 
highlighting its pervasiveness and acceptance in both rural and urban settings. 
Chapter six examines the operations of RBs in Sierra Leone in order to assess 
their levels of achievement in savings mobilisation and extension of credit to rural 
residents, The Outreach and Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) analysis are used to 
determine levels of achievement, identifying the factors which influence performance and 
highlighting reasons for such performance. 
Chapter seven discusses the research findings and proposes a model to enhance 
the performance of the RFM, involving both the RBs and the moneylenders. It is argued 
that supporting services such as research and extension services, improved infrastructure 
and a conducive economic environment, are necessary conditions for the successful 
operation of the rural banks in particular and the RFM in general. 
The research is concluded in chapter eight with a summary of the conclusions 
drawn from the preceding chapters and analysis and some suggestions for further 
research. 
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Chapter 11 AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN LOW INCOME 
COUNTRIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW. 
2.10. Introduction 
The provision of credit to support and develop the agricultural sector in low 
income countries (LICs) dates as far back as the 1950s. Governments of developing 
countries, largely supported by friendly foreign governments, international donor 
gencies and financial institutions, made several efforts to channel funds to rural 
residents, particularly farmers, with the objective of helping to improve their standard of 
living. The emphasis on developing the rural areas is predicated, among other reasons, 
on the fact that at least 60 per cent of the population of LICs live in rural areas, deriving 
their incomes and living from agriculture and its related pursuits. But the production has 
largely been at the subsistence level (Lewis, 1954; Schultz, 1977; World Bank, 1975). 
Cheap credit is seen as one of the instruments for helping farmers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on the supply of credit to 
the rural areas of developing countries, highlighting the views of some of the proponents 
of the cheap credit delivery system based on traditional assumptions. The chapter is 
divided into five sections. The first discusses the rationale for providing credit to rural 
residents, particularly farmers. Section two examines the major traditional assumptions 
underlying the provision of cheap credit, outlines the traditional model of credit supply 
and notes the failure of the model. The third section discusses the main issues in the 
debate on why the traditional model failed. It also discusses the pertinent issues in the 
debate such as, the interest rates charged, the rationing behaviour of lenders, the default 
problem, and the role of the informal credit sources. The impact these issues have had on 
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the overall performance of credit institutions that were created under the traditional 
model are also noted. Section four highlights the emerging consensus under the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). The final section discusses the prospects of the new 
consensus with conclusion. 
2.11 Rationale for Credit in LICs 
The debate on how to modernise the agricultural sector in LICs assumed a high 
profile after World War H. The majority view at the time was that credit should be 
provided as a means of raising the standard of living of rural peoples in LICs. Many 
notable economists put forward arguments in support of this hypothesis. Among them 
were Harsoadi (1952) who said that: "since the vast majority of farmers are small 
holders, the raising of the econon-k level could be attained by developing and organising 
credit to small holders". Lewis (1955) also noted that: "farmers need much more capital 
than they can afford to save". Leibenstein (1957) remarked that: "if capital, labour, 
entrepreneurial facilities, technical knowledge, and available credit facilities were 
increased, the income per head will rise". f1iggins (1959) said that- " . credit may be 
necessary for expansion in some areas, especially small agriculture and small industry" 
The aforementioned views tend to support the traditional views in Louis Tardy's report, 
Systems of Agricultural Cre&t and Insurance, published by the League of Nations in 
1938. These views were still espoused by many people concerned with rural 
development programmes (especially credit), design and operation through the mid 
1970s. In addition, policy makers in LICs were also influenced by the views of others 
such as Hugh Patrick (1966), who provided a theoretical basis for intervention through 
the financial system for the sake of development, by describing the advantages of 
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CC supply-leading" finance. He suggested the estabfishment of financial institutions and 
"the supply of their assets, liabilities, and related financial services in advance of demand 
for them, especially the demand of entrepreneurs in the modem, growth-inducing 
sectors", as a means of stimulating investment and economic activity. These initiatives 
were viewed as easy to implement and at minimum cost compared to, for example, a 
land reform (op cit. ). 
In the evolution of economic development, Keynesian economic doctrine also 
provided a justification for government intervention and economic planning was viewed 
as a very promising tool. The success of the Marshall Plan for countries of Western 
Europe was also regarded as clear evidence that large-scale foreign assistance for 
investment could enhance progress. In the early 1970s, the World Food Crisis and the 
mounting concern for involving the poor in economic development added to the 
attractiveness of supplying credit through government intervention with external 
assistance. In the early 1950s, the United States Farm Security Association (USFSA),, a 
predecessor of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), began 
a series of farm credit projects in many LICs, especiafly in Latin America. These credit 
programmes were expanded in the 1960s and marked the beginning of donor agencies' 
and international institutions' lending activities in fann credit in LICs. The World Bank 
provided huge funds for this purpose. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of 
the United Nations (UN) also provided funds through technical assistance, studies, 
publications, sen-ýinars and world conferences on agricultural credit in LICs. These 
comrnitments greatly expanded the supply of loanable funds at the disposal of institutions 
implementing credit projects (Adams, 1971). 
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There were, however, some dissenting views. Galbraith (1952), warned that- "a 
credit system can be an instrument of progress, stagnation or repression". But he noted 
that credit can only be an instrument of progress after some development has occurred. 
Li (1952), argued that: "governments should only start credit progranunes when farmers 
are on their way to becoming commercially oriented". Nfiller (1975), noted that- To- 
operative credit programmes might better accompany or Mow programmes of technical 
change, not precede them as has been the general case". These views were largely 
ignored. Funding of a large number of credit programmes and the establishment of many 
rural financial institutions were undertaken in many LICs such as Brazil, Ghana, India, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines and Sierra Leone. The policies used to supply 
credit to small farmers in LICs were based on a set of traditional assumptions. 
2.20. Traditional Assumptions of Credit Supply in LICs 
The principles of state intervention established during the colonial era, also 
influenced post-independence credit policies. The governments of the emerging nations 
did not question the basis of such policies. Beginning in the 1950s, development 
strategies in LICs emphasised, among other things, an increase in agricultural 
production, helping the poor and meeting the basic needs of the rural populations. Thus, 
the main traditional assumptions were centred on the conditions of the rural areas, 
particularly by the situation of the small farmers. 
2.21. High Proportion of the Population in the Agricultural Sector. 
It is estimated that at least 60 per cent of the population of LICs live in the rural 
areas and derive their living and incomes from agriculture and its related pursuits 
(Schultz, 1977; World Bank, 1989). In Sierra Leone, for exwnple, the proportion of the 
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population in the rural areas is about 62 per cent (CSO, 1991). In the developed 
countries,, this proportion has fallen to below 5 per cent (Schultz, 1977); but this small 
proportion produces adequate food supplies with surpluses that are often exported to 
LICs. In contrast, the high proportion of the population in the agricultural sector of LICs 
is still producing below domestic demand. The deficit is met by imports. In most LICs. 
agriculture contributes less than 40 per cent to GDP (op. cit. ). In Sierra Leone, for 
example, agriculture's contribution to GDP (at constant prices) ranges from 40 to 45 per 
cent (Table 3.1). The main factors underlying the low performance of the agricultural 
sector in LICs is the lack of improved technology and capital (finance) to increase 
production and productivity. Low economic growth was quickly identified as a 
consequence of a viscious circle of poverty (low output, low income, low savings, low 
investment); and the provision of credit was perceived to be one of the major means of 
breaking this viscious circle (Rostow, 1960; Wharton, 1964, p. 264). 
2.22. Cheap Credit 
To achieve this objective the main feature of such credit was its cheapness. The 
interest rates charged for loans in many credit programmes were lower than the rates for 
loans in other sectors of the economy. Another common feature is that the interest rate 
was concessionary, often below the rate of inflation in the economy (Adams, 197 1; 
Donald, 1976; Ladman and Tinnermeier, 1983). 
A few policy makers argued that cheap credit was justified because developed 
countries charged low interest rates on government loans to farmers. The USFSA was 
frequently cited as an example. During the 1930s, the interest rates on most loans made 
by this United States Agency were between 2 and 7 per cent (Ladman and Tinnenneier, 
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1983, p. 338; Adams, 1984, p. 67). Many of the technicians trained by this institution 
later became involved in the design and implementation of credit programmes in LICs. 
Thus, cheap credit became part of the package recommended for credit programmes in 
LICs. 
2.. 23. Adoption of New Technology 
The World Bank (WB), which is a major donor of funds for many credit 
programmes in LICs, also believed that agricultural credit was necessary for easing the 
financial constraint facing the smaH farmers in LICs. Consequently, help was 
recommended to enable them adopt new technology. It was also believed that farmers 
were too poor and could not afford the cost of new technology (Kindleberger, 1958; 
McNamara, (1973). In his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group, 
McNamara (op. cit. ) emphasised this view: 
"T'he miracle of the Green Revolution may have arrived; but the small farmer has not 
been able to participate in it. He simply cannot afford to pay for the irrigation, the 
pesticide, the fertiliser. For the small farmer operating with virtually no capital, access to 
credit is crucial". 
Von Pischke (1978), referred to this assumption as; "the smafl farmer credit need creed". 
It was also assumed that farmers in LICs do not save and therefore lacked the 
resources to expand production, suggesting that a demand for credit existed 
(Kindleberger, 1958; Walinsky, 1963; McNamara, 1973). Thus cheap credit was 
required to satisfy this demand and also enhance production. 
2.24. The Existence of Unsatisfied Demand for Credit. 
The creation of credit programmes was also frequently justified by the presumed 
presence of an unsatisfied demand for credit in the rural areas of LICs. Commercial 
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banks do not reach and service many farmers, presumably because farmers are assumed 
to be uncreditworthy or the information needed by banks to determine their 
creditworthiness is too costly to coflect and interpret. This led to the conclusion that 
credit programmes were needed to reach these potential customers even if costs 
exceeded interest receipts. In addition, maintaining such costly schemes was justified on 
the grounds that social benefits outweigh social costs (Wharton, 1964; Kindleberger, 
1958). This unsatisfied credit demand was also justified by assuming that informal 
sources, particularly moneylenders, were exploiting farmers by charging them high 
interest rates because there were no financial institutions to provide competition in the 
rural areas. 
2.25. Exploitation by Informal Sources of credit 
The lack of understanding of the operations of the informal credit markets at the 
time led researchers, aid agencies and governments to adopt a negative attitude towards 
the informal credit sources, especially the moneylender. Most farmers in LICs depend on 
the informal sector for their credit needs; but development technocrats believed that: 
"Informal finance is anti-developmental, exploitative, geared towards consumption and 
incapable of providing adequate volumes and range of financial services" (Von Pischke 
and Adams, 1983). Informal credit was, therefore, seen as counterproductive. Thus it 
was argued that informal sources should be replaced with formal lending institutions 
which were presumed to be more efficient and socially more desirable. In addition, it was 
held that these formal lenders should dispense cheap credit to enable farmers to free 
themselves from the 'evil' grip of the moneylender and enhance their capability to adopt 
yield-increasing technology, thereby increasing their incomes (Walinsky, 1963; FAO! p 
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1975; Kallon, 1978). Another view was that the moneylenders extracted monopoly 
profits through the high interest rates they charged for their loans. But research by Singh 
(1983) and Harris (1983) show that informal lenders do not necessarily receive 
monopoly profit. They noted that the high returns informal lenders often receive are a 
result of high transaction costs related to collection of information about customers and 
potential borrowers and the opportunity cost of time and investment funds. It has also 
been shown that the average borrowing costs from informal sources is much less than 
widely thought (Adams and Nehman, 1974). The widespread use of informal lenders 
amidst the high rate of interest charged suggests that moneylenders do perform valuable 
services for rural residents (Floro and Yotopoulos, 199 1; Aleem, 1990). 31 
2.26. Credit Policies are Easier to Adopt 
Credit was often viewed as an easier poficy option than, for example, land 
reform. It was believed that rural markets could easily be operated to conform to state 
policy and overcome the shortcomings of the rural labour market. Hugh Patrick's 
It supply-leading' hypothesis (1966) provided the impetus to this assumption. Its 
underlying rationale was that cheap credit would stimulate the demand for loans, 
providing an indication that small farmers need credit to increase rural incomes (Von 
Stockhausen, 1980). 
2.27. Adverse Impact of Other Economic Policies. 
Many policy makers believed that the agricultural sector is often penalised by 
policies such as food price controls, taxes on farm inputs, overvalued exchange rates and 
too little public investment aimed at creating a more productive agriculture (Gonzalez- 
Vegas, 1984a; Vogel, 1984). Adams (1984, p. 73), refers to this argument as 'the 
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Goliath of the justification for cheap credit. ' Cheap credit is defended on two main 
grounds. It would reverse the adverse production and equity effects of these taxes and 
was also expected to provide the income transfer to solve the equity problem. Adams 
(1984), Bouman (1977); Gonzalez-Vegas (1984b), and others, however, have refuted 
these arguments. First, all producers of a good are taxed by the levy, whereas only those 
who get cheap loans receive the subsidy. Second, because of the fungibility of financial 
instruments, loans could be diverted to other uses; a loan allows the borrower to gain 
command over any real resource or service in the market. Third, a poor investment does 
not become profitable because the loan is cheap. Fourth, even if these loans are granted 
in kind (production inputs) the problem will still not be solved. Because inputs are 
divisible, they can be sold in the open or black market,, and the proceeds used to buy 
other goods and or services that would provide more satisfaction (Adams, 1984). Thus 
the 'Goliath' of the arguments for cheap credit, as applied to multiproduct and widely 
dispersed agricultural firms is unsound on both efficiency and equity grounds. 
There have been other arguments counteracting traditional assumptions. Von 
Pischke (1984a), for example, questioned the need for providing cheap credit prior to the 
adoption of new technology. Some governments in LICs assumed that the adoption of 
new technology such as high yielding varieties of seed, fertilisers, and machinery could 
be achieved by providing cheap credit to farmers. In other words, farmers would have to 
be "bribed" with cheap credit to make them adopt an innovation. 
The evidence on the use of credit to get farmers to adopt new technology is 
inconclusive. In the Philippines, a study by a Presidential Committee (1978), concluded 
that credit could be a vehicle for the adoption of new technology. However, it 
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underscored the importance of adhering to the proper stages of the adoption process, six 
of which were identified: (1) the definition stage (i. e. identifying and defining the 
problem such as low milk production, unproductive soil or lack of adequate moisture in 
the soil), (2) the awareness stage (i. e. exposure to the innovation), (3) the interest in the 
innovation stage, which involves the how-to-do-it aspect of the innovation. (4) the 
evaluation stage, (5) the trial stage and (6) the resolution stage. Not all of these stages 
depend on the availability of credit. Farmers could go through some without having to 
borrow. The need for capital comes in the last stage of the adoption process and a farmer 
will adopt if he or she is convinced that the new innovation will bring increased output 
and higher returns to his or her labour and management, when compared to the 
technology used before the new one arrived (Schultz, 1977; Richards, 1985 and 1986). 
The Philippine study stressed that where agricultural credit is involved, it is important 
that these stages be followed because credit involves complex linkages not only between 
the lender (i. e. the formal financial institution) and the borrower (i. e. the farmer), but 
between these two and the prevailing economic environment. Schultz (1977) argued 
that, although the poor farmers are often illiterate, they are rational in the use of 
resources. There is no reason, therefore, to believe that the farmer wil-I behave 
irrationally when it comes to using credit. A study carried out in the Punjab, in India, 
revealed that the availability of credit was instrumental in the adoption of the medium- 
sized technology (Harris, 1983). In Zimbabwe, the access to credit played a major role in 
the adoption of irrigation technology in the country's fanning system (Norman, 1984)). 
In the USA, records indicate that credit and extension policies have been important tools 
in disseminating new technology among the farming population. The above studies 
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suggest, however, that credit at whatever price is not the only missing link in the 
development process. Other economic policies have to be in place. The traditional 
model, however), ignored the impact of other economic policies and information 
asymmetry on the performance of credit programmes (Stiglitz, 198 1). 
2.28. The Traditional Model of Credit Programmes in LICs. 
Between 1960 and 1970, over US$1.0 bilhon was transferred to LICs by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Inter-American Bank 
(IAB), The World Bank (WB) and other international donor agencies (IDAs). The 
programmes that were set up to dispense cheap credit include, among others, Co- 
operative Societies, Agricultural Development Banks (ADBs), Integrated Agricultural 
Development Projects (IADPs) and Rural Banks. In the main, these institutions operated 
on the basis of the assumptions discussed above (Yaron, 1992a). 
External agencies would typically fund a programme and production costs 
through a Central Bank or Development Bank for on-lending to small rural producers. 
The expectation was that with the additional physical resources obtained through loan 
funds, combined with the surplus labour (Lewis, 1954), these borrowers would be able 
to increase their output and incomes and repay their loans. The interest charged by the 
lending institution was expected to cover its loan transaction costs, defaults and capital 
erosion on account of inflation. The loan capital originally provided would become a 
revolving fund. This was the credit model that was widely used in the LICs (Wharton, 
1964; Adams, 1971). But the results of the traditional model were disappointing. 
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2.29. The Results of the Traditional Model. 
By early 1970s, many evaluations of rural credit programmes came up vAth some 
disturbing conclusions. It was revealed that a major portion of the credit had not reached 
small farmer for whom the credit was intended (USAIID, 1974; World Bank, 1974). 
"Kc Ex ept for the Republic of Korea, Columbia and the Republic of China, formal credit 
had reached less than 30 per cent of farm families. In Affica, formal credit reached less 
than 5 per cent of the rural population (Table 2.1). It also became clear that many of 
these programmes were unable to meet their operating costs from their interest incomes. 
Many others failed to recover large amounts of outstanding loans. The consequence was 
over-reliance on external funds from government, international donor agencies and 
through re-discount facilities at the central bank (Adams, 197 1). By the mid 1970s, 
outstanding credit in LICs was over US$90 million (Adams, 1971; Yaron, 1992a). In 
addition, much of the credit in the rural areas of these countries was still being provided 
by the informal credit sources (Yaron, 1992a). 
These revelations disturbed donor agencies. Some academics were already 
questioning the outcome of these credit programmes, chief among them were Penny 
(1968) and Adains (1971). Penny expressed grave reservations about government credit 
programmes on the basis of his observations of smaH farmer behaviour in Indonesia. 
Adams (1971) suggested that: "the objectives of externally funded rural credit 
programmes in Latin America were ftustrated by faulty interest rates policies""; and he 
questioned the basic assumptions on which these projects were based. A comprehensive 
review of rural credit programmes in LICs was undertaken by the USAID in the early 
1970s. More than sixty evaluation reports from over thirty-seven countries were 
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prepared. The whole collection (20 volumes), came to be known as the Spritig Review, of 
Small Farmer Credit (USAID, 1974). During 1974 and 1975, small farmer credit 
reviews and senýnars were organised by the WB, FAO and the Rockefeller Foundation 
to further examine the conclusions of these reviews. 
Table 2.1 Percentage of Farmers Receiving Crtdit from Institutional Sources in 
Selected Countries (Percentage of A Farm Families) 
Country Per cent Countr Per cent 
-- ----------- ----------- Africa SriLanka 14 
Ethiopia I China, Rep. of 95 
Ghana I Thailand 7 
Morocco 10 Turkey 23 
Sudan I Vietnam, Rep. of 21 
Tunisia 5 Latin America 
Uganda 3 Bolivia 5 
Western Nigeria I Brazil 15 
Asia Chile 15 
Bangladesh 15 Colombia 30 
India 20 Ecuador 18 
Jordan 8 Guatemala 2 
Korea, Rep. of 40 Honduras 10 
Malaysia 2 Mexico 15 
Pakistan 5 Nicaragua 20 
Philippines 28 Panama 4 
Paraguay 6 
Peru 17 
Note: Figures suffer from upward bias. Some farmers borrow from more than one source and it 
was difficult to eliminate such duplication. Secondly, some of the statistics represent potential 
borrowers, as in the case of Korea and Taiwan. In addition, some of the statistics are based not 
on national data but on those reporting institutional loans in a sample survey. If the sample was 
taken, as is often true, in an area in which an institution was active, this too could lead to over- 
estimation of coverage. 
Source: World BAd Agricultural Credit Sector Policy Paper, 1974,, p. 71. 
In addition, David and Meyer (1983) noted that due to the fungibdity, divisibility 
and substitutability of money, it is difficult to attribute specific increases in production 
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and incomes to credit alone. In some countries credit expansion coincided with output 
decreases (Graham and Bourne, 1984). In Sierra Leone, for example, agricultural credit 
has been increasing but domestic output, especially of rice (the country's staple food), 
has not matched domestic demand (Table 2.2). These research findings led to the overall 
conclusion that cheap credit has largely failed to achieve its objectives and the traditional 
assumptions which supported its supply must be seriously questioned (Penny, 1968, 
Adams, 197 1; USAID, 1974; World Bank, 1974). These conclusions sparked off a 
debate about the about limitations of credit programmes in LICs. 
Table 2.2 Credit Exi2ansion, Rice Production and 
Iml! orts in Sierra Leone 
Year Loans 
(Le M) 
Rice Production 
(000 tons) 
Rice Imports 
(000 tons) 
1983 3.9 641 11.3 
1984 5.3 556 73.5 
1985 6.2 516 107.5 
1986 14.2 498 119.2 
1987 68.7 326 98.6 
1988 213.3 415 96.7 
1989 298.9 451 79.9 
1990 362.2 314 123.7 
1991 409.7 250.5** 
92 404.1 286.7** 
Notes: - Annual total domestic demand for rice is estimated at 358,000 tons (FAO, 1992) 
* 'Rebel' war which started in 1992 has had adverse effect on production and no reliable 
estimates are available for these years. 
** Include relief supplies for refugees from Liberia 
Source. - Agricultural Statistical Survey, 1980 and Bank of Sierra Leone figures. 
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2.30. The Debate 
The debate that ensued explored reasons for the poor performance of formal 
credit programmes in LICs. At its centre were several issues. One is the difference 
between viewing finance as a process of intermediation or as a productive input. A 
related issue involved the desirability of controls and direct intervention in contrast to 
incentives and indirect regulation. One central concept in the debate was the rural 
financial market (RFM). An RFM consists of relationships between buyers and sellers of 
financial assets who are active in rural economies,, which are based on transactions 
including borrowing, lending and the transfer of ownership of financial assets. Financial 
assets consist of debt and ownership claims. Debt claims are promises to pay such as 
verbal promises, pieces of paper signed or thumb-printed as well as the more formal 
evidence of indebtedness by individuals; and deposit accounts which are debt claims on 
banks (Adams, 1971). Intermediation occurs when financial claims provided from the 
savings of individuals and firms are recycled by third parties to others who seek 
command over resources by borrowing or selling ownership claims (op. cit. ). 
Traditionally, credit has been regarded as having to do more with agriculture than with 
finance; but this perception changed through the course of the debate. 
2.31. The Main Issues 
As stated earlier, the issues emerging within the debate revolved around the 
reasons why credit programmes have been failing in LICs. Some of the major issues in 
the debate are interest rates, credit rationing, monopoly profits and transaction costs. 
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2.32 Interest Rates 
One of the most visible signs of duality in RFMs is the observed difference in 
interest rates between formal and informal credit sources. Interest rates in the former 
tend to be low and uniform whereas in the latter they are widely dispersed and relatively 
high. In this study, institutional and non-institutional are used interchangeably with 
formal and informal respectively. This difference in the variation of interest rates is seen 
as a symptom of rural financial market segmentation even within a specific market (such 
as, in a market town). Table 2.3 gives rates for two separate surveys, which broadly 
ranged from 6 to 12 per cent. Rates higher than 12 per cent are almost all in high 
inflation countries. Table 2.4 provides the rates charged by informal lenders as obtained 
in the same two surveys, A comparison of the two tables reveals that the informal rates 
are invariably much higher than the formal rates observed in the same countries. There 
has been no explanation as to why the rates should be so widely divergent (Mckinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973; Stiglitz, 1990; Aleem, 1990). The literature hardly addresses this 
issue except by implying that variations in the perceived risk of default or the size and 
duration of the loan are the main contributory factors (Bournan, 1977). This explanation 
appears to be plausible though partial, as we note in Chapter Four. 
We are interested in interest rates on two counts. Firstly, the high degree of 
variability appears, intuitively, to be a result of the imperfect flow of information. 
Borrowers are either imperfectly informed or there are implicit and explicit costs which 
prevent borrowers from moving to cheaper sources of credit. Our data and analysis (see 
Chapter Four) support the hypothesis that interest rates variation could be due to 
differences in the risk of default, size and duration of loans, - transaction costs and credit 
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Table 2.3 Nominal Interest Rates Charged by Agricultural Institutions 
(Per cent ver Vear) 
Country Wai Survey* Bank Survey" Annual Rate of 
1957 1974 Inflation" 
1967-1970 
Africa 
Ethiopia 12 4 
Ghana 6 6 
Ivory Coast 10 4 
Kenya 4.5 7 0 
Morocco 5 
Nigeria 10 6 8 
Sudan 7 0 
Tunisia 6 3 
Uganda 3.5 12 11 
Asia 
Afghanistan 5.5 9 n. a. 
Bangladesh 12 3 
India 7.5 9 10 
Indonesia 16 14 11 
Iran 7.5 6 2 
Jordan 6 7 5 
Malaysia 18 2 
Pakistan 5 7 3 
Philippines 6 12 6 
South Korea 16 11 
(South) 8 30 28 
Vietnam 
SriLanka. 7.5 12 6 
Taiwan 10 7 
Thailand 6.5 11 2 
Latin America 
Bolivia 7 15 22 
Brazil 6.5 14 30 
Columbia 12 8 
Costa Rica 6 8 4 
Ecuador 6.5 10 3 
El Salvador 6 10 2 
Honduras 6.5 9 3 
Mexico 10 10 3 
Nicaragua 10 2 
Peru 7 10 7 
Source: U. Tun Wai, 1957, p. 134. Rates for the Institutions specialising in agricultural credit. 
Source: Bank Policy on Agricultural Credit, World Bank, 1974, Annex Table 9. 
Note: Rates are averages of the reported rates charged on various types of agricultural loans by 
one or more institutions in given countries. Generally the rates in private banks are higher than 
those in public institutions by about 3 percentage points. 
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Table 2.4 Interest Rates Charp-ed by Informal Commercial Unders in Selected 
Countries (Per cent pgr Year) 
Wai 1957 Sunn* World Bank Sunn (1974)* 
Region/Country 4f usual" rates (over 50% Mid- '(Occasional" rates (10- Nornmal 
oflo-ans) 20% of loans) Rates 
---- -- --- 
points 
Africa 
Ethiopia 25-40 33 70 
Ghana 700 
Ivory Coast 150 
Nigeria 45 45 200 
Sudan 120 
Asia 
Afghanistan 33 
India 12-50,25-50 32 25 
Indonesia 50 50 200 40 
Iran 200 
Jordan 603,24-40 45 exorbitant" 20 
Malaysia 100 60 
Pakistan 30,20-25 28 30 
Philippines 60-200,25-303120 59 100-200 30 
South Korea 60 
Latin America 
Bolivia 100 
Brazil 60 
Chile 82 
Colombia 18-24 21 48 
Costa Rica 24 
El Salvador 25 
Guatemala 100 
Honduras 24-36 30 40 
Mexico 60 60 60 
*Source: U. Tun Wai, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 6 No. I (Nov. ), 1957, p. 140-42. Interest rates 
fbund in a single credit study on a country are given either as a single figure or a range; results 
of additional studies on the same country are placed on the same line separated by commas. 
Credit studies are cited in the original. 
** Source: Bank Policy on Agricultural Credit, World Bank, 1974, Annex Table 9. Each 
nominal rate is a representative figure from materials available on a given country in one or 
more studies, either in credit studies or in less fully documented reports. 
Note: - Midpoints of ranges in the "usual" rates were used. When several studies are given for a 
country, the midpoints or single figures from each study are averaged and rounded. The 
'foccasional" rates were not used. Source of midpoint adjustments: Donald, 1976, p. 89. 
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interlinkage. Moreover, barriers to exit from moneylenders for borrowers exist, and 
these further prevent them from taking advantage of cheaper sources of credit. Secondly, 
nominal interest rates in formal credit programmes are lower than in other sectors in 
almost all LICs (Adams, 1971), For example, in the 1970s, nominal interest rates in the 
agricultural sector in Costa Rica were 8-9 per cent compared to 13-15 per cent for non- 
agricultural loans while inflation was running at over 100 per cent (op. cit. ). A siýnilar 
situation existed in Sierra Leone. Between 1985 and 1992, interest rates on agricultural 
loans in the RBs were between 35 and 38 per cent while inflation was, on average, over 
83 per cent during the same period (Tables 3.3 and 6.11). 
The financial repression school argues that distortions which characterise 
financial markets in LICs are largely due to government manipulation of free-market 
prices. The low and often negative real interest rates that prevail in formal lending tend 
to disrupt the supply side of the financial system and distort the demand for loans (Shaw, 
1973 and Mckinnon, 1973). The result is a redirection of the flow of credit to larger 
borrowers and those with political clout and patronage (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984b). 
Negative real interest rates also have other serious implications for both the lenders (the 
financial institutions) and the borrowers. Negative interest rates can erode the loan 
portfolio of the lenders (Vogel, 1984; Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984b). The long run 
consequence is the collapse of the institution if external assistance is not available. For 
example, if the nominal interest rate (rate in the loan contract) is 10 per cent and 
inflation is 25 per cent, a negative real interest rate of 15 per cent is impfied. Under such 
conditions, the loan portfolio of the lender could be reduced by half of its value in little 
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over four years, at a rate of 12 per cent each year (Adwns, 1984)7 . 
The erosion of loan 
capital leads to FFI seeking resources either from the goverrunent, the central bank or 
from international donors agencies. When these sources can longer provide funds to 
replenish the loan portfolio, the credit institution closes down and borrowers turn to 
other sources, usually the informal sector, to satisfy their credit needs (Floro and 
Yotopoulos, 1991). Yotopuolos and Floro (1991) referred to this role of the informal 
sector as complementary. 
Low interest rates have often been mandated with the best of intentions, although 
sometimes also to satisfy political objectives. But such preferential rates have largely 
failed to achieve their objectives and have more frequently distorted the allocative 
function of interest rates. Ladman and Tinnermeier (1983) argue that: "when resources 
are allocated to satisfy political objectives, less than optimal results for long term 
development can be expected". In their study of Bolivia, they discovered that between 
1971 and 1978, the distribution of agricultural loans was not only skewed towards a 
particular region, Santa Cruz, because of its potential power base, but also that over 70 
per cent of the value of loans went to less than 10 per cent of the population. This small 
proportion was composed of large fanner-borrowers. They further suggest that low 
priced loans produce a 'demand illusion' combined with the disproportionate transfer of 
income. According to these researchers, if loans to agriculture are subsidised and interest 
rates lowered without lowering interest rates for non-agricultural loans, two effects will 
occur. Firstly, 'an agricultural illusion' will be observed as other borrowers take 
This figure is derived by using the formula 1(1+i)/(I+p)]-I, where i= nominal interest rate, p 
change in prices (measured by some price index) (Adams, 1984). In Sierra Leone, the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) is used. 
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advantage of the cheap funds and apply for agricultural loans, thereby increasing the 
demand (demand illusion)' for agricultural loans. The fungibility of money allows credit 
to be ostensibly acquired for agricultural purposes but diverted to either consumption or 
non-agricultural activities or to more profitable investment. Secondly, a concessionary 
income transfer wiff occur and add to the skewed transfer of resources. A concessionary 
income transfer can be caused by a loan default, which can either be temporary or 
permanent. The former is due to the late repayment of loans (loan delinquency) i. e. when 
the loan is not paid on the due date, and the latter when the loan is not paid at all. The 
permanent income transfer is equal to the value of the loan principal plus the real value 
of interest charges, less any real amounts repaid on the loan principal plus interest. Thus, 
those with access to credit under interest rates restrictions and high inflation will gain at 
the expense of others. Concessionary interest rates lead to lower interest revenues for the 
lending institution, if demand for credit is inelastic or the supply of loanable funds is 
restricted over the relevant range of the demand schedule. Coupled with the recognised 
high administrative costs of agricultural credit programmes in LICs, the financial viability 
of lending institutions is seriously threatened (Richards and Karimu, 1981; Ladman and 
Tinnermeier, 1983). This threat to long term viability causes lenders to react by 
employing measures to forestall the demise of the institution. The measures used vary 
from cutting down costs of operations, passing the extra costs to borrowers and savers 
or using non-price mechanisms i. e. rationing (quantity closure) (Stiglitz and Weiss, 198 1; 
Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984b). In any event, the low, non-equifibrium level of interest rates 
have implications for the misallocation of resources. Thus, Gonzalez-Vegas (I 984a), 
See Ladinan. I R. and R- L. Tinnerincicr (1983): pp. 337-345. 
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Adams (1984), Ladman and Tinnermeier (1983), and others have argued that a low 
interest rate policy creates an excess demand, building up arbitrage pressure and 
necessitating non-price allocation. 
2.33. Credit Rationing. 
The commonest credit rationing methods used include specifying crops or 
enterprises for direct lending, detailing loan size for specific crops or enterprises or 
regions (as in the case of Bolivia) and introducing extra collateral requirements 
(Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984a). The negative effects low interest rates and credit rationing 
have on formal financial markets became one of the strong arguments against the 
traditional view. Credit rationing is not limited to formal financial markets in rural areas 
alone. Commercial banks have also used credit rationing to dispense credit to their 
clients (Adams, 1983; de Juan, 1990). 
A loan to a borrower has three aspects, narnely, the loan size, the interest 
charged (nominal interest rate stipulated on the loan contract) and the non-price (non- 
interest) elements (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984a). The first two aspects are recognisable but 
this less is true for the non-interest elements. The latter involve the transaction costs and 
the opportunity cost to the boffower. The transaction costs include fares to and from the 
credit institution, purchase of application forms, bribes and in some cases a fee (usually 
called a commitment or administrative fee). This fee is usuaUy deducted before the loan 
is disbursed. The opportunity cost is the cost of time spent out of the farm or enterprise 
to transact the loan contract. The amount of time spent out of the farnt/enterprise could 
be as high as several weeks. In a survey carried out by the BSL (Moinuddhin, 1969), it 
' See Chapter Six. 
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was found out that farmers could spend as much as 320 hours, or about two weeks, to 
complete a loan contract. Our survey found that applications for loans in rural banks 
took, on average, between 3-4 weeks from lodging to sanctioning, compared to 2 days 
for loans from moneylenders'o. Farmers could also spend long hours trying to get 
documents completed and signed. An Oxfam. study (1987) in Maharashtra in India, 
discovered that bank loan applications had to be supported by eight or more documents, 
each requiring costly official stamping. Farmers had to travel from 2 to 55 kilometres to 
reach the bank offices. An average loan involved 10 to 12 visits over a period of between 
6 and 8 months. In addition to loss of wages during this time, borrowers had to incur 
costs such as fees, bribes and costs of refreshments/entertainment for middlemen. Given 
the risks, transaction and information costs associated with lending to different borrower 
classes, most FFIs in LICs try to optimise the adjustment of these three aspects of the 
loan (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984a). When ceilings on loan rates become binding, however, 
lenders adjust the non-interest terms of the loan contract or reduce the term structure of 
the loan. The result is that borrowers receive a less attractive combination of these three 
aspects (op. cit. ). 
Several models have been used to explain this kind of lender behaviour. Among 
them are the portfolio theory, which provides insights into uncertainty and risk, and the 
theory of the multiproduct firm, because of its usefulness in explaining transactions costs, 
product differentiation and heterogeneity. Theories about non-price credit rationing 
have, however, been associated mostly with the controversy over the availability 
doctrine. This doctrine,, whose most articulate exponent is Roosa (1952), emphasises 
10 See Chapter Four. 
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that reductions in the money supply could have significant restrictive effects on spending, 
even if such restrictions result in only a smaH increase in interest rates. This is because 
banks are usuaHy forced to reduce the amount of credit they could extend to their 
customers, even if the latter did not lower their demand for money. Hodgman (1960) 
nevertheless argues that because of the existence of default risk, any borrower will reach 
a loan size beyond which he or she will not be able to obtain additional funds by 
promising to pay a higher rate of interest. The supply of credit to a borrower becomes 
totally inelastic because each borrower's wealth and ability to repay are finite. To 
demonstrate the existence of credit rationing, however, it must be shown that an excess 
demand for credit exists at the rate charged in equilibrium (op. cit. ). Jaffee and 
Modigliani (1969), note that credit rationing is not profitable for a tender acting as a 
discriminating monopolist, i. e. one who maximises expected profits with respect to each 
borrower and is free to charge each borrower a different interest rate. It has, therefore, 
been recognised that credit rationing takes place even without interest rate restrictions 
(op. cit. ). 
In his theory of agricultural lender behaviour Gonzalez-Vegas (1984b) argues 
that the loan portfolio of formal financial institutions (FFIs) accommodates both rationed 
and non-rationed borrower classes. Because of interest rates restrictions, the non- 
rationed classes, who are mainly the large farmers, receive bigger loans whereas the 
rationed borrower classes, - the small 
farmers,, receive smaller loans". As the rate becomes 
more restricted (i. e. lower), the rationed borrower classes are squeezed out of the credit 
market (crowding out). This occurs as a result of the larger farmers taking advantage of 
11 See Gonzalez-Vegas (I 984b): pp. 78-95. 
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the low interest rate to demand bigger loans. The implications of the changes in loan size 
granted as a result of rationing are threefold. Rationed borrowers get a smaller share, 
non-rationed borrowers get a larger share of the loan portfolio; and as the interest rate 
ceiling becomes more restricted some borrowers are excluded from formal loans. 
Another implication is that the progressive concentration of the loan portfolio and the 
exclusion of marginal producers (small farmers) from access to institutional credit 
worsens income distribution. In addition, when interest rate ceilings are imposed in a 
situation of high inflation, implying negative real interest, the lenders will be unable to 
cover costs in the long-run. The institution will collapse if subsidies are not available. 
The rural financial landscape of LICs is littered with examples of FFIs which have 
operated under such conditions and have ultimately collapsed (Seibel, 1994; Bouman and 
Hospes, 1994). When losses of FFIs are too high, fiscal sources may not possess 
sufficient resources to continuafly provide the transfers needed. Some of the above 
implications have manifested themselves in rural credit programmes in Sierra Leone 
between 1972 and 1985 
12 
The traditional analysis of the impact of interest rates ceilings posits a market 
characterised by an aggregate demand for loans inversely related to the loan rate of 
interest and an aggregate supply of deposits that is directly related to the deposit rate of 
interest. Furthermore, interest rate restrictions on loans are assumed to lead to a decline 
in the interest rates paid to depositors (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984b). Consequently, most 
FFIs in LICs end up mobilising fewer deposit resources (where savings mobilisation is 
part of the functions of the FFI), and an erosion of loan portfolio (where the FFI is 
,, See Chapters Three and Six for more details. 
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merely a credit outlet). This further deepens portfoho concentration and ends up 
excluding marginal borrower classes (op. cit. ). The model's basic prediction that lenders 
adjust their loan portfolios in favour of large borrowers through quantity restrictions has 
not received clear support. Although the model has also been criticised (Cuevas, 1988) 
for its failure to include different loan procedures, information asymmetry and 
transaction costs, empirical work supports its price adjustment prediction and it is still 
useful in explaining the behaviour of agricultural lenders in relation to credit rationing 
(op. cit. ). 
2.34. Default and Delinquency Rates 
The problems of delinquency and default have also been identified as some of the 
major obstacles associated with the failure of formal credit institutions in LICs. It has 
Table 2.5. Loan Delinguencv in Selected Institutions in Africa, 1970-1973 
Country Institution Arrears Rate* 
Ethiopia WAMAMO 3 
Ghana CADU 50 
Ivory Coast BNDA 55 
Kenya GMR 33 
AFC 36 
Niger CNCA 29 
Nigeria WSACC 80 
FAID 95 
Morocco SOCAP 50 
Sudan COOP 26 
ABS 13 
Tanzania NDCA 50 
Tunisia BNT 50 
Mean 38 
Std. deviation 26 
Note: - *loans not paid at due date. 
Source: Agricultural Credit Sector Policy Paper, World Bank, 1974, p. 83. 
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often been difficult to distinguish between delinquency and default because of the 
variations in how default is calculated (Yaron, 1992a). The former denotes delay in 
repayment after the due date whereas, the latter is non-repayment. However, 
delinquency often leads to default. The traditional model presumed that formal lenders 
would be able to cover costs even with default. What is not addressed is the magnitude 
of the default that a lender can accommodate without impairing performance. USAID 
(1974), concluded that: 
"As would be expected, delinquency rates are a good indicator of project success. 
Unsuccessful projects had delinquency rates that ranged between 10 and 75 per cent, 
with most falling between 25-50 per cent. The successful projects had delinquency rates 
ranging frorn 0- 15 per cent with most falling below 5 per cent. Although comprehensive 
data are not available, it appears that successful projects had rates of 2-3 per cent". 
It has also been argued that default rate in excess of 10 per cent poses a threat to 
the credit institution (World Bank, 1974, USAID, 1974; Wahid, 1993). Wahid, however, 
cautions that formal credit institutions operating under high inflationary and restrictive 
interest rate regimes are unlikely to perform well if default rate is in excess of 2 or 3 per 
cent. Table 2.5 provides delinquency rates for selected institutions of countries in Affica, 
with a mean and standard deviation of 38 and 26 per cent respectively. Apart from 
CNCA in the Sudan and WAMAMO in Ethiopia, aH other institutions experienced very 
high delinquency rates. The World Bank (1974) reports that most of these institutions 
were kept afloat by huge subsidies from governments and donor agencies including the 
World Bank itself 
The default issue is relevant on two main counts. Firstly, it reinforces the 
understanding that the structure and functions of rural credit markets also stem from the 
high financial losses faced by formal lenders while informal lenders experience fittle, if 
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any, default (Graham and Bourne, 1984). Secondly, the lender, whether formal or 
informal, can reduce the risk of default in a number of ways including a better sorting Of 
risk categories through the use of contract terms, such as collateral,, land titles, credit 
interlinkages"; a better screening of loan applicants; and choosing the fight level of loan 
size and interest rate. The experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh suggests that 
the reasons for its low default (about 3 per cent), was the careful screening of potential 
borrowers, as well as the pooling of information about customers (Rahman and 
Mahabub-ul Islain,. 1993). Aleem (1990) also came to the same conclusion in his study of 
rural credit markets in Pakistan. Our study 14 also supports this observation. By 
comparison, RBs in Sierra Leone experienced default rates in excess of 35 per cent 
compared to about 1-6 per cent default rates reported by moneylenders 15 . This 
high 
default rate has contributed to RBs being incapable of improving financial 
intermediation. Our assessment is that a minimum level of screening and the absence of 
any attempt to pool information on defaulters are also contributory factors. The above 
observations tend to support the imperfect information hypothesis (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). 
The non-payment of loans has several undesirable consequences. The first is that 
it gradually destabilises the credit system, In addition, when defaulters are the large 
farmers,, the system becomes unjust inasmuch as these large farmers are subsidised by 
small farmers who tend to repay promptly (Vogel, 1984). It has been found that in many 
countries such as Colombia, Bolivia,, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and 
" See Chapter Four for details. 
14 See Chapter Four for details 
15 See Chapter Six 
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Ghana, the large farmers default the most (USAID, 1974; World Bank, 1975). Costs of 
overdue loans are high and default pushes up lending costs without any corresponding 
increase in loan turnover. Default also reduces the resource base for further lending, 
weakens staff morale and affects borrowers' confidence in the institution (Moinuddhin, 
1969; World Bank, 1975; Singh, 1978; Vogel, 1984). 
2.35. Activities of Informal Credit Sources in LICs. 
The presence of informal credit sources (moneylenders, Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations, relatives and friends) has also been blamed for the failure of FFIs in 
the rural areas of LICs (Bouman, 1977). In 1973, for example, two agricultural credit 
programmes in the Philippines, the Masagana-99 and the Masaganang Maisin, were 
introduced to modernise agricultural production and to achieve self-sufficiency in rice 
production by providing cheap loans to farmers. The cheap loans were expected to 
provide adequate resources for the farmers to afford the new technology (Floro and 
Yotopoulos, 1991). An evaluation by Esguerra (1981), however, revealed that the 
ma . ority of the farmers in these programmes did not have access to the credit funds of j 
the programmes due partly to the strong bias of the Masagana-99 project towards large 
farmers and to farmers' indebtedness to moneylenders. The latter get priority treatment 
when loan repayment is due, leaving inadequate or no resources to repay project debt. 
According to Yotopoulos and Floro (199 1), the number of participants in the Masagana- 
99 programme alone dropped by about 90 per cent from 531,249 in 1974 to 54,250 in 
1980. The majority of those who remained with the programme were large farmers. 
Yotopoulos and Floro added that: "correspondingly, the share of the formal sector in the 
rural credit market declined to the level of the 1960s. This meant that farmers who had 
54 
entered the government programmes and had adopted the use of modem inputs, such as 
seeds and fertilisers., were abruptly left without government credit and reinforced the 
farmers' dependence on informal lenders". Manto and Torres (1974), discovered that 
although the governiment of Bangladesh provided huge subsidies to credit programmes, 
informal sources were still a significant source of loans among programme recipients. 
2.36. Other Views 
Several other explanations have been put forward for the continued lack of 
access of formal credit to the rural poor. Lipton (1976), views the problem as a result of 
urban bias. He argues that urban interests conspire against the rural poor and deny them 
access to a significant amount of formal credit. Gonzalez-Vegas (1984a), provides an 
alternative explanation which focuses on supply aflocation problems within the financial 
institutions. He argues that widely used concessional interest rate policies, combined 
with relatively large loan transaction costs of the lender for servicing small or new 
borrowers, discourage financial institutions from lending to the rural poor. It has also 
been argued by Bouman (1977), that many rural poor do not seek credit from formal 
sources because they lack profitable investment opportunities or do not know how to use 
formal credit or are unaware of its availability. 
Furthermore, many rural poor do not take advantage of formal credit because of 
the type of coflateral demanded (Moinuddhin, 1969; KaHon, 1978). In most Affican 
countries land is the most single tangible asset owned by the farmer; but the land tenure 
is mainly communal. It is usually held in trust for the community or for families and is not 
fee simple. In Sierra Leone, for example, the rural land tenure system is mainly 
communal. The Paramount Chief holds it in trust for families or the community. It 
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cannot be transferred through sale. In cases where usufruct rights are transferred to 
another family or individual for a period, the PC is consulted to make sure that an 
outright sale does not occur. This kind of transfer takes place when the head of a family 
defaults or uses the land to acquire a loan which is a pledge or part of a loan contract or 
a 'gift to a respectable stranger' 16 (Richards, 1986; Udry 1990). Land/credit 
interlinkages 17 are very common in Affica. The land will, however, be returned to the 
pledgee or defaulter after the loan has been repaid or after the lender has exercised his 
usufructuary rights conferred upon him by the default or the pledge (Johnson, 1972, 
Udry, 1990). In parts of Asia, such interlinkages can result in a permanent transfer of 
land to the lender (Bardhan, 1989). 
Thus, while the formal financial institutions in LICs carry out credit transactions 
within the limits set by the market environment and government policies, informal 
institutions evolve by particular selection of modes of economic behaviour that are 
responses to the intrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal market enhances 
trust by making existing ties an integral part of credit contracts (Richards, 1979; Floro 
and Yotopoulos, 1991)" 
The debate has led to a general consensus that traditional assumptions were 
faulty. But it has not provided clear direction on the level of interest rate to be charged, 
the default rate that could be accommodated by a credit institution without impairing its 
intermediation role and the role of the infbrmal financial market. This inconclusiveness 
16 'Gift to a respectable stranger' who may have married a daughter of the soil; such land mav or mav 
not revert to the original owners. 
See Chapter Four for more details. 
See Chapter Four for more details of this mode of operation of the informal credit market. 
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has led to a fresh look at the policies and operations of rural financial markets, especially 
the informal sector, under the New Institutional Economics. 
2.40 The New Institutional Economics 
The New Institutional Econornics (NIE)19 appeals to both logic and facts to 
dispute the claims of the 'traditional' view. In the first place, cheap credit does not make 
an unprofitable activity profitable. A sufficiently profitable activity will have returns that 
will adequately cover costs of the resources employed. Since in the NIUE farmers are 
assumed to be efficient and make rational decisions, they also allocate borrowed funds in 
an efficient manner (Vogel, 1984; Adams, 1984; Aleem, 1990, Floro and Yotopoulos, 
1991). 
Second, credit is not a binding constraint to agricultural development. The NIE 
argues that many inputs and technologies are divisible and can be adopted in small 
quantities or utilised in other ways (Adams, 1984). Thus, credit is not like any other 
inputs, such as fertilisers, seeds, etc. It is a facilitator in the sense that the borrower who 
obtains it has a claim over resources. An important characteristic of credit is that it is 
fungible (Von Pischke, 1983). Consequently, a special credit programme may not 
achieve its desired results because the target borrowers can divert cheap credit to non- 
priority uses, to more profitable ventures and to consumption (Bourne and Graham, 
1984). 
Third, cheap credit provided by formal financial institutions is not necessarily 
cheap. The effective cost of borrowing which includes the nominal rate of interest and 
the transaction costs per Leone borrowed may be very high. The latter comprise out-of- 
19 see Chapter Six for relevance of the New Institutional Economics on the operations of rural banks. 
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pocket costs and opportunity costs of the borrower's time spent to complete the loan 
procedures. For example, farmers can incur out-of-pocket expenses on transportation, 
refreshment to follow up loan applications 20 . These costs 
increase with the distance 
travefled and the number of visits to the bank (Adams, 1983; Aleem, 1990; Floro and 
Yotopoulos, 1991). Sometimes credit is not available to farmers when it is required. 
Processing of a loan application could take several weeks before the loan is disbursed 
(Adams, 1984; Richards and Karimu, 198 1). Since some agricultural production 
activities are time-specific, it may be more risky to use the credit for agricultural 
production activities when the loan is disbursed late. Thus, a loan could be better used 
for purposes other than those for which it was intended. To farmers, accessibility and 
timeliness of credit are more important than the interest rate they have to pay (Vogel, 
1984; Richards and Karimu, 198 1). 
Fourth, rural people do save, although most of their savings are in the form of 
real assets such as jewellery, livestock, building materials, crop inventories (Adams, 
1984). This may be due to the negative return on financial instruments on which interest 
rate ceilings have been imposed, especially in periods of high inflation, making physical 
assets more attractive than financial instruments. 
Fifth, cheap credit stifles the growth of formal financial institutions. Ceilings on 
interest rates decrease their ability and capacity to increase resources through savings 
mobilisation (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984a). Our data and analysis in Chapter Six tends to 
support this view. Consequently, such institutions continually depend on subsidies from 
either foreign donors, governments or the central banks' rediscount mechanisms. 
20 See Chapter Six for more details. 
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Most importantly, interest rates in the informal sector reflect the transaction costs 
of lending as determined by the level of trust (personalistic relationships) between 
contracting parties (lenders and borrowers) and the market interlinkage. The NIE sees 
markets and the economic rent they create not as a result of government manipulation, 
but rather as a natural outcome of the existence of non-zero transaction costs. These 
costs are not normally included in the conventional production costs of neo-classical 
theory. The NIE tries to isolate these costs with a view to explaining why an apparent 
economic rent is not in fact an economic rent and, thus, it is not a profit opportunity for 
new entrants. (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991; p 13). 
2.50. Retrospect, Prospects and Conclusions. 
The assessment that rural credit markets play a passive or limited role in the 
development proceSS21 has been challenged with the increasing availability of data. The 
stimulus for this reassessment comes from the increased emphasis on rural/agricultural 
development and the realisation that past government policies to direct more funds to 
this sector and to intervene directly in rural credit markets have not been successful. This 
has led to a new orthodoxy which recognises that rural financial markets play a much 
bigger role than previously thought. Their operations are complex and contain 
imperfections that are not well understood, but which can adversely affect their 
operations and that of the rural economy. The new orthodoxy posits that financial 
markets provide a number of services such as the mobi. lisations and allocation of funds, 
transformation and distribution of risk, and the stabilisation of economic activity. It 
further recognises that these services are provided by both the informal and formal 
" See theoretical perspective in Chapter Four for more details. 
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sources. In this NIE, the moneylenders flourish not because they receive monopoly rent 
but because they perform varied and legitimate services and are better suited to the rural 
enviromment than the formal sources which were created to replace them (Seibel, 1994). 
Economists now believe that where the development of the market is suppressed by 
government controls or market imperfections, the flow of financial services will be sub- 
optimal and the pace of development will suffer. The NIOE thus shifts the emphasis away 
from increasing the flow of credit as a farm input to one of improving the overall 
performance of the market, both formal and informal. 
The NIIE further argues that past government interventions Wed because they 
were based on faulty traditional assumptions. For example, interest rates kept low by 
government policy led to credit rationing which discriminates against small borrowers, 
the group that governments aim to support. Low interest rates have also increased the 
losses of formal financial institutions already facing high default rates and operating in a 
high inflation environments, They have Wed to provide a viable alternative to the 
moneylender whose displacement they seek to achieve. 
More fundamentally, rural financial markets are widely observed to be 
fragmented. Fragmentation of money markets can prevent the optimal aflocation of funds 
to investment opportunities thereby reducing the yield on capital and the level of output. 
There is no agreed explanation as to what causes fragmentation or how it affects the 
operations of the market or why this phenomenon is absent in the goods market. 
Perceptions about the role of credit markets are still evolving. More research, both 
empirical and theoretical is required into their complexities before their contribution can 
be fully understood. Our thesis represents a small step in this direction. 
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Chapter III Economic Background and Brief History of 
Agricultural Credit in Sierra Leone. 
3.00. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the economic policies 
under which rural banks operated between 1985 and 1993, highlighting the role of the 
i! - nnancial system in shaping the credit policy in Sierra Leone. Emphasis will be placed on 
those policies that impact directly on credit supply, especially for the rural areas. The 
chapter also gives a brief history of agricultural credit and the reasons for the failure of 
past credit schemes. This background lays down, to a large extent, the factors that led to 
the establishment of rural banks in Sierra Leone. 
The chapter is organised into three sections. The first gives an overview of 
economic conditions during the 1980s, highlighting the commercial banks' aversion to 
supplying credit, especially to farmers, and reviewing some policies directly related to 
credit supply. The second discusses the contribution of agriculture to the economy and 
the third gives a brief history of the supply of credit in Sierra Leone, reiterating the 
interpretations given by various studies (Moinuddhin, 1969; Conteh, 1978 and 1979; 
Karimu and Richards, 1980; Karimu, 1981; Reddy, 1885; Johnny, 1985) for the failure 
of the various credit programmes that were established prior to the launching of the rural 
banking scheme. 
3.10. Overall Economic Performance (1980 to 1993) 
Sierra Leone has substantial economic potential given that it possesses mineral 
and other natural resources, as well as a climate and sod conditions that favour the 
cultivation of most tropical crops (Saylor, 1967, World Bank, 1989). These resources, 
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Table 3.1 Gross Domestic Product At Factor Cost (constant 1984/85 prices) 
(Le Mffion) 
Sector 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting & fishing 2069.5 2008.1 2152.4 2309.5 2225.6 2341.3 
(44.5) (44.1) (4 5. (47.7) (44.9) (44.7) 
Mining & quarrying 290.0 340.7 354.9 353.6 399.7 449.3 
7.5 (7.3) (8.1) (8.6) 
Manufacturing & 
handicrafts 165.9 159.5 147.1 141.2 127.1 133.5 
(3.6) (3.5) (3.1) (2.9) (2.6) (2.5) 
Electricity & water 
supply 12.2 13.4 9.8 8.2 8.2 8.6 
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) 
Construction 127.9 131.8 136.5 100.0 147.0 138.0 
(2.7) 2.9 2.1 (2.9) (2.6) 
Wholesale & retail, 
hotel & Restaurants. 758.3 762.6 781.8 796.0 875.6 963.2 
(16.5) (16.5) (17.7) A) 
Transport, storage 
& Communications. 545.9 439.7 399.6 360.0 414.0 434.7 
(9.7) (7.4) (8.3) 
Finance & business 
services 433.9 436.4 456.6 461.0 461.5 476.1 
(9.3) (9.6) (9.5) (9.3) 
Other services 102.8 106.0 107.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 
(2.3) (2.3) (2.1) 
Producers of govt. 
services 181.7 191.7 218.7 237.5 225.7 225.7 
(3.9) (4.2) (4.6) (4.9) (4.6) (4.3) 
Less imputed charges of 
financial intermediaries -35.0 -36.9 -38.3 -39.0 -40.0 -41.0 
(47) (48) (48) (48) (48) (48) 
GDP at factor cost 4653.1 4553.0 4726.5 4837.4 4953.8 5238.8 
100 (100) (100) 0) 
I Growth rate I - 1 -2.2 1 3.8 1 2.3 1 2.4 1 5.8 
Note: - Figures in brackets represent percentage contribution to GDP. 
Source,. - CSO, Sierra Leone, 1992. 
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together with good economic management could be a basis for self- sustainable growth 
and raising the standard of living of the rural population (op. cit. ). But Sierra Leone is 
still among the poorest countries in the world (The Economist, 1995). 
The economy is basically agricultural with over 80 per cent of the rural 
population engaged in agriculture and its related pursuits (CSO, 1880). This sector about 
40 to 45 per cent of GDP (Table 3.1) and is characterised by numerous small farmers 
cultivating, on average, less than two acres mainly in the upland (CSO, 1987). These 
small farmers still use rudimentary tools such as hoes, cutlasses, machetes etc. Less than 
10 per cent of them make use of mechanical cultivation (CSO, 1987). Production has 
therefore remained mainly at the subsistence level. Economic and financial conditions in 
Sierra Leone during the period under review (1980-1993) were relatively poor. There 
were widespread shortages of essential commodities such as petroleum products, 
medicines, spare parts and rice (the nation's staple food). The major reasons are 
economic mismanagement, corruption and the failure of government to respond 
adequately to the changing economic circumstances. In particular, there was acute fiscal 
indiscipline and fiscal profligacy (Conteh, 1985). Social and other infrastructure 
deteriorated severely (IMF, 1987), leading to poor health and a high death rate. 
According to The Economist (1995, p. 66), Sierra Leone has the highest death rate (21.6 
per thousand) in the world. 
During the first decade of independence (1961-71), however, the economy grew 
at nearly 4 per cent a year. The fiscal and foreign exchange position was healthy. The 
first oil price shock in 1973 notwithstanding, economic growth exceeded 3 per cent per 
63 
year up to 1975. GDP growth slowed to about I per cent a year during 1975-80 mainly 
because of the decline in diamond output as a result of depletion of alluvial deposits, as 
Table 3.2 Value of Domestic Exports in Sierra Leone, 1984-1992 (constant $) 
(Smillionl 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1"0 1"1 1992 
Total 
Agric. 
36.4 
(28.1) 
48.6 
(37.2) 
23.3 
(19.7) 
38.1 
(28.0) 
35.2 
(33.3) 
20.8 
(15.3) 
15.8 
(11.4) 
11.2 
(7.6) 
10.0 
(6.1) 
Coffee 6.5 25.8 10.9 15.9 13.7 7.9 7.6 2.4 2.9 
Cocoa 23.2 20.3 12.0 18.4 12.2 9.0 6.1 4.8 2.3 
P. kemels 4.6 1.2 0.3 - 0.2 - - 0.06 0.02 
Piassava 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.1 
Ginger 0,2 0.08 00.03 0.01 - ... 0.02 - - 
Fish & 
Shrimps N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 1.8 1.1 0.4 0.07 
Raw 
Tobacco - - - - 0.8 1.4 0.6 1.6 1.5 
Others 1.9 1.2 3.0 3.7 2.8 0.7 1.2 1.9 3.1 
Total 
Minerals 
93.2 
(71.9) 
82.0 
(62.8) 
95.0 
(80.3) 
98.0 
(72.0) 
70.4 
(66.7) 
115.0 
(84.7) 
121.7 
(88.6) 
137.7 
(92.4) 
153.3 
(93.9) 
Gold 8.4 5.0 3.7 3.5 0.5 2.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Diamonds 40.1 27.6 27.8 31.4 3.3 20.9 12.6 33.4 33.6 
Bauxite 19.8 22.1 22.6 21.1 22.2 25.1 25.9 24.6 42.6 
Rutile 24.9 27.3 40.9 42.0 44.4 64.6 78.8 75.2 71.9 
11menite - - - - 2.1 4.2 4.3 4.7 
Total 
Exports 129.6 130.6 118.3 136.1 105.6 135.8 137.3 148.9 163.3 
Note: - N/A =not available 
... 
is negligible 
Figures in brackets represent percentage of total exports. 
Source: - BSL Economic Reviews and Annual Reports, 1984 - 1992. 
well as the cessation of iron ore mining, GDP growth has been at a virtual stand-sti. 11 
since then, with an annual average growth rate of only 0.2 over 1980 to 1985 (IWI. 
1992). The current economic crisis began when huge expenditures were made for 
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hosting the Organisation of African Unity Annual (OAU) conference without any 
corresponding increase in revenue in 1980, which led to a serious drain on the country's 
reserves. The second oil price shock in that same year and the decline in prices of some 
of Sierra Leone's main exports, particularly cocoa reduced the country' purchasing 
power (IMF, 1987). Partly because of an overvalued exchange rate, an increasing 
proportion of diamonds and gold exports have been traded in the parallel market, 
constituting an important form of capital ffight. Official cocoa and coffee exports 
declined as smuggling increased. Consequently, total recorded exports declined by about 
one quarter between 1985 and 1989, but increased by 17 per cent in real terms in the 
fiscal year ending June, 1990 (IW, 1992). Total recorded imports also declined by 
about 25 per cent (value-wise and in real terms) between 1985 and 1988, but rebounded 
subsequently and by June, 1990 stood at 95 per cent of their 1985 level (op. cit. ). 
Table 3.3 
. 
Selected Rates in the Econom3: of Sierra Leone. 1980-1993 t%) 
Year Savings 
Rate* 
Loans & 
Advances 
Rate* 
Central Bank 
Discount rate 
Exchange 
Rate 
(LeTS$) 
Inflation 
Rate 
1980 10.5 18 10 . 
76 12. 
1981 10 20 10 . 
90 23.3 
1982 10 20 10 1.16 26.9 
1983 11 22 12 1.86 68.5 
1984 12.5 23 12 2.51 66.6 
1985 13 25 12 5.12 76.6 
1986 14 25 14 15.24 80.9 
1987 15 26 16 34.04 178.7 
1988 16 27 16 32.51 32.7 
1989 30 50 16 59.82 62.8 
1990 40 50-60 55 151.41 
1991 55 65-80 55 295.34 102.7 
1992 50 55-75 45 499.08 65.5 
1993 35 45-55 30 -- T-560.38 34.8 
Note. -* Commercial banks' rates. 
Source: - Bank of Sierra Leone Economic Reviews (various issues, 1980-1994) 
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Overall economic performance in the 1980s was therefore unsatisfactory. GDP 
declined in every year, except 1983/84 and 1986/87 (Table 3.1). Official exports declined 
overall, as trade was diverted from official channels into the parallel market. The 
disparity between the official and parallel market rate of exchange attracted most 
commodities underground especially in the face of acute shortages. Per capita income 
has also been declining reaching an estimated US$167 in 1995 (The Economist, 1995, p. 
24). Total government revenues in relation to GDP declined steadily from 8.3 per cent in 
1982/83 to 5.5 per cent in 1985/86, before gradually rising to the 1982/83 level in 
1988/89. Although expenditure on wages, goods and services as well as capital 
expenditure fell as percentage of GDP in the first half of the decade (EMY, 1987; CSO, 
1992), the ratio of subsidies and transfers to GDP declined to 1.6 per cent in 1988/89. 
Government borrowed from the banking sector mostly to finance its rising deficit, 
crowding out the private sector (IMF, 1989). By June 1990, government accounted for 
over 60 per cent of total domestic credit outstanding (RAF, 1991). This had the effect of 
fuelling inflation, which peaked to about 179 per cent in 1987 (Table 3.3). The decline in 
econon-fic activity recorded by official national accounts, continued in 1987/88 and 
1988/89 (CSO, 1989). 
In 1986, government attempted to address the problems of the declining 
economy through exchange rate adjustments, but these were limited, applied too late and 
not sustained. In June of the same year, government introduced comprehensive economic 
reforms including a market-detem-fined exchange rate regime, a liberalised import regime 
and decontrolled prices for many basic goods. This programme was the basis for an IW 
stand-by arrangement approved in November, 1986, which was supplemented by 
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Structural Adjustment Facility resources. But government failed to meet the 
programme's fiscal and monetary targets. In March, 1987, the programme was 
suspended (IW, 1987). In November, 1987, government issued restrictive regulations 
called the Public Emergency Economic Regulation (PEER) which were characterised, 
among other things, by rigid controls on currency holdings, cross border trade and prices 
of domestic products (PEER, 1987). These measures were largely bypassed by the 
majority of the business community and resulted in significant reduction in official trade 
and foreign exchange flows into the banking system. The paraflel market thrived, 
especially on account of the banking system's inability to supply adequate foreign 
exchange to meet domestic demand. 
Government also devalued the Leone from Le32[US$ in March, 1988 to Le 
60/IJS$ in 1989 (Table 3.3). But due to insufficient foreign currency in the banking 
system to satisfy demand, paraflel market rate of the US doflar rose to about Le 8 1.00, 
almost five times the official rate. Under the PEER, government also liberalised the trade 
regime. Importation of rice was privatised and the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing 
Board's (SLPM[B) monopoly in export crops (coffee, cocoa etc. ) was abolished in June, 
1990 (Budget Speech, 1990). Special import licences were also abolished. It became 
clear that these reforms were not enough to forestall further economic decline in 
economic performance. Because of extra-budgetary expenditure, the overall budget 
deficit in 1988/89 amounted to 7.8 per cent of GDP, on a commitment basis (op. cit. ). 
This was in deference to other measures instituted by government such as the elimination 
of 'ghost workers' 22 ) cancellation of supply contracts and the introduction of a bonus 
People receiving salaries even though they are not on the payroll. 
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scheme for tax coflection. The budget deficit was financed by borrowing from the 
banking system. This financing led to an increase in money supply (Table 3.4) which 
further fuelled inflation. 
ZALS the banking system had virtually no foreign exchange to sell to the private 
sector and real interest rates remained negative, there was little incentive to save in 
f, -- unancial form. Currency outside banks grew (Table 3.4) as parallel market activities 
increased further. Despite an increase in money supply by over 50 per cent, banks faced 
acute shortages of currency notes. The economy could arguably be called, at the time, a 
parallel market economy and confidence in the banking system and economy waned. The 
PEER was abolished in June, 1989. Since that time goverment has had frequent 
discussions with the IW on the components of an adjustment programmes. A new 
Structural Ad ustment Programme called a Rights Accumulation Programme began in j 
1992. Its objectives include, among other things, liberalisation of trade and interest rates, 
Table 3.4 Currencl in Circulation and Monel SuRply 
in Sierra Leone (as at 30th June). 
( Leone Miflion) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Currency notes 96 141 233 369 649 1529 1980. 2897 6069 
Coins 5 6 6 6 - - - - - 
Cuffency issued 101 147 239 375 649 1529 1980. 2897 6069 
Cuffency in Com. banks 9 13 13 22 37 29 118 60 224. 
Currency outside banks 92 134 226 353 612 1500 1862 2837 5844 
Demand deposits 77 123 134 249 572 1616 1955 3150 4013 
Money supply 169 257 360 602 1184 3116 3818 5987 9857 
Savings deposits 70 89 131 168 243 408 689 988 1447 
Time deposits 85 96 64 96 124 145 302 380 687 
Quasi money 156 185 
- 
195 264 367 553 991 1368 2134 
Total monetary assets 3251 442 1 555 1 866 1551 3669 4809 7355 11991 
Source. - CSO,. Sierra Leone, (1992). 
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removal of subsidies, abolition of the monopoly of the SLPMB. Special import licences 
were also abolished and simplified export procedures instituted. 
3.11. Overview of the Financial System 
The financial system in Sierra Leone is relatively small, underdeveloped and 
shallow in financial assets when compared, for example, to Nigeria and Ghana. The 
structure consists of the Bank of Sierra Leone (the Central Bank), Six Commercial 
B S23 ,te 
Post Office Savings Bank, National Co-operative Development Bank, 
twelve Insurance Companies (the number may have increased as at time of writing), 
numerous Pension Funds and eight rural Banks. The financial system expanded in the 
late 1970s to early 1980, mainly due to the increase in trade and other economic 
activities (CBs, 1978). Previously, there were only three commercial banks and a couple 
of insurance companies. Two of these commercial banks were 100 per cent foreign 
owned 24 until the late 1970s when shares were floated in the open market. The branch 
network of these commercial banks is mainly concentrated in the urban areas especially 
Freetown. As at March, 1994, commercial banks had 39 branches, 40 per cent of which 
were located in Freetown alone (the Survey, 1994). The banking system is dominated by 
three banks, Barclays, Standard Chartered and Sierra Leone Commercial bank, which 
share close to 80 per cent of the banking services in the country (BSL, 1992). In terms 
of branch network, the situation suggests limited access to banking services. A rough 
picture of the adequacy of banking (access to banking services) could be determined by 
calculating the ratio of population in relation to the number of bank offices. This ratio 
2' These are Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, National De- 
velopment Bank. Meridien (BIAO) Bank and the International Bank for Trade and Industry (closed 
down in late 1992). 
"' These are Barclays and Standard Chartered Banks. 
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ranges from 0.01 to 0.5 in LICs, compared to above 1.0 in developed countries 
(Cameron, 1967). In Sierra Leone, the ratio dropped from 0.16 in 1983 to 0.10 in 1994 
due to the closure of two banks namely, Bank of Credit, Commerce and Industry (BCCI) 
and its branches in 1991 , the International Bank 
for Trade and Industry (IBTI) and its 
branches and closure of branches in parts of the country by Barclays and Standard 
Chartered banks. These closures have been attributed to poor liquidity management 
arising from imprudent banking, the harsh economic environment and the ' rebel' war 
which has affected major production areas in the provinces. The ratio suggests 
inadequacy and limited access to banking services for the majority of the population in 
Sieffa Leone. 25 
The financial system has been depressed throughout the 1980s. Financial depth 
measured by the ratio of broad money (M2)26 to GDP, declined during the early 1980s, 
but increased slowly to reach 2.3 in 1990 mainly on account of economic liberalisation 
measure instituted as discussed above. Some bankers argue that this is reasonable for the 
country's stage of economic development (CBs, 1978); but the World Bank (1989) 
holds a different view, maintaining that the financial depression is the result of restrictive 
policies, especially interest rates and distortions in the economy (op. cit. ) and 
recommends a restructuring programme. 
25 The ratio =[ number of bank offices (commercial banks) x 10,000 people/population]. 
The figures fbr Sierra Leone are, 51 and 39 bank offices in 1983 and 1994 respectively (survey), with a 
population 3.26 and 3.765 million for the respective periods (CSO, 1986). Therefore, the ratio of bank 
concentration in Sierra Leone =51x 10,000/3,765,000 = 0.16 (1983) and 0.10 (1994). According to 
Cameron (1967, p. 297) if the ratio is I and above, it is adequate. If it is between 0.5 and 1.0, it is 
moderate. If it is below 0.5, it is inadequate. 
In Sierra Leone, M2 includes Quasi money and time and savings deposits. 
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3.12. Regulating the Financial System and Some Credit Policies in Sierra Leone 
Under the Banking (Amendment) Act, 1978, and the Bank of Sierra Leone 
(Amendment) Act, 1970, the central bank has authority to licence, regulate and supervise 
commercial banks including the rural banks. The Nfinistry of Finance (now Department 
of Finance) through the central bank, monitors the financial sector and establishes 
monetary and economic targets and policies. The central bank administers these policies 
using a set of instruments which are adjusted in accordance with changing economic 
circumstances. Some of these poficies which have a direct impact on credit supply 
include, 
Interest rates guidelines (which set the minimum and maximum for savings and 
lending rates), 
2. The discount rate, 
3. The reserve requirement which has usually been set in terms of liquid assets 
requirement, but occasionally also specifies cash ratios and 
4. Selective credit controls over the expansion and direction of credit. 
It is worth noting that interest rates guidelines have been abandoned under the 
Rights Accumulation Programme (a version of Structural Adjustment) sponsored by the 
International Monetary fund (IMF) which cornmenced in 1992. Interest rates are now 
determined by the market. Similarly, selective credit controls have also been abolished 
together with foreign exchange restrictions. But it should also be noted that the effects of 
the current IMF programme are being overshadowed by the on-going 'rebel' war, which 
has engulfed over three-quarters of the production areas and stifled investment in the 
economy. 
Before 1991 
, 
interest rates were determined administratively, and were largely 
negative in real terms due to inflation. This trend continued up the beginning of 199 1. 
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The argument then was that maintaining low interest rates, as in many LICs, would 
stimulate investment. But as discussed in Chapters Two and Six, the impact of this is still 
unclear because of the opposing income and the substitution effectS27. According to the 
BSL (1992), the impact of this regulation has not been clear. It would appear that the 
response of savings and investment to interest rates has been largely neutral, It has not 
produced a significantly marked effect in the amount of savings (BSL, 1992). But this 
statement should be treated with caution. The lack of a marked increase in savings in the 
banking system after liberalisation of interest rates in the economy may be due to two 
main factors. First interest rates were still below inflation until 1992 (Table 3.3) and 
savings may have been in terms of real assets. Secondly, the 'rebel' war is still on-going 
and potential savers may be converting their savings into hard currency. The continued 
buoyant activity in the parallel market, especially for hard currency suggests that the 
latter may be more significant in explaining the indifference of savings to interest rates 
(IW, 1989). The low levels of interest rates and their negative return on interest 
incomes introduced distortions in the economy. Commercial banks have, therefore, been 
rationing credit by non-price means. They have emphasised coflateral requirements such 
as land and life insurance policies which the average farmer in Sierra Leone cannot 
provide. 
The sector which has received most of the loans and advances from commercial 
banks is trade. It received 34 per cent of commercial bank loans between 1981 to 1991 
(Table 3.6). Given that most trade is in imported commodities (BSL,, 1992), some 
observers have argued that commercial banks have been financing consumption at the 
27 see chapter six for more details. 
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expense of production (Moinuddhin, 1969, Conteh, 1987). The agricultural sector 
received, on average, less than 6 per cent of loans from the commercial banks for the 
same period. The commercial banks' argument for low agricultural loans include lack of 
trained staff to handle the appraisal and monitoring of agricultural loans and projects, 
Although subsidisation of credit has been motivated by broadly recognised development 
and social objectives in many LICs, this policy has rarely proved to be the best means of 
targeting subsidies (Adam, 1971, Tommy and Roberts, 1978). The effects of this policy 
have already been discussed in Chapter Two and will be exan-tined more fully in the 
Sierra Leone context in Chapter Six. The reluctance of commercial banks to devote a 
large proportion of their loans portfolio to agriculture led the SLG to use other means in 
getting their co-operation in this regard. In December, 1988, the BSL issued sectoral 
guidelines to commercial banks for lending. This was motivated by the failure of moral 
suasion as a general policy when dealing with the commercial banks. The guidelines 
indicated that commercial banks' loans portfolio should reflect the following 
proportions. 
30 per cent of loans to agriculture 
30 per cent to trade 
20 per cent to mining and 
20 per cent to other sectors (BSL, 1988). 
As Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show, these targets have largely been ignored. The commercial 
banks devoted less than 20 per cent to agriculture, most of which was directed at 
agricultural trade (especially purchasing of export produce). The guidelines did not 
specify, as was the case in Nigeria (Ogundipe, 1990; Okorie, 1992), the proportion that 
was to be devoted to agricultural production. Consequently, commercial banks 
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circumvented this guideline by concentrating on agricultural trade. Most of the 
beneficiaries were large businesses and companies (i. e. buying agents for the SLPMB) 
who held accounts with commercial banks. The arrangement was also convenient since 
payments to these buying agents made by the SLPMB, that bought produce, were 
lodged with the commercial banks in cheques. Thus, the commercial banks deducted the 
repayment at source as soon as these cheques were deposited in the agents' accounts 
(CBs, 1978). The Central Bank has also used its reserve requirement for controlling the 
supply of credit. But commercial banks were also quick in limiting their credit to trade 
and squeezing out lending to the agricultural sector. 
A Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) for small borrowers had been launched in 
1974 an attempt to cajole commercial banks to lend to the agricultural sector. The 
, gPlarantee cover was 
70 per cent (raised to 80 per cent in 1978) for all loans to the agric- 7- 
Table 3.7 Sectoral Anaivsis of Loans under the Credit Guarantee 
Scheme in Sierra Leone, 1974-1985 (Le'000') 
Year Trade 
no. amt. 
Agric, 
no. wnt 
Transport 
no. amt. 
Industry 
no. amt. 
Services 
no. amt. 
Total 
no. amt. 
1974 130 387 8 22 2 7 10 82 2 2 152 500 
1975 89 369 22 72 12 69 8 84 5 4 136 598 
1976 54 248 10 33 4 43 7 22 - - 75 346 
1977 44 178 9 57 4 23 3 14 - - 60 272 
1978 28 127 6 44 1 10 1 1 1 1 37 183 
1979 6 21 2 3 2 37 - - I 1 11 62 
1980 4 17 1 2 - - 4 44 1 3 10 66 
1981 3 26 1 3 1 20 - - 1 1 6 50 
1982 8 55 - - - - - - - 8 55 
1983 8 64 30 207 - - - - 38 271 
1984 6 62 15 101 - - - - 21 163 
1985 5 32 5 24 - - - 
E 
- - - 10 56 
Total 385 1586 109 568 26 209 33 247 11 12 564 2622 
Source-- Development Finance Department, BSL (1986). 
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cultural sector and 662/3 per cent for loans to other sectors. The cover provided some 
kind of insurance to commercial banks, in the event of a default. In such a case, the 
Guarantee Organisation i. e. the Central Bank, reimburses the commercial bank to the 
tune of the cover for the amount of loan outstanding (CGS, 1974 and 1978). A 
fundamental mistake was that the CGS did not give a cut-off date for the commencement 
of guarantees. Thus the commercial banks made good their old and outstanding debts 
and losses through the CGS. Table 3.7 gives the number and amount of guarantees 
honoured by the scheme. The figures should be treated with caution in the light of the 
foregoing point. The increase in amount and number of loans in 1974 and 1975 is mainly 
due to the laundering of bad debts by commercial banks. After 1976, loans guaranteed 
under the scheme declined as commercial banks reverted to their reluctance in lending to 
the agricultural sector. The figures also show that the trade sector received the highest 
proportion of total loans, 61 per cent as against 22 per cent for agriculture. The 
percentage distribution is reminiscent of the commercial banks aversion to agricultural 
credit. Against the background of the foregoing discussion, it could be concluded that 
government has not succeeded in persuading commercial banks to lend to the 
agricultural sector. The CGS is still in operation, but is mainly providing guarantee cover 
to rural banks. Commercial banks aversion to aversion to agricultural credit in Sierra 
Leone is summed up in their joint paper presented at the National Workshop on 
Agricultural Credit and Banking: 
"farmers are still mostly illiterate and bound by strong concepts and customs. They are 
completely ignorant of business methods and have little notion of the meaning and 
obligations of institutional credit" (CBs, 1978: p. 64). 
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It could therefore be concluded that commercial banks in Sierra Leone are not yet 
interested in agricultural credit. It should, however, be noted that the above credit 
policies were motivated by a recognition of the importance of the agricultural sector in 
the economy and government's objective of achieving self-sufficiency in food 
production, especially rice. But this objective remains largely unfulfilled. 
3.20. Agriculture in the Sierra Leone Economy 
As stated earlier,, agriculture is the dominant sector of the Sierra Leone economy. 
About 60 per cent of the population earn their living and incomes from agriculture and 
its related pursuits (CSO, 1992). Overall, the sector contributes about 45 per cent to 
GDP (Table 3.1). Agriculture also contributed over 80 per cent to export earnings 
during the 1970s. But this proportion decreased to about under 40 per cent in 1985 and 
to less than 10 per cent in 1992 (Table 3.2), due to decreased production and the 
deteriorating macro-economic environment within which the sector has had to operate. 
Although the agricultural sector employs over 60 per cent of the population yet 
its contribution to GDP between 1980 and 1992 has been low, indicating the inefficiency 
of the sector. This sector was largely ignored in Sierra Leone's post independence 
development strategy. This neglect coupled with rural out-migration contributed to the 
low growth observed since independence as Sierra Leone like most emerging nations 
adopted import substitution policies (Byerlee et al. 1976). 
The overall growth rate of the economy was around 3.8 per cent in the decade 
after independence and less than I per cent during the 1980s; the agricultural sector 
grew at 1.6 per cent and -0.1 per cent respectively (Byerlee, et al, 1976; CSO, 1989). 
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Agriculture's contribution to the Sierra Leone economy can be summarised 
through three major categories; 
(a) source of food supply, 
(b) source of foreign exchange and 
(c) source of employment 
3.21. Source of Food Supply 
Sierra Leone was virtually self-sufficient in rice production until 1954 in the wake 
of the discovery of diamonds. Although production was at subsistence level, it largely 
satisfied domestic demand, The discovery of diamonds in the early 1950s attracted large 
numbers of young and able-bodied men and women from farms in search of quick wealth 
in the diamond mines (Byerlee et al. 1976). From 1954 onwards, importation became 
necessary to bridge the gap between production and domestic demand. From 1954 to 
1982, imports of rice increased significantly from about 4.6 thousand tons valued at Le 
0.58 million to 89 thousand tons worth Le 48 million (Johnny, 1985). Imports soared 
through the eighties reaching about 300 thousand tons in 1992, valued at over Le 500 
million (Table 1.2). The low level of production has been attributed to several factors, 
among which the most important is migration to diamond mining areas (Byerlee, et al, 
1976). Levi (1976) estimated that over 70,000 men moved to the mining areas from the 
farms between 1954 and 1960, while others went to urban areas in search of jobs. 
Another important factor is the overall population growth which has outstripped the 
growth in food production. While the rate of growth of agricultural production was, on 
average, below 2 per cent, between 1980 and 1990, population growth was estimated at 
about 2.6 per cent (CSO, 1986). Government pricing policies have also been urban- 
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biased. Prices) especially for rice have been fixed low, creating a disincentive to 
production. Some observers (Tommy and Roberts, 1978; Johnny, 1985) have noted that 
low prices were intended to appease the powerful urban groups. The above factors have 
not only caused shortages in food supplies but have also led to a reduction in foreign 
exchange inflows. 
3.22. Source of Foreign Exchange 
The major foreign exchange earners are minerals (diamonds, gold, bauxite, 
111menite) and agricultural products (coffee, cocoa, ginger, piassava and palm kernels), 
Table 3.2 gives export earnings for the period between 1984 to 1992. The Table 
indicates that export earnings from the agricultural sector have been decreasing and its 
contribution to total export revenue declined from 37 per cent in 1985 to less than 10 per 
cent in 1992. Most of this export revenue has been used to pay for the huge imports of 
not only food (mainly rice) but also other essential commodities such as petroleum 
products. The declining trend in the agricultural sector has been further exacerbated by 
the effect of the on-going 'rebel' war which has engulfed over 80 per cent of the 
production areas. 
3.23. Source of Employment 
As stated earlier, over 60 per cent of Sierra Leone's population of 3.76 million 
live in the rural areas, of whom about 80 per cent are farmers or obtaining their incomes 
and livelihood from agriculture and its related pursuits (CSO, 1986). This huge 
proportion is still producing below domestic demand. Per capita incomes in rural areas 
is below two-thirds of the 1995 national figure of US$167 (The Economist, 1995). The 
overall objective of government is to encourage farmers to increase production to market 
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level. Since poverty and lack of capital have been identified as the main bottlenecks 
towards achieving this goal, government has tried several schemes to provide cheap 
credit to the rural areas, especially to farmers. The current development strategy is, 
therefore, both growth and welfare oriented 28 . Some of the schemes which have been 
established by the goverment of Sierra Leone to achieve these objectives are the subject 
of the next section. 
3.30. Brief History of Agricultural Credit in Sierra Leone 
We are interested in the history of past credit schemes for two main reasons. 
First, the factors which influenced their creation and the demise of these programmes are 
important in analysing the factors influencing the level of achievement of the present 
model of supplying credit (i. e. the rural banks) and provides a basis of comparison of 
these schemes with rural banks. It will also facilitate an assessment of changes in policy 
and what effect these changes (if any) have had on rural banks' performance. 
The history of agricultural credit in Sierra Leone makes dismal reading. The 
organisation of agricultural credit was a major concern of the government of Sierra 
Leone (GSL) even before independence in 1961. The overriding objective has been to 
provide finance to the numerous small farmers in the form of low cost loans to help them 
procure modem inputs such as fertilisers and improved seed in order to both move them 
from subsistence to commercial production and to increase their incomes and standard of 
28 The most prominent development objectives in the agricultural sector have included the 'stimulation 
of development from subsistence to market oriented production, diversifying production. self- 
sufficiency in food production, especially rice. maximising foreign exchange earnings through the 
expansion of export crop production'. The welfare objectives of development include 'Increasing the 
incomes and living conditions of the rural population' (National Development Plan, 1978,79. p. 130- 
131). 
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living. Alongside these schemes, rural residents have also been receiving credit from 
moneylenders, rural residents and itinerant traders i. e. the informal sector. 
Thus, the sources of credit in Sierra Leone can be grouped into two categories,, 
formal or institutional and informal or non-institutional credit sources. The former 
includes Commercial banks (CBs), Co-operative Societies, the National Development 
Bank (NDB), Integrated Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs),, the National Co- 
operative Development Bank (NCDB) and Rural Banks (RBs). These are wholly or 
partly owned and often controlled by government. The latter, the informal credit sources,, 
include moneylenders, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (the osusu clubs29), 
relatives and friends. Informal sources are neither controlled nor monitored by 
government - 
It has been estimated that less than 5 per cent of farmers in Affican 
countries have access to formal credit (World Bank, 1974). Our Survey and analysis in 
the Chapter Six suggests that this is still true for farmers in Sierra Leone. 
3.31. Credit Schemes 
The position of commercial banks regarding agricultural credit and government 
attempts to induce them to participate in providing loans to the sector has already been 
discussed and demonstrate, to a large extent, one of the reasons why government has 
been involved directly in this regard. Before independence, a number of schemes were 
introduced, the first of which was implemented in 1946 through the Development of 
Industries Ordinance. Its purpose was to advance loans to farmers who then formed over 
80 per cent of the population, as well as to small scale industrialists (CSO, 1970/7 1). The 
records show that farmers at the time used simple tools - hoes and cutlasses - without 
2' The osusu is the local name for the rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA) in Sierra Leone. 
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any fertilisers, pesticides or insecticides and produced mainly for their own consumption. 
Consequently, it was decided to provided funds which would enable them to adopt 
fertilisers, improved seed and new technology. The interest rate charged was 3 per cent 
compared with 5 to 8 per cent for commercial bank loans. Repayment of loans was in 
cash and at end of harvest. The loans were short term (6-9 months). Over 60 per cent of 
beneficiaries were rice farmers. After about fifteen years in operation, an assessment of 
the scheme revealed that it had not achieved its objectives (Moinuddhin, 1969). The 
main problems identified include (1) the granting of loans without proper project 
appraisal (2) the fact that the main beneficiaries turned out to be influential people in the 
rural areas (PCs, chiefdom speakers, Councillors and Members of the Legislature) who 
did not repay, (3) high default rates and (4) non-existence of strong legislation to 
prosecute defaulters. As a result, the scheme was discontinued in 1964 with over 
Lel 13,538 or about 67 per cent of the loans still outstanding (MANR, 1965). During 
this Period, another credit scheme to help the fisheries sector was also in force. It was 
also discontinued in 1961 after Le 85,306 or 55 per cent of loans resulted in default 
(NlANR, 1965). 
3.32. The Agricultural Loans and Credit Scheme 
When it became apparent that the failure of the first scheme was imminent, the 
GSL instituted another scheme in 1961 whose objective was to help farmers to increase 
production of export crops such as coffee, cocoa, oil palm and ginger. The export 
potential of these crops as foreign exchange earners was beginning to be realised. and 
GSL was motivated to increase exports. Unlike the first scheme which was administered 
vAth overdraft facilities to farmers by commercial banks with government guarantees, the 
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Agricultural Loans and Credit Scheme was financed by budgetary allocations. It was 
intended to supplement credit from co-operative societies which had been in e)dstence 
since the 1930s. The scheme used Principal Agricultural Officers (PAOs) to channel the 
funds to farmers. Applications had to be submitted to the Agricultural Officers (AOs) of 
the area concerned, who were expected to appraise the applications and make 
recommendations to the PAO. The applications were then sent to the 'Provincial Loan 
Boards' after which they were forwarded to the Chief Agriculturist (CA) in Freetown for 
approval. Thus, applications took not less three months before approval (Moinuddhin, 
1969). An evaluation of the scheme revealed that corruption by extension officers was 
rife. Projects were inadequately appraised and extension officers were unable to monitor 
lr- 
farmers because of the high farmer/extension officer ratio. The ratio, which was about 
1300: 1 (Moinuddhin, 1969). In addition, seeds and other inputs were largely unavailable 
and farmers who received credit for farming frequently diverted such funds to other uses. 
The overall result was a depletion of the fund mainly on account of the high default and 
misappropriation. In his summary of the evaluation of this scheme, Monuddhin (1969: p. 
18) wrote: 
"The Agricultural Loans and /Credit Scheme has suffered both on account of lack of 
interest of the borrowers in the execution of projects undertaken by them and also as a 
result of inadequacies in loan management, appraisal of projects and supervision. Market 
gardening poultry and piggery projects undertaken under this scheme have suffered ftom 
lack of marketing facilities and the unavailability of feed. Machinery and equipment 
purchased by borrowers have been rendered useless and unproductive for want of spare 
parts, repairs and maintenance facilities. " 
Meanwhile, Co-operative Societies had also been functioning under the supervision of 
goverment. 
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3.33. Co-operative Societies 
The Co-operative Societies are the oldest institutions to be involved in the supply 
of credit in Sierra Leone. They were established as far back as the 1930s through 
government encouraging, mainly farmers, to become members. The government official 
with responsibility for overseeing their formation, supervision, monitoring and auditing is 
the Registrar of Co-operative Societies (RCS), whose team, made up of civil servants, 
was frequently ill-equipped to organise and monitor such institutions. In a report by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1980), it was revealed that out of 35 civil 
servants under the RCS, only about one-quarter of them had attended some form of 
training pertaining to co-operative development. 
By the 1950s, these societies were merely engaged in marketing of produce for 
their members with credit forming just 10 per cent of their operations (MANR, 1967). 
Credit was mostly in kind consisting of sacks and transport facilities to evacuate 
produce. Repayment was also in kind. The RCS also operated a loan fund, which was 
mainly intended to provide credit for labour and consumption needs. The scheme started 
in 1950 with an initial government appropriation of Le 115,000, and granted loans to co- 
operative societies at interest rates of 4 per cent. These in turn extended loans to its 
members at rates ranging from 12 to 15 per cent. The default rate in this scheme was as 
high as 64 per cent and by the early 1970s it ran out of funds and ceased operations. The 
ILO report (1980, p. 45) referred to it as the "fund that never operated in the interest of 
Co-operatives societies", commenting that by 1970, the fund had been depleted mainly 
as a consequence of corruption and misappropriation. The Co-operative movement 
meanwhde suffered a loss of membership amidst complaints of misappropriation of Co- 
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operative funds and loss of confidence in the movement. As at December, 1970, number 
of Co-operative societies declined to 879 from 13,000. Membership dropped to less 
than half of the original figure of over 36,500 (ELO, 1980). Attempts were made to 
revive the co-operative movement by the creation of a National Co-operative 
Development Bank in 1971. 
3.34. National Co-operative Development Bank 
The National Co-operative Development Bank (NCDB) was instituted to act as 
an apex financial institution for all Co-operative societies, to revitalise the co-operative 
movement, provide banking facilities (savings mobilisation) for its members and grant 
credit. Ownership of the NCDB belonged to Co-operative societies, although initial 
funds came from Government of Sierra Leone and a loan from the British government, 
which together amounted to Le 470,000. Operations of the NCDB have been relatively 
small. It became credit active in 1975 and up to 1980 only about 70 loans worth about 
Le 114,000 had been extended. The majority were short-term, mainly for marketing 
activities and were granted at a rate of 12.5 per cent. Although loan recovery was 
reported to be as high as 85 per cent, yet mismanagement and misappropriation of funds 
caused serious operational problems (ELO, 1980). 
Less than 45 per cent of the 879 co-operatives still operating at the time of its 
establishment were members. The activities of the NCDB have also been constrained by 
lack of resources and management problems. The employees have mostly been civil 
servants (about 90 per cent of them) with dual loyalty to the Managing Director and the 
RCS. The RCS seats on the Board of Directors (though not its Chairperson) and 
according to civil service edict, has to sanction decisions emanating from the NCDBs 
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Board of Directors. This suggests that any decisions he may not be in favour of runs the 
risk of not being implemented. 
Since 1993, the bank has been under new management and signs suggest that 
decisions are now being taken on the basis of commercial considerations as opposed to 
civil service edict. The new management is gradually introducing the Grameen Bank 
model, focusing on women and the poor. However, it remains to be seen what impact 
the new direction will have on the number of Co-operatives,, the membership, savings 
mobilisation and credit activities. 
3.35. The National Development Bank 
The National Development Bank was incorporated in 1968 as a limited liability 
company with a share capital of Le 4.5 million, held mainly by the Government of Sierra 
Leone, the Affican Development Bank (ADB), the SLPNIB, and other institutions 
interested in financing the agricultural sector. Its objectives include financing mainly 
development projects in the industrial, agriculture and commercial sectors. The bank also 
identifies and promotes projects and provides technical assistance and supervision for 
projects it finances. 
Between 1968 and 1977 the NDB approved 94 projects valued at Le 6.5 million. 
Repayment on these loans was on average 68 per cent (NDB, 1977). The 1977 report 
stated that staffing problems relating to both quality and quantity had made it difficult to 
monitor agricultural loans. It was also noted that the NDB had no branches and that no 
savings mobilisation was undertaken. In short, the NDB was only dispensing credit. The 
main conclusion was that the bank had failed over its first decade of operation and that 
savings mobilisation should be introduced to enable it mobilise resources and move 
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towards self-sufficiency. The NDB's resources became depleted as subsidies 
(concessionary loans) from the Bank of Sierra Leone and other international donor 
agencies were suspended pending a review of its operations. It, however, continued to 
operate, concentrating on recalling outstanding loans from borrowers. 
In 1984-85 a comprehensive review was undertaken and more funds from the 
Aftican Development Bank were received. It also opened a savings mobilisation wing in 
1987 and established a branch in Kenema in the Eastern Province the following year. 
Demand and time deposits increased from Le 425.9 million in 1987 to Le 1.08 billion in 
1991 (NDB, 1991). Loans and advances also increased from Le 0.44 million in 1986 to 
Le 34.6 million in 1992 (Table 3.8). A sectoral breakdown is not available but recovery 
analysis indicates that default rates have been high, rising from II per cent in 1986 to 
about 60 per cent in 1992. The reasons for default reported in the Annual Report (1991) 
states that logistics and staff problems are still hampering operations. The report added 
that "project visitation and recovery exercises were abandoned in the 'rebel' war affected 
Table 3.8 Anallsis of NDB's Development Loans Repayment 
Performance, 1986-1992 (Le M) 
Year Amount 
disbursed 
Repayment 
due* 
Repayment 
made 
Arrears Recovery 
rate (%) 
1986 0.44 15.36 1.76 13.59 11 
1987 6.19 15.01 2.86 12.16 19 
1988 14.07 18.88 11.87 6.91 62 
1989 29.62 26.54 16.13 10.41 61 
1990 54.85 42.63 33.74 8.89 79 
1991 26.25 67.60 40.71 26.89 60 
1992 34.61 67.23 40.04 27.58 59 
Note: - *includes old debts. 
, Source: - NDB (1992). 
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areas and debtors in these areas soon became displaced persons and citizens of straw" 
(op. cit., p. 
In 1992 a Women's Enterprise Development Unit was opened and allocated 10 
per cent of a credit fund of US$1.12 million received from the African Development 
Bank (NDB, 1992). It was expected that most of this would be injected into Women's 
associations for both on-farm and off-farm projects. 
GeneraHy, however, the NDB, like other formal credit institutions in the past, has 
not been able to meet its objectives. Default is still high and management and logistical 
problem still forestall achievement. 
The failure of similar specialised, institutions and programmes world-wide such as 
the NDB and others discussed above, led the World Bank to continue the search for a 
solutions to the development problem of LICs. An integrated approach was identified as 
appropriate because it was designed to tackle simultaneously, agricultural production, 
health, education and infrastructural development. 
3.36. The Integrated Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs) 
The World Bank proposed to tackle LICs' development problems from several 
angles - production, infrastructure, health, training and credit (Lele, 1975). In Sierra 
Leone, LADPs started in 1972 with the estabfishment of the Eastern Area LADP 
(EAIADP). As the name implies it is situated in the Eastern region of the country. By 
1982, seven IADPs had been established, covering about 80 percent of the country (Map 
3). Each LADP is location and crop(s) specific. The main objectives of IADPs included, 
1. The provision of credit to smaH farmers for labour, improved seed, fertilisers and 
pesticides, 
2. The training of project farmers (i. e. those participating in the project) in the use 
of modem methods of production, 
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Summary of Major Agricultural Development Projects 
Project External Year Area Components 
funding agency launched covepd Crops Others 
km 
Eastern TDA 1972 17,350 
Area IAD 
Northern IDA 1976 3,445 
Area 1ADP 
Koinaduqu EDF 1978 5,600 
IADP 
North- EOF 1980 6,700 
Western 1ADP 
Moyamba IRDP ADB 1980 3,070 
Magbosi IADP IFAD 1980 3,110 
Bo-Pujehun RDP GTZ 1981 8,142 
Gambia-Mattru AOB 1974 3,038 
oil palm project 
Swamp rice, upland rice, oil palm Feeder roads. 
(estate and outgrowers), coffee, 
cocoa, rubber (estate and out- 
growers). 
Cho 
rt 
(D 
CL 
r+ 
op 
0 
_0 
3 
M 
:3 
0 
L- 
rD 
0 
(D 
DIP 
Ln 
Swamp rice, upland rice, Feeder roads, water 
groundnuts. wells, livestock. 
Swamp rice, onions, tomatoes, Livestock, roads, 
groundnuts, upland rice. wells, market centres. 
Mangrove swamp rice, cassava, Marketing. 
cashew and pentadesma research. 
Swamp rice, upland rice, ginger, Water wells. 
maize, benniseed, groundnuts, 
oil palm, coconut. 
Swamp rice, upland rice, maize, Market centres, rice 
pigeon peas, cassava. village water supply. 
Swamp rice, upland rice, cassava, Primary health care, 
coffee, cocoa, kolanuts, oil palm. water wells, roads, 
fisheries, education. 
Oil palm (estate and outgrowers). 
ýz 
Co M 
(-ýJ 
Source: PEMSLI (1983), Agricultural Statistical Bulletin, No. 1, p. 21 
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3. The provision of extension services, 
4. The construction of feeder roads to link production areas and 
5. The development of market centres (Binns,, 1977, p. 5). 
Projects typically had specific number of funding years, with the expectation that 
they would continue on their own when funding ended. The World Bank, FAO, The 
African Development Bank (ADB), International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(EFAD) and a German technical assistance agency (GTZ) were the major external 
funding institutions. 
The IADPs provided two main types of loans, seasonal and development. The 
former were provided for improved high yielding seeds, mainly rice, maize, groundnuts 
coffee, cocoa, oil palm seedlings and fertilisers. Seasonal loans were disbursed in kind at 
interest rates of 20 per cent, although some loans had been granted at a rate of 10 per 
cent during the first phases of these projects (Richards and Karimu, 1981). Development 
loans were granted for both rice (mainly swamp rice development) and perennial (tree) 
crop development such as coffee, cocoa and oil palm. Loans covered labour costs and 
improved planting material. The rate of interest was 8 per cent during earlier phases but 
increased to 15 per cent in 1978 (op. cit. ). 
All IADPs were plagued by high operational costs and default rates (Karimu and 
Richards, 1981; Karimu, 1981; World Bank, 1981; Reddy, 1985). A World Bank study 
(1981) revealed that about 35 and 40 per cent of loan portfolio was expended on 
operating cost including salaries, rent and vehicle running costs. Another study by Reddy 
(1985) revealed a similar figure for operating costs and further reported an overall 
default rate of over 45 per cent. 
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The reasons for the poor performance of these projects included, 
corrupt practice by credit officials. 
lengthy lending procedures, making loans ineffective when they are disbursed. 
inadequate training for and staff to monitor loan use. 
poor appraisal of projects and uncreditworthiness of borrowers and 
over ambitious expectations (Karimu and Richards, 1980, Karimu, 198 1; Reddy, 
1985; Johnny, 1985). 
By 1985 most of these project reached the end of their external funding phases, 
but the basis for continuity was non-existent. With the exception of EAIADP which 
continued as a Farmers Finance company (FFC) and the Bo-Pujehun rural development 
project which is still operating, other projects have either closed down or are in their 
final stages of funding. But because of the infrastructure (mainly houses, and the project 
headquarters) created by these projects, they have been incorporated into the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries' operations (MAFF). Negotiations with other 
international funding bodies are underway for some of these projects' funding phases to 
be extended and new ones established. 
The above brief history of agricultural credit in Sierra Leone suggests that 
government intervention in providing capital (funds) at low interest rates to farmers has 
largely been unsuccessful. The most recent initiative, the rural banking scheme, is 
expected to fill the gap left by these projects and to complement those that are being 
planned. 
3.37. Conclusion 
The above analysis indicates that the economy has been characterised. by high 
inflation, financial repression, economic mismanagement and corruption. The overview 
finiher suggests that although Goverment of Sierra Leone has focused on credit supply, 
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the initiatives have been frustrated by high default rates, mismanagement and mis- 
appropriation of credit funds. The analysis also shows that commercial banks are not yet 
interested in agricultural credit. Government of Sierra Leone is still searching for a 
suitable model to provide credit to the agricultural sector because of the important role 
this sector will continue to play in the economy. 
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PART If THE CASE STUDY 
Chapter IV Analysis of the Operations of the Informal Financial 
Market in Sierra Leone 
4.0 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter three, the rural financial market (RFM) is divided into 
two sectors, namely the formal financial market (FFM) and the informal financial market 
(IFM). The objective of this chapter and the next is to examine the operations of the EFM 
with a view to putting them in proper context within the RFM. The FFM is made up of 
commercial banks, development banks, credit unions, insurance companies, rural banks 
and other formal financial institutions largely regulated by a monetary authority, which in 
Sierra Leone, as in most LICs, is the central bank. The EFM comprises moneylenders, 
osusu clubs" (ROSCAs), relatives, friends and neighbours and is largely unregulated 
(Nisbet, 1967; Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991; Moinuddhin, 1969; Johnny, 1985; Reddy, 
1985). This chapter focuses on moneylenders and the kinds of services they provide in 
rural areas, contrasting their mode of operation with that of RBs as a basis for 
suggesting policy initiatives to improve the operation of the RM particularly the RBs in 
Sierra Leone. 
The chapter is organised into four sections. The first reviews the literature on 
D117MS 
I%X with particular reference to the informal financial sector. The second section is an 
extension of the first, discussing the common characteristics of RFMs and highlighting, 
30 The osusu is the local version of the rotating savings and credit association in Sierra Leone. In this 
study both terms will be used interchangeably. 
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as it progresses, those that are peculiar to the RFM in Sierra Leone. It also discusses the 
significance of credit interlinkage in the EFM and briefly reviews the arguments regarding 
the level of interest rates charged. The third uses a simple linear regression model to 
analyse the transaction costs faced by the moneylenders in Sierra Leone and attempts to 
explain the rationale for the level of interest rates they charge. Section four interprets the 
results of the regression analysis, which will form part of the basis of comparison 
developed between operations of moneylenders and RBs. 
The data used in this chapter are based on a sample of 20 moneylenders (five 
from each of the service areas of the four RBs surveyed). The sample was identified 
through information from RBs management teams and household questionnaire 
respondents. It should be noted that it was impossible to obtain a statistically random 
sample of moneylenders given their anonymity, reluctance to talk to 'strangers' about 
their money lending operations, the absence of a baseline survey on them, the size of the 
area covered, time and financial limitations. The above qualifications notwithstanding, 
the data is reliable enough to explain their mode of operation in the rural areas of Sierra 
Leone. 
The few studies of the RFM undertaken in Sierra Leone (BSL, 1965; 
Nfionuddhin 1969; Richards and Karimu, 1981; Johnny, 1985) have mainly focused on 
its demand side. Those of Richards and Karimu (1981) and Johnny (1985), for example, 
incorporated some critical and quantitative analysis on the factors affecting the demand 
side of the rural credit market and reasons for default. We have not located any study in 
the literature relating to the supply side of the IFM in Sierra Leone. This chapter 
concentrates on the supply side to complement other studies mentioned above with a 
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view to providing an overall picture of the behaviour of the IFM, especially 
moneylenders, in Sierra Leone, because such an understanding should help to improve 
policy on credit supply in rural areas. 
4.10 Literature Review. 
There has been a growing body of literature on RFMs in LICs. But the role that 
the RFM plays in the development process of LICs is a relatively neglected area. The 
reasons for this may be two-fold. Firstly, it may be due to the inaccurate perceptions of 
this sector (Rahman, 1992) and secondly it may be the outcome of neo-classical 
development models which have been used to explain the development process; but are 
inappropriate for analysing RFMs in LICs. 
These models by eminent scholars such as Lewis (1955) Rostow, (1960), Ranis 
and Fei (1961) had as a common feature, in their implicit assumption that the RFMs play 
a passive role in the development process of LICs. The development models of Ranis 
and Fei (1961) and Lewis (1955) focused mainly on labour transfer from the rural to the 
urban industrial sector as development progresses. The main reason for this benign 
neglect is that money was not considered part of the analysis. To the extent that credit 
markets were considered to have a supportive role to play, the focus was on the 
development of formal credit programmes which would influence growth in the modem 
sector located in the urban areas (Lewis, op. cit. ). Rural credit was alleged to be in the 
hands of 'evil' moneylenders, who charged 'usurious' interest rates and kept the rural 
borrower, mainly the farmer, in perpetual debt and poverty (Bottomley, 1963a). An 
extension of these models led to others which emphasised, economic dualism and to the 
argument that there are two sectors in LICs -a traditional, backward and poor 
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agricultural sector located in the rural areas, and a modem, relatively advanced and rich 
modem sector, located in the urban areas. In Lewis' classical theory, savings translated 
into productive investment were thought to be the force behind growth and, as Lewis 
saw it, only the rich can save: "The central fact of economic development", Lewis wrote, 
"is that the distribution of incomes is altered in favour of the saving class" (Lewis, 1954, 
157) 
The 'dependent' and 'marginality' versions of economic development (Hayan-ii 
and Ruttan, 1985), however, do not accord with Lewis' view. They perceive the modem 
sector as a set of priviledged institutions which tended to distort and inhibit growth 
rather than expand and transform it. But they are also in agreement with the neo-classical 
models in identifying the potential for economic dynamism which, in their view, fies in 
the modem, relatively capital intensive sector. In other words, the rural sector is 
regarded merely as a passive entity in the development process. This assumption of the 
passivity of RFMs in the development process in LICs has, however, come under 
scrutiny over the last two to three decades. 
The stimulus for challenging these views came from the increasing realisation of 
the growing importance of the rural areas, particularly the agricultural sector, in the 
development process of LICs (Pearse, 1980). As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
importance of the rural areas, particularly the agricultural sector in LICs, cannot be 
underestimated. Agriculture forms the backbone of most economies of LICs, supporting 
60 - 70 per cent of the labour force and contributing no less than 30 per cent to GDP 
(World Bank, 1975). Its contribution to export earnings is also substantial. In Sierra 
Leone, for example, the agricultural sector accounted, on average, for 11.5 per cent of 
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export earnings between 1981-1992 period (Table 3.1). The agricultural sector provides 
jobs and incomes for over 60 per cent of the population of which over 80 per cent are 
farmers. The farmers in this sector, however, tend to cultivate small holdings, on 
average, below 2.5 acres (CSO, 1980). The small acreage coupled with the use of 
traditional tools and methods of production and the use of low yielding varieties of seed, 
keeps farmers at the subsistence level of production (Spencer, 1977). 
To help farmers move from subsistence to market-oriented production,, 
governments in LICs, including Sierra Leone, embraced the 'supply-leading' approach 
and instituted agricultural development programmes ahead of established demand for this 
service (Patrick, 1966). A majority of these programmes failed (Adams, Von Pischke,. 
and Donald, 1983; Gonzalez-Vegas, 1983, Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). It is estimated 
that less than 5 per cent and less than 15 per cent of the target population in Aftica and 
Latin America respectively, received this cheap credit because of reasons discussed in 
Chapters Two and Six (Adams, 1971, World Bank, 1975). Govemments of LICs were 
supported in this approach by donor agencies such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD), the 
World Bank (WB) and friendly foreign governments. This external support led to an 
expansion of farm credit programmes in LICs. According to Adams (1971), a total of 
over $1 billion was provided to set up these programmes by the VVB, USAID and IDB in 
Latin America between 1960 and 1973. 
The assumptions on which this massive injection of capital was based include the 
shortage of credit as a bottleneck in efforts to transform low tabour and land 
productivity. Concessionary credit was regarded as justified on the basis of traditional 
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assumptions already discussed in chapter two. In addition, it was assumed that little or 
no savings capacity existed and marginal propensity to save (NWS) was low in the rural 
areas. Consequently, it was believed that finance for development had to come from 
outside the agricultural sector. It should be noted that this is an extension of the neo- 
classical argument which was boosted by Hugh Patrick (1966) who described the 
advantages of 'supply-leading" finance, 
Shortly after it was reafised. that these interventions had not produced the desired 
results, a debate ensued 31 , The consensus that emerged after the debate was that past 
government interventions in providing credit to the rural areas of developing countries 
had been based on faulty policies. The consensus also observed that even though formal 
credit programmes were failing, the IFM continued to provide credit using a different 
mode of operation. The failure of FFM was also blamed, among other factors, on the 
presence and activities of the IFM, particularly the moneylender. Given that the informal 
sector charges high and variable rates of interest to its clients, whereas the formal sector 
charges low but uniform rates, several questions immediately come to mind. Why is the 
informal sector charging high and differential interest rates? The answer to this question 
may depend on the transaction costs facing the informal sector, particularly the 
moneylender. A second question relates to whether it is possible to arbitrage between the 
low interest rates in the formal credit sector and the informal credit sector charging high 
interest rates. Tentatively, the answer is likely to be in the affirmative because of the 
fungibility of money and because some of the moneylenders are also customers of FFM 
(Adams, 1983). To be able to answer these questions, and to understand the functioning 
31 sce Chapter Two fot details of the debate. 
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of the RJFM and in particular the IFM, however, it will be helpful to identify some of the 
key characteristics of the RFMs. 
4.20. Some Common Characteristics of Rural Financial Markets in LICs 
Rural Financial Markets in LICs are quite complex, as in evident from the 
discussion below. Specific features observed in the Sierra Leone context will be noted as 
the discussion proceeds. 
4.21. Segmentation. 
D- 
Researchers have given various reasons as to why RFMs are segmented into 
FFM and EFM. According to Seibel and Marx (1987), each segment of the RFM has its 
own mode of operation, interest rates and clients, The situation in Sierra Leone is, 
however, slightly different from what Seibel and Marx described. Our survey revealed 
that some operators in the IFM have links with the FFM. For example, about 30 per cent 
of our sample of moneylenders had deposit accounts with the rural banks. In the sample 
of customers of rural banks, it was discovered that a high proportion, over 60 per cent of 
them, were customers of both rural banks and of moneylenders. Thus, in the case of 
Sierra Leone, the two segments of the RFM may have different modes of operation and 
different interest rates, but they also share some common clients, raising the possibility of 
arbitrage between low interest rates in the FFM and the relatively high interest rates in 
the IFM as well as in the flow of funds between them. For example, a moneylender who 
is a customer of a rural bank as in Sierra Leone, could obtain a loan ostensibly for 
farming, yet uses such funds to on-lend to his clients. 
Shaw (1973), described the economies of LICs as highly fragmented by noting 
that: "finns and households are isolated in the sense that they face different effective 
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prices for land, labour, capital and commodities and do not have access to the same 
technologies". Hence the economy consist of several markets. He also mentioned that 
government policies have unwittingly given rise to market fragmentation. However, 
Besley (1993), argues that RFMs in LICs tend to be segmented because a lender's loan 
portfolio is sometimes concentrated on a group of individuals facing common shocks to 
their incomes in one particular area such as farmers producing one particular crop or an 
area suffering from drought or other natural hazards or even fluctuation in prices of a 
particular commodity. Segmentation as defined by these researchers tends to suggest that 
there is no flow of funds between the two compartments of the RFM. 
On the contrary, however, segmentation does not prevent funds from flowing 
across groups or individuals or regions. For example, rural banks in Sierra Leone are unit 
banks" and they are expected to operate within a twenty-five mile radius. It is also 
stipulated that funds mobdised in these areas are to be invested within these areas (BSL, 
1984). The success of this policy is questionable, as shown in Chapter Six. Substantial 
funds have been moved from rural banks to the urban areas through the bank clearing 
mechanism for cheques drawn on RBs by rural residents who have dealings with urban 
business entities and through malpractices such as cross-firing of chequeS33 . These two 
aspects, among others, have tended to create an outflow of funds from the rural to the 
urban areas. Besley (1994), also argues that unit banking further exacerbates 
segmentation because of the policy of reinvesting a proportion of mobilised funds in the 
areas from which they have been mobilised. 
32 See Chapter Six for more details. 
" See Chapter Six for details of this cross-firing of cheques incident. 
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The old view that market segmentation was restricted to isolated monopoly 
markets (Bottomley, 1975), has given way to the idea that segmentation means different 
term structures of loans and different characteristics and types of loan that meet 
particular needs not substitutable by other types of loans (Lamberte and Lim, 1988). The 
heterogeneity of borrowers and their needs tends to characterise lending as a personal 
activity. Thus in RFMs, personalised transactions tend to predominate mainly as a result 
of the lack of bankable collateral,, which tends to make lenders observationafly equivalent 
(op. cit. ). 
4.22. Personalised Transactions 
In the absence of assets to be used as collateral (see Section 4.23 below), 
personalistic relationships tend to predominate, Historically developed ties are usually 
the basis of personal relationships. Moreover, the extended family and kinship set-up 
help to forge strong personal trust which allows for a high degree of social interaction 
and co-operation (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1982 p. 12-16). These social bonds and the 
reciprocal nature of relationships "establish the requisite trust" on which informal credit 
is founded (Nisbet, 1967; Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Loans are sometimes given as 
character loans extended at zero or near zero interest rates., though normally only in 
emergencies, for example, providing catastrophic insurance within the extended family 
context. They are cash-flow-solving loans intended temporarily to alleviate household 
consumption bottlenecks (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). In our survey, character loans 
formed less than 10 per cent of moneylender's loans. Most of these were given at zero or 
near zero interest rates mainly because of the expected reciprocity when the lender in 
time-period one becomes the borrower in time-period two. 
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Other relationships within the rural context help to cement trust and personal ties 
such as the one formed between the trader-lender and the farmer-borrower in the 
markets for farm inputs and output as well as consumerables. Repeated dealings in these 
markets between such parties build personal ties and feelings of reciprocity which 
encourage the extension of credit after a period of time. Von Weizsacker (1980) argues 
that buyers extrapolate market relations on the basis of past experience. They prefer to 
return to the same seller as long as the opportunity cost of searching for a new seller is 
higher than the cost they would incur in dealing with the former seller. Buyers and sellers 
often engage in deferred payment schemes which tend to minimise price competition, 
facilitate the continuity of repeated sales transactions, provide quick turnover and 
solidify the seller's position in the market (Szanton, 1972, Silverio, 1982). Thus personal 
ties tend to be beneficial to both trader-lenders and farmer-borrowers. 
But there are some disadvantages associated with personalised transactions. The 
flow of information within the RFM and between its two compartments, the FFM and 
FFM, is highly restricted. Table 4.1 provides an indication of the flow of information 
within the fFM in Sierra Leone. Only 35 per cent of moneylenders are willing to share 
infonnation about borrowers with other lenders. Information about others' indebtedness 
and about the terms offered by other lenders is restricted. This bears a significant 
influence on how the market operates. For example, it may be one of the reasons why 
the IFM is able to charge differential interest rates and operate on a personalised basis. 
But banks which lend to farmers and rural residents often find information on borrowers) 
willingness and capacity to repay loans very costly and difficult to obtain. It is, therefore, 
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not uncommon to associate losses due to default with information asymmetry (Stiglitz 
and Weiss,. 198 1). 
Another important result of personal ties and transactions is quantity rationing 
through which lenders establish their own criteria to detertnine credit-worthiness instead 
of using price to clear the market. Furthermore, moneylenders do not lend to all 
applicants who may happen to be observationally equivalent from the point of view of 
Table 4.1 Flow of Information within the Informal Credit Market 
[number and M11 
Moneylenders Moneylenders Moneylenders Respondents Respondents 
aware of willing to share who make who knew who knew 
interest rates information enquiries and about others' terms offered 
charged by about visit indebtedness* by other 
other lenders* borrowers with farni/enterprise lenders* 
other lenders* of clients* 
16(80%) 7(35%) 18(90%) 20(10%) 45(22.5%) 
Note: - * Sample of moneylenders. 
** respondents to the household questionnaire. 
Source: The Survey, 1994. 
the FFM,, suggesting that some form of credit rationing exists and determines who gets 
loans (Floro, and Yotopoulos, 1991). Lending in the IFM even on personabsed terms, is 
also fraught with risk and uncertainty even with the existence of credit rationing. 
4.23. High Risk and Uncertainty 
RFMs are characterised by many risks and uncertainties and these can be high. 
Borrowers' demand for loans and capacity to repay are greatly influenced by their 
incomes. On the supply side, the purveyors of credit also rely to a great extent on the 
borrowers' incomes for repayment. But incomes in the rural areas, especially in farming, 
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are typically uncertain (Harris, 1983, Bottomley, 1975; Adams, 1983; Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). 
The risks in the agricultural sector are many. Bad weather can have an adverse 
impact on output and hence incomes and repayment capacity. Changes in commodity 
prices also constitute another important risk. Considered together, these risks can affect 
the operations of credit markets if they are adverse enough to cause borrowers to default 
en mass. This can be avoided by lenders, who have well diversified loan portfolios; but 
this rarely happens because of the segmented nature of RFMs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). 
Other risks associated with default include the problem of enforcement of loan 
contracts. It has been shown that default can be high in RFMs in LICs (Adams, 1971; 
Gonzalez-Vegas, 1980; Harris, 1983; Botomley, 1963b). Political interference can also 
help to reinforce default by, for example, government's use of debt forgiveness 
programmes. Debt forgiveness programmes have been reported, for example, in Haryana 
State in India (India Today, 1991) and in Bolivia (Ladman and Tinnermeier, 1983). Bell 
(1990, p. 301) notes the widespread view in rural India that institutional credit is in 
practice a 'grant'. Politicians regularly vie with one another in promising, if elected, to 
institute debt forgiveness programmes. Harris (1983) reports that "during the election 
campaign of 1972 (in North Arcot, India) farmers were promised that "a vote in the right 
direction would write off a loan". In such cases,, borrowers have little incentive to use 
funds for the purposes for which they were borrowed or to repay since, as reported in 
Sierra Leone, they regard these funds as their own share of the 'national cake' (Deen and 
Parker, 1978). In Sierra Leone, there have never been any government debt forgiveness 
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pronouncements; but government inaction to prosecute defaulters is tantamount to a 
tacit acceptance of such a policy. To escape this problem, FFM demanded collateral. for 
loans. 
Formal financial markets in both developed countries (DCs) as well as LICs 
concentrate on bankable collateral for credit transactions, making such transactions 
relatively homogeneous and rendering borrowers observationally equivalent. Collateral 
enforcement creates two effects. Firstly, it partly or fully shifts the risk of loss to the 
borrower. Secondly, it provides borrowers, with low disutility of default and additional 
incentive to repay loans (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991 p. 44). As a consequence, 
"collateral becomes a credible instrument of risk-sharing because of its transferability- 
(Binswanger, 1984; Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Transferability is, however, only 
effective in a well defined property rights market and with a legal framework that ensures 
not only compliance of loan contract but also assures penalty when violation occurs. 
These conditions may be limited to certain areas of LICs. In Sierra Leone, for example, 
legal conditions for compliance and enforcement are virtually absent in the rural areas 
(Johnson, 1972; Johnny, 1985; Knickel, 1988). In the urban areas, however, a western- 
styled legal system is predominant and the courts take care of these aspects. In the rural 
areas, the absence of effective legal penalties has been one of the many reasons why 
defaulting farmers in government credit projects, such as those discussed in chapter 
three, have never been prosecuted (Moinuddhin, 1969; Conteh, 1977; Turay and 
Kamara, 1981; Johnny, 1985), There are other reasons for government inaction against 
defaulters. In a bid to retain the support of the majority of voters, about 60 per cent of 
whom are rural residents, governments have turned a bfind eye to these violations and no 
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attempt has been made to prosecute defaulting farmer-borrowers in government projects 
(Reddy, 1985; Deen and Parker, 1978)34 
Because of the relative poverty of rural residents, especially farmers, and their 
lack of bankable assets, the most important coflateral often requested for loans is land. 
But the land tenure system does not support foreclosure and land does not have well 
defined ownership and transfer codes as is known in urban areas. Land is therefore 
usually unacceptable as collateral, especially to FFMs such as commercial banks 
(Johnson, 1972; Besley, 1993). BuH (1983 p. 666), describes this kind of situation a 
"missing market" and a "non-viable" credit contract following the implicit contract 
theories. Many LICs, according to Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), are characterised by 
poverty, making the availability of bankable collateral rare. In addition, the 
underdeveloped legal systems and the ill-defined property rights make the acceptability 
of collateral, especially land, questionable (Bull, 1983). The poorly defined property 
rights for assets, especially land, in the rural areas of LICs also create a risk associated 
with enforcement of loan contracts (Nfigot-Adhofia, 1991). Land rights are not only 
undefined and limited to usufructuary rights (i. e. use of land only) but also have limited 
transferability ( Johnson, 1972; Migot-Adholla, 1991). Besley et al. (1994) have argued 
that such limitations help to explain the widespread use of informal credit in LICs. In 
other words, informal arrangements are more useful where RFMs are unable to enforce 
repayment. In Nigeria, Udry (1990) cites cases of delinquent borrowers being forbidden 
to participate in village ceremonies until repayment is made. In Sierra Leone, 
3.4 See Chapter Six for an example of the effects on a RB of the absence of enforcement mechanisms. 
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moneylenders make use of secret societies and the Paramount Chief (pC)35 to bring 
pressure on borrowers to repay loans (Turay and Kamara, 198 1; Johnny, 198 5) and can 
lead to public ridicule and ostracism, which are viewed as highly degrading by rural 
residents. A borrower would, therefore, try to borrow from another lender, if possible, 
rather than being found guilty of default and forced to face ostracism and humiliation. 
Such disgrace can also be extended to the defaulter's family members. In Sierra Leone, 
the act of borrowing from one lender to repay another lender, in order to avoid this kind 
of hurnifiation and embarrassment is referred to as 'digging a hole to cover a hole'. Even 
in the event of the death of the borrower, as explained in chapter seven, the moneylender 
can still recover loans from surviving relatives. This tends, among other reasons, to 
support the proposition that the IFM is dominant and more successful in the RFM than 
the FFM, 
4.24. Dominance of Informal financial sector. 
The dominance of the EFM in LICs is usually associated with the modus operandi 
of the moneylender (Bell, 1990), which entails easier and lower cost access to credit 
relative to the FFM. Bottomley (1975), Wai (1957 and 1977), Miller and Ladman (1983) 
have all reported loans being provided by moneylenders within hours of the applicant's 
request compared to months in the FFM. Our survey found that the time taken to secure 
a loan from a moneylender ranges ftom I to 3 days, compared to a range of from 3 to 20 
weeks in the RBs (the Survey). The long delays observed in the provision of credit are 
3" The PC arbitrates all chiefdom disputes (including land disputes) that do not warrant the attention of 
a western style court. Paramount Chieft in some chiefdoms still possess a device callcd Ka? lnka 
(Temne) or Kpeiwe (Mende). It is a log of woodMth holes carved out to hold an adult's lcg. Boffo,, A-ers 
who fail to repay a loan. when reported to the PC, will have their legs 'handcuiTed' in this contraption 
and displayed publicly. The debtor in this situation is subjected to public ridicule. This kind of public 
humiliation acts as a deterrent to defaulters. 
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cited as contributing to the high level of default on credit from FFMs (Bouman, 1977). 
Moneylenders usually have first hand knowledge of borrowers and potential borrowers,, 
mainly because they are residents of, or regular visitors to, the viflage or participants in 
other markets with clients and potential borrowers (Harris, 1983; Johnny, 1985, 
Richards and Karimu, 198 1). As BeH notes, "There is nothing that escapes his eye about 
the circumstances of his debtors and potential clients" (Bell, 1990). This knowledge 
suggests that the moneylender takes the problem of the adverse selection of risk very 
seriously. Arrow (1985) describes adverse selection as "hidden information", when the 
lender cannot, at reasonable cost distinguish between bad and good borrowers. 
The majority of loans in the IFMs are granted on personalised terms, as discussed 
above, and sometimes without collateral (Botton&y, 1975, p. 284). The relatively low 
transaction costs encountered by borrowers in the EFM, compared to what they face in 
the FFM, also makes the former a favourite source of credit (Adams, 1983). Borrowers 
incur lower costs in terms of transport cost, opportunity cost of time in visiting lenders 
and bribes to ensure that their applications are completed and approved (Aleem, 1985; 
Floro, and Yotopoulos, 199 1). The moneylender is always there and sometimes lends 
without requesting to know how funds are to be utilised, gives consumption credit 
(which most FFMs rarely entertain in some countries, such as Sierra Leone) and 
performs marketing functions as well as providing social support in the form of 
contribution towards easing the adverse effects of calamities which may befall his clients. 
Formal financial institutions can hardly match this operational flexibility displayed by the 
moneylender. In Sierra Leone, the mean transactions cost of moneylenders surveyed 
between ranged of 1-3 per cent (Table 4.12), compared to over 20 per cent for some of 
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the RBs (Tables 6.19 - 6.22). Unlike RBs, moneylenders use simple procedures and very 
minimal paper work. In contrast, RBs use huge amounts of costly stationery and are 
required to have 'quafified' staff, all of which increase administrative costs. Most formal 
financial institutions (FFIs) within the FFM are normally specialised institutions unlike 
their counterparts, the informal financial institutions (EFIs), in the IFM which, normally, 
do not specialise ( Long, 1968; Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984a). 
4.25. Lack of Specialisation. 
Lack of specialisation is demonstrated in the combination of activities such as 
trade, lending, farming and merchandising characterising EFIs (Long, 1968; p 277; Wai, 
1957, p. 57; Aleem, 1990; Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Typically, informal lenders 
almost always combine credit with other activities such as trade. In many cases, credit 
involves the delivery of inputs or comsumer items to borrowers with repayment being in 
kind (mainly harvested crops). The cost of borrowing in such circumstances can only be 
estimated from the terms of the commodity contract. Many researchers including Wai 
(1957, p. 66), Long (1968, p. 277), Seibel and Marx (1987), NEller and Ladman (1983), 
Aleem, (1990), Floro and Yotopoulos, (1991) have noted this lack of specialisation in 
examples drawn ftom. both Asia and Aftica. The main source of informal credit is the 
moneylender who has been described as a triad i. e. one who combines the functions of a 
trader, a moneylender, and a farmer (Table 4.3). But engaging in different activities may 
not necessarily ensure a risk-free outcome. Lack of specialisation may even contribute to 
inadequate measures being adopted to recover loans (Aleem, 1990). To minimise the risk 
of default, the lender tends to spread risk across contracts. The above notwithstanding, 
the risk of default is always present in both EFMs and FFMs. 
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4.26, Default rates. 
Default rates are reported to be normally higher in FFMs than in IFMs in LICs 
(Bottomley, 1975; Adams and Nehman, 1979). Harris (1983), reported default rates of 5 
per cent for moneylenders in the Southern rural districts of India, compared to over 15 
per cent for FFMs within the same region. In Sierra Leone, Reddy (1985), reported a 
default rate of under 10 per cent for moneylenders whereas FFMs (i. e. IADPs) suffered 
default rates of over 30 per cent, The World Bank estimates that II agricultural credit 
programmes in eight developing countries in Asia had an average rate of default of 
nearly 40 per cent (Saito and Villnueva, 1981). Our survey of moneylenders revealed an 
average default rate of about 4 per cent (actual), with a range of I to 8 per cent (Table 
4.10), compared to a range of from 3 5-74 per cent in RBs (Table 6.15). 
The reasons for default have been varied. The ability to repay, as mentioned 
earlier, is related to the farmer's income. In Kenya, according to Bottomley (1975), 
defaulters in a particular project had lower average yields than those who repaid their 
loans. In her analysis of development projects in several African countries including 
Sierra Leone, Lele (1975) argued that borrowers' incomes and default rates are also 
related to low prices of output, riskiness of new technology, poor extension, and lack of 
or limited follow-up of loan utifisation. Other studies have identified more causes of 
default. Sanderatne (1977) identified no fewer than 17 such causes of default in Sri 
Lanka which he organised into six categories. Table 4.2 below shows these categories 
together with the percentage of defaulting farmers and the percentage of the loans that 
were defaulted in the 1967-70 period. 
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Table 4.2 Reasons for Default in Sri Lanka (1967-1970 
Category % of defaulters % of loans defaulted 
Defects in Agric. Structure 19 17 
Seasonal factors 26 33 
Defects in credit organisation 17 12 
Attitudinal factors 16 18 
NEsuse of funds 15 15 
Mscellaneous reasons 7 5 
Total 100 100 
Source: Sanderatne, 1977. p. 27. 
In the main, Sanderatne (1977: p. 28) concedes that "'in the context of small size 
holdings, productivity and incomes derived from a significant proportion of farm 
holdings, are inadequate to meet the basic needs of farm households". Richards and 
Karimu (1981) forwarded two main reasons for default by project farmers in the 
Northern Integrated Agricultural Development Project (NIADP) in Sierra Leone. These 
are (1) over-optimism in the calculations about returns to project investment and (2) the 
degree of indebtedness of the farmer to other lenders even after they joined the project. 
Another survey of 'Grassroots Problems in Sierra Leone' (Kamara and Turay, 
198 1), deduced several reasons for default including (a) lack of a legal framework to 
ensure compliance (b) lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms for violation and (c) 
riskiness of agricultural enterprises. The lack of bankable collateral, risk of default and 
uncertainty and the need to screen borrowers in the EFM to reduce adverse selection of 
risk and moral hazard problems, among other reasons, encourage lenders to engage in 
credit interlinkages. 
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4.27. Linkage Between Credit and Other Markets (Tie-ins) in the IFM. 
Interlinkages in rural financial markets have been observed in many developing 
countries including India (Bardhan, 1978; Bardhan and Rudra, 1980), The Philippines 
(Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991), Ghana (Adegboye, 1983) and Sieffa Leone (Karimu and 
Richards, 1981, Johnny, 1985). In Sierra Leone, for example, village moneylenders, 
traders and itinerant merchants engage in credit interlinkage 36 , providing credit 
in cash 
and/or in kind and receiving repayment in output and/or cash. The formal credit 
institutions,, in most of the LICs including Sierra Leone do not provide this kind of 
service. They were not designed to handle credit and output/inputs interlinkages. 
Interlinkage in the credit markets of developing countries, however, plays a vital role and 
the ability of landlords, moneylenders, trader-lenders, and farmer-lenders to provide this 
kind of service has been identified as one of the many reasons why they have been 
relatively successful and dominant in the rural credit markets (Bardhan, 1989). 
An interlinked. deal is one in which two or more contracts are simultaneously 
agreed upon (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta, 1986). Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), 
describe interlinkage as the linking of two or more market transactions with the terms of 
one being contigent upon the other. They add that these arrangements operate on the 
basis of personal relationships. Interlinkage is increasingly being appreciated and used as 
a basis for understanding many puzzling characteristics of rural financial markets. 
Braverman and Srinivasan (1981) noted that interlinked deals are transactions in more 
than one commodity or service made between the same pair of individuals and linked in 
an essential way. For example a landlord and a tenant entering into a contract in which 
36 The terms interlinkages, and tie-ins will be used interchangeably in this discussion. Elsewhere, they 
have been described as 'bundle transactions' (Clive Bell. 1988) 
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the tenant rents a piece of land at a stipulated price, and at the same time the landlord 
extends credit to the tenant, again on specified terms. However, interlinking covers a 
much wider range of contracts than those simply created to circumvent the absence of 
certain markets. 
4.271. Types of Interlinkages 
There are several kinds of interlinkage in the informal sector in the rural areas of 
LICs. Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), identified five types in the Philippines which they 
classified according to how the loan is tied- (a) to the provision of services in on-lending 
and or procuring output, (b) to the sale of output to the lender, (c) to the purchase of 
inputs or lease of farm equipment from the lender, (d) to the transfer of rights over the 
usufruct of the land to the lender and (e) to the provision of labour services to the lender. 
They stated that the first three are more prevalent among trader-lenders and the last two 
among farmer-lenders. In our survey in Sierra Leone, a sixth type of interlinkage was 
identified where the loan is tied, not only to the sale of output but also to the purchase of 
farm inputs and consumer goods such as sugar, kerosene, soap, salt, building material 
etc.. Repayment is in kind and/or the sale of output to/through the lender. Over 40 per 
cent of respondents in our survey, reported that they had this kind of arrangement with 
lenders, whereby the trader-lender collects the repayment output from the farm-gate and 
buys extra output, thus performing a useful service given the poor state of the road 
network and marketing facilities (storage, transport etc. ). In the absence of any effective 
competition from formal credit agencies, the farmer has no choice but to rely on the 
moneylender (Bottomley, 1975). But this does not explain why interlinkage occurs. 
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4.272. Some Models of Interlinkage 
Several models have been used to explain market interfinkage. An important 
characteristic of some of them is their implicit treatment of moneylending as the primary 
economic activity of trader-lenders (Gongapadhyay and Sengupta, 1986,1987; Bell and 
Srinivasan, 1989). The trader is depicted as the principal agent who provides credit to 
farmers in return for repayment in kind and an undertaking to sell output to the lender. In 
Sierra Leone, moneylending in rural areas is almost always a clandestine activity in the 
sense that moneylenders do not operate publicly as moneylenders but rather as farmers, 
traders,, blacksmiths, - teachers, chiefdom councillors or even as religious leaders. The 
point being stressed is that in Sierra Leone, moneylenders in rural areas tend to portray 
moneylending as complementary to other economic activities they are engaged in. What 
is visible is a village shop, a blacksnfithery workshop, the activities of purchase and sale 
of consumerables and produce by rural residents or itinerant traders. Floro and 
Yotopoulos (199 1) came to the same conclusion about moneylending activities in the 
Table 4.3 OccuiRations Relaorted by Monglienders 
Occupation Frequency Percentage 
Trader 5 25 
Farmer 9 45 
Clergyman/woman 2 10 
moneylender 1 5 
chiefdom councillor/section head 2 10 
Combination (trader/farmer/osusu 
leader 
1 5 
Total 20 100 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
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Philippines. Moneylenders in Sierra Leone operate outside the financial regulatory 
framework and are not recognised by government. At the same time, no laws have been 
enacted forbidding moneylending activities in rural areas. 
In the survey, only 5 per cent of respondents reported that moneylending is their 
primary econon-fic activity. 45 per cent reported that they were farmers and 25 per cent 
traders (Table 4.3). The others reported that they combine osusu leadershi P37, with trade 
and farming. Others are religious and chiefdom leaders (10 per cent). In contrast, 
professional moneylenders can be found operating openly in the urban areas especially 
around markets and business centres and serving micro- and medium-sized enterprises in 
every conceivable segment of the economy (Johnny, 1985). 
Bell and Srinivasan's (1989) market interlinkage model demonstrates the 
redundancy of charging both a commission rate on crop sales (similar to underpricing of 
output) and an interest charge on the loan in equilibrium contracts. The interlinking of 
credit and product contracts enhances the bargaining power of the trader whilst tending 
to weaken that of the borrower. It implies the reduction in desirability of risk-sharing on 
the part of the lender and raises the possibility of monopoly power in the form of price 
stipulation (op cit., 1989). 
Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1986) examined two situations, (1) borrowing 
from a linked lender (e. g. a trader-lender) and (2) from a pure moneylender. They 
clemonstrated, using profit maximisation analysis, that of the two types of lenders, the 
farmer would opt to borrow from the trader-lender since he charges a lower interest rate 
compared to the pure moneylender. The low interest rate offered by the trader-lender is, 
37 In Chaptcr Five they arc idcntified astfaster osusu. 
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however, deceptive and is compensated for by the low price he or she pays the farmer- 
borrower for the output. At the end of the day it is the farmer-borrower who tends to 
lose in the interlinked contract. Given that, why is interlinkage common? 
4.273. Reasons for Interlinkages. 
Axas discussed earlier, tie-ins or market interlinkages involve contracts between 
two or more parties that relate two or more market transactions with jointly determined 
terms of exchange. An example involves traders securing a regular supply of output from 
farmers whose credit needs they meet in return. Workers in Indonesia (Bottomley, 
1963a) have their labour services tied to their employers who provide them with 
consumption credit. Landlords rent out land to their tenants and at the same time 
advance loans in cash or kind (mostly food) that are payable upon harvest (Sengupta and 
Gongapadhyay, 1989). Tie-in contracts can serve as a screening device in a situation of 
imperfect information regarding the attributes of a heterogeneous population, In a village 
setting where some attributes such as tenant's managerial skills are not normally 
observable, interlinked credit and tenancy contracts may serve as screening devices for 
landlords to identify more reliable and hardworking tenants. Market interlinkage also 
serves as an instrument for increasing information about the borrower especiaHy when 
commercialisation in the rural area increases (i. e. reducing the 'hidden information) 
problem). With increasing volumes of market transactions, the need for additional 
information over and above what is known through existing personalistic ties becomes 
important as extant market transactions become additional sources of market 
information. 
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The trader-lenders use interlinkage to complement trading activities. Ray and 
Sengupta (1989) suggest three ways in which the trader-lender achieves this. Firstly, 
interlinkage is used to expand his or her share of the market. Secondly it involves an 
alternative use of operating capital during seasonal fluctuations. Thirdly, it reduces the 
procurement price of output by allowing the lender to negotiate a low price or fix a 
harvest delivery date when seasonal prices for the commodity are low. In Sierra Leone, 
for example, the period April to October is the growing season for rice, the country's 
staple food, and supplies are usually very low. Farmers who borrow under this kind of 
tie-in arrangement are often quoted low prices for their harvest when the contract is 
negotiated during this period (Tommy and Roberts, 1978). 
Interlinkage may also enable the reputation mechanism to work more effectively. 
Bardhan (1980) describes one way this can occur with interlinkage: "It can reduce the 
market costs of work, contract enforcement and collection of information by making 
possible discovery of dishonesty or shirking by an agent in one transaction, which would 
have been too costly for him or her in terms of its spillover effects which could threaten 
other transactions and a general loss of goodwill in the small closed world of a traditional 
village". When an economic relationship entails transactions in several markets, there is 
scope for more information gathering and higher profits for the lender. 
Market interlinkage is also produced by the existence of moral hazard (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 198 1). Quite often, the linking of contracts occurs when there is a moral 
hazard problem which results in an "inappropriate" externality". Moral hazard arises in a 
risk-sharing contract when one party, often called the agent (tenant, insuree or borrower) 
38 In the broader sense, even this class of contracts can be defined as arising Erom the non-eMIstencC of 
markets where the missing markets are themselves defined as the markeU for the externalities. 
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can affect the probability distribution of the outcome (output or accident) through his or 
her action (effort, driving habits, gambling, laziness etc. ), which the other party, often 
cafled the principal (landlord, insurer or trader-lender), cannot effectively or cheaply 
monitor (Bell, 1983). Since the landlord can neither perfectly nor cheaply monitor the 
borrower's actions and cannot force him or her to exert a certain level of effort because 
it is too costly, there is an inherent externality from the credit market into the production 
process. Landlords or lenders are aware of this externality and they try to intemalise it 
and thereby address the moral hazard problem by linking the credit to land, production 
inputs, and consumer items. Within the context of principal-agent relationships, 
according to Arrow (1985), interlinking permits the principal (the lender) to exercise a 
greater degree of control and monitoring over the activities of the agent (the borrower). 
Alternatively, interlinkage may serve to reduce moral hazard or adverse selection 
of risk problems by permitting the use of contractual forms in one transaction to alter an 
agent's behaviour in another (Stiglitz, 1986). Braverman and Srinivasan (1982) and 
Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) define control in terms of influence over the performance 
of the tenant-borrower as a cultivator. Lenders who are landlords or merchants may use 
the contractual terms in these other exchanges to affect the probability of default. A 
trader-lender, for example, may offer a farmer who borrows from him lower prices on 
fertilisers and pesticides because the probability of default is reduced when such inputs 
are used. 
The use of interfinkages as a direct mechanism for solving information and 
enforcement problems is quickly established in the rural markets. Information gathering 
is a by-product of living near the borrower or being part of the kinship), clan, tribal group 
119 
or a party to some other market transaction with the borrower. Thus,, viflage 
moneylenders also coRect information and monitor at lower costs while the formal 
institutions, especially the banks, may find it virtually impossible to do so. The 
trade/credit interlinkage "makes information on the size of the borrower's operation 
available to the lender and to nobody else; thus restricting borrowers' access to other 
lenders" (Siamwalla et. aL, 1990). Furthermore, the trader-lender can easily enforce his 
claim by deducting it from the value of the crops sold to, or through him. In towns with 
well organised commodity markets, there may sometimes be co-operation among trader- 
lenders in enforcing repayment. Bell (1990) reported that: 
"in Chitoor (in Thailand) a commission agent who dealt in gur (a sugar product) told me 
that agents frequently know one another's clients. If a farmer attempted to sell through an 
agent other that than one with whom he normally dealt, the new agent would deduct 
principal and interest on the loan, basing his calculations on the usual rule of thumb, 
relating the size of the loan to the quantity to be delivered, and hand over the said sum to 
the first agent". 
Bell (1990) and Siamwalla et. al. (1991), argue that trade-credit interlinkage 
helps in resolving the information asymmetry between borrower and lender and the 
enforcement problem, while they create asymmetry of information across lenders. 
Lenders who do not serve as traders for a borrower will not know as much about the 
latter's productivity and will be in a less favourable position to enforce a loan. In our 
survey of moneylenders, only 35 per cent reported that were willing to share information 
about borrowers with other lenders (Table 4.1). 
It is not uncommon for landlords to require their tenant to borrow from them 
alone. This is done to get tenants to behave in a way advantageous to the landlord, who 
could charge an interest rate that is above market rate with a view to lin-titing the tenants) 
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borrowing (Braverman and Guasch, 1986, p. 126 1). The landlord could at the same time 
provide a contract that is attractive in other ways such as rescheduling loans when 
default occurs. Braverman and Guasch (1986) concede, however, that such a situation 
could occur in both competitive and non-competitive markets. They added that 
interfinkage is a way of internalising externalities in the absence of a complete set of 
markets, and causes the utilities possibilities frontier to move outward; but the 
distribution effects remain ambiguous. 
It should be noted, however, that linking credit and land as it obtains in parts of 
Asia is different to what happens in parts of West Africa. In Asia, a loan that is linked 
with land bestows upon the lender rights of occupancy and use of the borrower's land 
until the principal is repaid. Such loans by landlords have also been observed in Thailand 
who tend to increase their holdings when default occurs (Siamwalla et. al., 1990). In 
some parts of West Africa, the situation is different. In Ghana for example, the 
procurement of loans could be ensured by transferring only the rights to harvest the 
borrower's tree crops. The harvest provides the principal and interest on the lender's 
loan. Such a transactions is called tree pledging and is very common in English-speaking 
West Affica (Adegboye, 1983). The pledge is part of the contract and not necessarily the 
result of a default (op. cit. ). 
In Sierra Leone, as stated earlier,, land in the rural areas is mainly communally 
owned and held in trust for the family or the community by the PC. Land cannot be 
transferred (sold) freely in the open market. All land transactions have to have the 
concurrence of the family elders and that of the PC. Therefore, any interfinkage between 
credit and land is usually limited only to usufructuary rights (johnson, 1972; Knickel, 
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1988). The lender is aflowed in cases of default to extract repayment from income 
derived from output of economic trees. Such extraction is supposed to be monitored by 
the PC to ensure that more than what is due is not extracted from the land. fn cases 
where the land does not have economic trees, such as bananas, kola nuts, oranges, oil 
palm etc., the lender is allowed to cultivate the land for a certain period agreed between 
the lender and the borrower in the presence of the PC or his representative (Turay, 
1980). In some areas of Sierra Leone, if the lender fails to cultivate the land during the 
agreed period, he runs the risk of forfeiting his debt, which is presumed to have been 
extracted from the land during the agreed period. The latter clause is one of the reasons, 
among others, why interlinkage of credit and land are not common in rural Sierra Leone, 
If, however, the original terms of the agreement was a land pledge, the lender is 
permitted to retain the land and benefit from the fi-uits thereof until the borrower or a 
member of his or her family settles the debt. 
Such interlinkages could run for several years, even generations and can 
sometimes result in a land dispute (Kamara and Turay, 198 1). The apparent lack of 
written records on such deals (especially those which have spanned considerable number 
of years) makes claims for the return of land to original owner-families difficult to 
adjudicate. To mininýise such occurrences, the pledging or linking of land in loan 
contracts is usually a family affair in the sense that the elders of the extended family 
(brothers, sisters, uncles etc. ) having some claim to the land should be consulted and 
involved in the initial deal. This is not an easy thing to achieve because people do not 
want to be deprived of their claim to land and locating such relatives to conclude such a 
deal could be costly and fi-ustrating. Land is regarded as the fink between the unborn, the 
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living and the dead and in most rural areas in Sierra Leone, it is the single most important 
. 0- - factor of production and source of livelihood. Family members can harvest from 
economic trees and sell the output for necessities. Since litigation involving land can be a 
protracted and very costly affair (Kamara and Turay, 198 1), lenders try as much as 
possible to avoid engaging themselves in interlinkages involving land. 
The most popular form of interlinkage, and the least costly for the lender in 
Sierra Leone, is the one involving credit and the purchase of consumerables, inputs 
and/or the sale of output. In our survey over 40 per cent of moneylender reported that 
they were involved in this kind of interlinkage, receiving repayment in kind (see Table 
4.4). None was involved in land/credit interlinkage among our sample, because the costs 
and social repercussions may be adverse to the moneylender in the long run. 
Table 4.4 Modes of Lgnding and Repa: Ement bv Mone3jenders 
Loan/repayment loan 
Freq 
How granted 
.% 
Fre 
How repaid 
q. % 
All Cash 3 20 5 25 
All produce (output/input) 9 45 12 60 
Goods (consumer items) 6 35 - - 
Part cash/part goods/out t M2 2 
- 
10 3 15 
Total 
ý 
20 100 20 100 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
Moneylenders informed us that such deals do not augur well for business. Apart from 
land disputes being protracted and costly affairs, land/credit interlinkage can convey a 
wrong message about a moneylender. He could be viewed as some 'greedy and evil' man 
who is seeking to expropriate land from families in the locality. Such a man risks being 
unpopular and untrustworthy in the rural set-up, leading to disrespect or even social 
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ostracism for him and his family. This could further impact adversely on any political 
ambitions he or a member of his family may have in the future. 
In addition to the high costs involved in linking credit and land, another reason 
why such a deal is usually avoided by the moneylender is that faflow periods are still long 
in rural Sierra Leone. By 1975, faflow periods were estimated to have fallen from an 
average of 15-20 years to 10-15 years (Spencer and Brylee, 1977; Johnny, 1981; 
Knickel, 1988)). In a situation where agriculture still relies on rain-fed-shifting- 
cultivation technology, few borrowers would risk using their land in land-credit deals and 
thereby risking their source of income as well as incurring the wrath of the extended 
family. Consequently, lenders and borrowers prefer to use output instead of land in credit 
interlinkage in Sierra Leone. 
The above analysis suggests a very strong case for credit interlinkage and the 
literature does not yet have any counter arguments. The questions that need to be 
answered, however, are; (1) why are FFMs not taking advantage of credit interlinkage to 
provide effective competition for IFMs in the RFMs ? (2) Are there any barriers to entry 
or exit? 
4.274. Barriers to Entry and Exit. 
From an outsider's point of view, the apparent dominance of the IFMs, especiafly 
moneylenders, in LICs tends to suggest that there are many and that there is competition 
among them (Aleem, 1990); and therefore an advantage to borrowers in terms of the 
reduction in interest rates that could result. But from the borrower's point of view, it is 
different. Most borrowers are unable to use multiple sources of informal loans or to 
switch easily from one lender to another. In our survey, about 80 per cent of both 
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samples (i. e. rural banks customers and the control samples combined) who reported that 
they had borrowed from a moneylender, had borrowed from only one source during the 
last three years (Table 4.5). The main reason given was that the moneylender has been 
their customer,, which means in the Sierra Leone context, that he had been dealing with 
these borrowers in several markets. Many of them also borrowed from rural banks as 
well. Siamwalla et al. (1990), observed a similar situation in their survey of the Nakhon 
Table 4.5 Number of Moneylenders borrowed 
from in the last three vears 
Number Frequency Percentage Major reasons 
One 241 80.3 He has been our trader 
Two 32 10.7 Old customer died 
Three 25 8,3 Still owe last moneylender 
More than three 2 0.7 Moved from two 
Total 300 too 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
Ratchasima province in Thailand, where about five-sixths of those surveyed reported 
having borrowed from the same source in the last three years. In their national survey of 
Thailand (Siamwalla et al., 1990) it was observed that a total of 72 per cent of the 
informal sector borrowers did not attempt to borrow from more than one informal lender 
for the same period. 
The trader-lender secures business in advance of the harvest through interlinked 
loans, By negotiating the terms of the loan, he can influence the borrower's action in a 
manner that will be advantageous to his expected profits from moneylending and market 
interlinkage. By providing a fairly high amount of debt, the trader-lender can influence 
the farmer-borrower to use inputs (fertilisers, pesticides etc. ) more extensively, in order 
to increase expected volume of output. By acting as a marketing channel, the trader- 
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lender is in a position to exercise first claim on proceeds, thereby settling what is owed 
him. The above analysis suggests a strong hold by the moneylender who interlinks credit 
with output sales and further suggests some barrier to exit for the farmer-borrower. This 
is especially so where there are very few moneylenders such as in the rural areas of 
Sierra Leone. Barriers to exit are also likely to exist in a situation where the viscious 
circle of poverty is still strong and tends to make the farmer-borrower tied to one 
moneylender. The borrower goes in for a loan year-in and year-out, finding himself or 
herself in cycle of debt. 
There is the tendency in the literature to view the lender as possessing a natural 
monopoly stemming from his intimate knowledge of his clients, their ignorance and poor 
communication with the rest of the economy, all of which isolate the area in which he 
operates (Udry, 1990a). This view is also embraced by Wharton (1961), Nisbet (1967) 
39 
and Bottomley (1975) who draw in data from the Reserve Bank of India . 
Of these 
writers, Nisbet provides the clearest evidence yet, - 
in support of the contention that 
lenders have significant market power, controlling what is to be cultivated and dictating 
the price of the output through interlinkage arrangements. Moneylenders, who were all 
agriculturists, were active in 18 out of the 34 Communas that Nisbet (1967) studied in 
central Chile and they accounted for most of the private credit. Each had a weU defined 
geographical area, with no instances in which such areas were adjacent to one another. 
This suggests that with rather limited access to institutional finance, conditions ranged 
from monopoly to oligopoly in the credit markets of central Chile. To clinch the 
argument, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the barriers to entry were 
39 Some of these references may seem old, but the literature has not vet produced any new or counter 
c-Odence in this regard 
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sufficiently formidable to deter potential lenders from going into business if expected 
profits were supernonnal. Nisbet did not do this directly; but the general tone of his 
exposition suggests that this is what he had in mind. 
In Sierra Leone, formidable barriers to entry seem to exist. To start a 
moneylending business, seed capital is required. The average rural resident including the 
farmer is poor as we have indicated earlier and per capita annual income has fallen to 
about US$167 (The Economist, 1995) due to Ming output combined with an increase in 
population. In addition, shortage of inputs largely in consequence of falling exports and 
scarcity of foreign exchange, has compounded the problem further. Moreover, marginal 
propensity to save in rural areas is very low, estimated at about 0.02, compared to the 
national figure of 0.23 (CSO 1990). Furthermore, access to institutional credit is limited 
to rural banks which are few and far between, lend only for production purposes and 
have only reached a small percentage (about 7 per cent) of the target population in their 
service areas (see Chapter Six). In these circumstances, the rural trader-lender appears to 
hold and exercise various controls over borrowers. In our household survey, some of the 
respondents in the control sample gave a contradictory response when asked if they 
knew any moneylenders. They responded that they did not know any moneylender but 
admitted that they borrowed from some relatives or friends or neighbours. Our 
interpretation of this is that they may be afraid to reveal the names of moneylenders for 
fear of being denied a subsequent loan or not wanting to talk about debt obligations to 
'strangers'. Nisbet (1967) reported a sirnilar situation when, in one commune that he 
surveyed, farmers were afraid to discuss the activities of three moneylenders for fear of 
losing their only current source of credit. For some rural residents, the local moneylender 
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represents the only source of loans in cash and/or in kind. Any attempt to go outside for 
institutional or non-institutional credit could entail some cost and endanger their 
subsequent borrowing chances. Moreover, some lenders are important rural community 
leaders which strengthens their position and enables them to exert socio-economic 
sanctions on individuals who do not cooperate (Aleem, 1990). Landlords, traders, and 
rich farmers in LICs use credit interlinkage. Through these mechanisms, they can exert 
influence and control over borrowers. Furthermore, because the interlocker can reduce 
transaction and risk costs, he is in a position to force his competitors to also use 
interlinkages. But vertical integration and tie-in arrangements can also force borrowers 
not to deal with other lenders. The above discussion suggests that interlinked markets 
can be a way of limiting entry to the credit market (Lamberte and Lim, 1988). The 
analysis also suggests that barriers to entry for new moneylenders and exit for the 
farmer-borrowers tend to exist in Sierra Leone and indeed, in some other developing 
countries, especially in the midst of high levels of poverty and given the high degree of 
market control that the trader-lenders exercise. The barriers are not the result of 
collusion among moneylenders but a consequence of the underdeveloped nature of the 
rural economy. They are, however, not insurmountable. What is required is investment in 
market infrastructure and appropriate marketing and pricing policies that will provide the 
incentives for private investment and an effective competition in both credit and 
input/output marketing. Rural banks in Sierra Leone could provide this kind of 
competition if policies governing their operations are modified as suggested in Chapter 
Seven. Competition could also help to reduce the level of interest rate in the IFM. 
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4,275. Interest Rates in the Informal Financial Markets 
The debate about interest rates in the IFMs is polarised into two distinct schools 
of thought - the neo-classical (competitive) school and the monopolistic school. It was in 
the 1960s that first attempts were made to provide an economic rationale for the 
relatively high interest rates observed in EFMs in the rural areas of LICs. Nficro- 
economic tools used to carry out partial equilibrium analysis in goods markets were 
employed (Bottomley and Nudds, 1969). Thus the debate that emerged centred on 
whether the market was competitive or monopolistic and high interest rates were 
explained by either cost of lending (competitive) or due to the pressure of monopoly rent 
(monopolistic). What was ignored at the time was the impact of information and 
uncertainty. The neo-classical models underestimated the problems of rural financial 
markets, especiafly uncertainty and asymmetric information; and have become inadequate 
in analysing the functioning of RFMs, especially the EFMs. 
4.276. The Competition View Point. 
Many observers including Bottomley, (1963a, 1964a, 1975); and Ghatak (1972), 
have been of the opinion that interest rates in the rural areas of LICs are high because of 
(1) the high rate of default (partial or complete) and (2) the size and short term nature of 
the loans which push up administrative costs (an excuse commonly used by western- 
styled commercial banks for the low proportion of their loan portfolio devoted to small 
farmers in LICs). The analysis used then, was straightforward and based on the 
assumption that the demand for loans was given and the curve is downward sloping. It 
also centred around opportunity costs (0c), administrative costs (Ac), premium risk 
(Pr) and monopoly rent (Mr). Thus, the interest rate under that analysis was, 
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Interest rate = Ac + Oc + Pr + Mr .................................. 
(1) 
When the probability of default (P), loan size (L) and the nominal interest rate (r) are 
included in the analysis, a second equation emerges; 
r) (I - P) = (I + Ac + Oc)L .................................. 
(2) 
the interest rate r. becomes 
Interest rate = [I + Ac + Oc/(I-P)] -I..................................... (3) 
Equation (3) suggests that a relatively small default rate can increase costs of lending. 
For example, if Oc is 5 per cent, default is 15 per cent and Ac is 5 per cent, the lender 
would need to charge borrowers no less than 29 per cent to cover his operating costs. 
The probability of default also depends on the dishonesty of borrowers, the vagaries of 
the weather which could adversely affect output,, and market price fluctuations for 
agricultural produce, All of these factors can in turn affect the income of the producer. 
The competitive model assumes, therefore, that if the interest rate covers costs, then the 
rate is competitive. It also assumes that default and the terms of the contract are 
independent of each other. Furthermore, equation (3) assumes that the interest rate 
reflects the average risk of default and the latter is the same for all borrowers. 
With the degree of screening and information collection undertaken by 
moneylenders (Table 4.6), a farmer who has a reputation for dishonesty or laziness will 
not be treated observationally equivalent to an honest and hard-working farmer. The 
former is a high risk borrower and the terms of the loan contract, including the interest 
rate for such a borrower, could be treated differently from a less risky (honest and hard 
working) farmer/borrower. This non-inclusion of the risk factor and information 
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asymmetry, therefore, renders the neo-classical model inadequate in analysing present- 
day RFMs in LICs. 
4.277. The Monopolist View 
The monopoly argument is that a monopolist will lend up to that volume at which 
his marginal cost of lending equates the borrower's marginal product of the loan and he 
will charge an interest rate that is equal to the value of marginal product, where product 
markets are competitive (Lipton, 1976). But the true rate of borrowing in the IFMs in 
LICs is usually subsumed in the price at which a trader-lender sells his goods to a 
borrower in credit/market interlinkages. High interest rates in the EFM have been cited as 
an indication of credit shortage because of the demand pressure on a small pool of 
loanable funds in a highly inelastic supply situation. Thus interest rates for these funds 
are driven up (Bottomley, 1975). Other studies argue that high interest rates in the IFMs 
may be justified because loans are small, short term and mostly for consumption. In 
addition, lenders' administrative costs, opportunity costs of capital and risks are high 
under substantial rates of inflation (Bottmdey, 1963a, 1964c). Yet other studies note 
that there is very little evidence to substantiate extensive monopoly profits in the EFM 
(Adams, 1971; lqbal, 1987; Aleem, 1990). 
From the monopolists' point of view, the major component of high interest rates 
is monopoly rent. Empirical evidence which tends to support this view came mainly from 
surveys carried out in India (Chandavarkar, 1965) and Chile (Nisbet, 1967) mentioned 
above (section 4.29). Chandavarkar suggests that monopoly exists because of the low 
density of moneylenders and formal financial institutions in the rural areas. It has, 
however, been generally recognised that the proliferation of bank branches and credit 
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institutions achieved very little in terms of influencing the terms offered by moneylenders 
in the rural areas of LICs (Virmani, 1982, Akaah, et al., 1987; Abbot, 1985; Okorie, 31 
1991). It has also been argued that interest rates will tend to decline on their own accord 
as econornic growth increases because higher productivity with its associated high 
incomes wil. 1 lead to an increase in demand for loans thereby lowering unit administrative 
costs and interest rate (Bottomley, 1964c). Premium risk will also decline as marketable 
surplus increases (Bottomley and Nudd, 1969). One policy implication related to this 
view is that direct intervention such as creation of government credit institutions or 
directing commercial banks to establish branches in rural areas, will not provide the 
complete answer. The answer rather lies in policies that will raise productivity through 
high yielding technology - fertilisers, seeds etc. - and other appropriate econon& policy 
instruments such as the removal of price subsidies and/or the creation of market 
infrastructure as incentives for increased production. 
In Sierra Leone the debate about monopoly profits realised by moneylenders is 
still on-going mainly because the overall operation of the EFM is still not properly 
understood. To understand how the EFM works and to contribute to the debate, it has 
become necessary to analyse moneylenders' operations and why they charge relatively 
high norninal interest rates. We are of the view that interest rates in the IFM of Sierra 
Leone are high mainly because of high transactions costs, especially those faced by the 
moneylender. 
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Table 4.6 Stelos Taken by Moneylenders to Screen Borrowers 
Lender A B c D E F G H 
1 1(2) 2 3 4 no yes 
2 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
3 1(2) 2 3 4 no yes 
4 1(0) 2 3 yes yes 
5 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
6 l(O) 2 3 yes yes 
7 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
8 1 (1) 2 3 4 no yes 
9 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
10 l(O) 2 3 yes yes 
II l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
12 1 (1) 2 3 4 no yes 
13 1(2) 2 3 4 no yes 
14 1(0) 2 3 yes 
15 1(2) 2 3 4 no yes 
16 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
17 l(O) 2 3 yes yes 
18 1(2) 2 3 4 no yes 
19 l(l) 2 3 4 no yes 
120 1 l(l) 2 13 141 no IT yes 
Note: - Figures relate to the stages through which a borrower goes before being granted a loan. 
Figures in brackets are the number of seasons step I could take before a borrower 
is regarded as a regular customer. 
Kev to Columns 
Column A: - assessment related to dealings in other markets. 
Column B: - request for reference/surety. 
Column C: - enquiries of other borrowers/farmers In the applicant's village. 
Column D: - visiting the applicant's farm/enterprise. 
Column E: - small initial loan. 
Colunm F: - if lender would grant loan to applicant who has not gone through first step. 
Colunm G: - borrowers residing outside lender's operational area. 
Colunin H: - borrowers who reside inside the lender's operational area. 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
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Table 4,7 Cost of Obtaining Information about Applicants and 
Some Operational Characteristics 
Lender A B c D E F G 
1 1 60 yes 10 no 90 10 
2 1 20 yes 8 yes 60 15 
3 1 20 yes 15 no 80 12 
4 0.5 20 no 20 yes 62 8 
5 1 20 yes 15 yes 85 20 
6 1 20 yes 10 no 95 15 
7 1 40 yes 12 yes 100 24 
8 0.5 15 yes 15 yes 75 23 
9 1 30 yes 10 yes 93 10 
10 1 20 yes 20 yes 86 10 
11 1.5 45 yes 30 no 58 14 
12 1 20 yes 20 yes 72 18 
13 2 30 yes 10 no 84 20 
14 
. 
05 10 yes 15 yes 98 16 
15 1 40 yes 5 yes 65 20 
16 1 30 yes 5 yes 95 10 
17 1 25 yes 10 yes 96 11 
18 1 20 yes 15 yes 79 14 
19 1 30 yes 20 no 67 15 
20 2 20 yes 40 yes 81 9 
Mean 1.03 26 
. 
75 15.25 81.05 14.7 
KgI to Columns: - 
Column A: - average number of days used to collect information about applicants. 
Column B: - average expenses incurred per day. 
Column C: - are moneylender's costs decreasing? 
Column D: - percentage of applicants rejected by moneylender. 
Column E: - did moneylender grant additional loan to customers who suffered crop failure? 
Column F: - percentage of repeat borrowers 
Column G: - number of years in moneylending business. 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
134 
4.30. Transactions Costs in the Informal Financial Market 
Data for this section come from our sample of 20 moneylenders (five from each 
of the four service areas of the RBs). A majority of the moneylenders we interviewed (80 
per cent) are located within their area of operation (defined as a five-mile radius) 
because, according to them, they want to keep abreast with issues and events involving 
their clients with a view to minimising risk (Table 4.6). 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 provide a synopsis of the steps moneylenders in Sierra Leone 
use to collect information and to screen borrowers. The moneylender expends 
considerable effort and resources to obtain information about applicants in order to 
reduce the risk of default and to solve the moral hazard and adverse selection of risk 
problems. Due to the lack of bankable collateral, the legal problems and high costs 
associated with the foreclosure of land, there are no practical alternatives open to the 
moneylender other than a careful screening of his applicants. An indication of the 
consequence of providing loans without adequate screening is the rate of default which is 
in excess of 30 per cent experienced by the rural banks and past government credit 
schemes in Sierra Leone (see Chapter Six). 
Although there is considerable variation in the methods used by individual 
moneylenders, some flexibility is displayed. However, the moneylender does not 
normally lend to an applicant with whom he has not dealt with in another market, say in 
the sales market of harvested crops or in the moneylender's multi-purpose shop (Table 
4.6). Notable exemptions are close relatives who are not usually charged any interest and 
from whom collateral is not usually demanded. It should also be noted, however, that the 
moneylender could entertain a first application from a borrower who can provide 
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adequate collateral or a surety40- Such cases are shown in Table 4.6. These applicants 
were not given a small loan as an initial test and a visit to their farm or enterprises was 
only made to cross check and collect more information about their activities. The 
screening period which, on average, lasts one cropping season (April to November) 
provides important information about the farmer/borrower, which includes the likely 
marketable surplus and the way the latter deals in other markets. Such information is not 
available to the rural banks and if the rural banks were to attempt to collect it the cost 
could well be prohibitive. Secondly, most of the moneylenders surveyed made enquiries 
of applicants in their village and even their farms/enterprises (Table 4.6). Such enquiries 
involved the applicant's indebtedness and reputation in the market. Thirdly, if the 
applicant satisfies the requirements in the three stages, a small loan is given as a test. If 
the borrower repays the initial loan, he or she can depend on the moneylender for 
subsequent credit. 
Tables 4.8 and 4.10 show that the screening costs are substantial. On average, it 
takes one day of the moneylender's time to collect information about the applicant. 
Expected default, which is based on past experience, is high given the amount of money 
lent. There are costs implicit in this exercise. Firstly, there is an opportunity costs of time 
for the one day which is determined here using the agricultural daily wage rate 41 and 
which is uniform for the whole country. It is a better measure than, for example, returns 
which may vary with different types of enterprise and the entrepreneurial skills of the 
moneylenders, 
40 A surety in this case means a NIllage notary who has the means of repaying the loan if default occurs 
or a member of the borrower's fanuly who is of good standing with the moneylender in the viflage. 
41 Agncultural daily wage rate was LeI66.00 (FAO, 1992) 
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Table 4.8 Risks Faced by Moneylenders 
Lender A B c 
1 3.0 8 1.5 
2 2.6 0 1 
3 2.7 0 2 
4 3.1 10 1 
5 3.0 0 3 
6 2.1 10 2 
7 2.0 0 1 
8 2.6 0 1 
9 2.7 5 2 
10 2,8 20 1 
11 2.5 0 1 
12 2.3 0 1 
13 2.6 0 2 
14 1.7 20 2 
15 3.2 0 1 
16 2.6 0 2 
17 2.3 10 
18 2.6 0 
19 2.8 0 
20 2.6 0 2 
Average 2.59 - 1.45 
Kev to Columns. 
Column A: - percentage of expected default (based on past experience). 
Column B: - percentage of loan against which collateral is taken. 
Column C: - average delay of repayment after due date (months) 
Source: - The Survey, 1994 
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Table 4.9 Location of Monevienders and their Clients 
Lender Location of 
moneylender 
Nameof 
town or 
village* 
Clients 
located 
within* 
Clients 
located 
outside* 
I I Nfile 91 *** yes 
2 0 Mathoir yes 
3 1 Yonibana yes 
4 1 Malal yes 
5 1 Masorie yes 
6 1 Lunsar* ** yes 
7 0 Portloko yes 
8 1 Feredugu yes 
9 1 Mabesseneh yes 
10 0 Mamusa yes 
II I Mattru *** yes 
12 1 Mokanji yes 
13 1 Mattru *** yes 
14 1 Luawa yes 
15 1 Bonthe yes 
16 0 Makali *** yes 
17 1 Masingbi yes 
18 1 Makali yes 
19 1 Matotoka yes 
20 1 Magburaka yes 
Note: - I located inside operational area (defined as a 5-mile radius). 
0 located outside operational area. 
Moneylenders location. 
clients located inside or outside operational area of moneylender. 
Location of RB. 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
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Table 4.10 Moneylenders Loans Analysis (Previous jear's Actuals) 
Lender Number of 
borrowers 
Amount 
loaned 
(LeOOO) 
Average 
size of 
loan 
(LeOOO) 
Number of 
actual 
defaulters 
Amount 
actuafly 
defaulted 
(LeOOO) 
Percentage 
of loans 
actually 
defaulted 
1 16 24.00 1.50 2 1.20 5.0 
2 11 30.00 2,70 3 0.51 1.7 
3 4 20.00 2.50 1 -- 0.60 6.0 
4 3 20.00 6.60 1 0.40 2.0 
5 6 20.00 3.33 1 0.42 2.1 
6 9 30.00 3.33 2 0.33 1.1 
7 8 15.00 1.88 2 0.77 5.1 
8 5 20-00 4.00 3 0.68 3.4 
9 3 15.00 5.00 2 0.90 6.0 
10 4 10.00 2.50 1 0.62 6.2 
11 3 30.00 10.0 2 1.56 5.2 
12 7 35.00 5.00 3 2.10 6.0 
13 10 30.00 3.00 1 0.30 1.0 
14 8 40.00 5.00 2 0.40 1.0 
15 15 30.00 2.00 1 2.40 8.0 
16 12 20.00 1.67 1 0.42 2.1 
17 13 10.00 0.77 3 0.16 1.6 
18 5 15.00 3.00 2 0.62 4.1 
19 14 20.00 1.43 1 1.40 7.0 
20 10 30.00 1.80 1 1.20 6.7 
Total 166 464 67.01 35 16.99 1 - 
1 LMean 
8,30 23.20 3.35 1 1.75 1 0.8ý5 
ý 
3.84 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
On average, the expected rate of default ranged between 1.7 to 3.1 per cent with a mean 
of 2,6 per cent (Table 4.8). The actual default for the previous year (Table 4.10) was 
higher, with fifteen (75 per cent) of the twenty moneylenders surveyed experiencing a 
default rate of over 2.0 per cent. The cumulative rate of default is a good approximation 
of the incidence of bad debt. Given that some of the overdue loans may eventually be 
recovered, due mainly to the closeness of the moneylender to his clients and the methods 
used to collect repayment, the cumulative rate of default, if anything, an over estimation 
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Table 4.11 Factors Influencing Moneylenders' Loan Decisions 
lender A B c D E F G Ranldng 
I yes yes yes 45 yes yes Fý Eý &C 
2 yes yes yes yes 60 yes F), C, &A 
3 yes yes yes 75 yes FýE&C 
4 yes yes yes 40 yes C, D&F 
5 yes yes yes 40 yes yes FY G&E 
6 yes yes yes 50 yes D3, E&F 
7 yes yes yes 60 yes EJ&A 
8 yes yes 70 yes yes F, C&E 
9 yes yes yes 30 yes yes A, F&E 
10 yes yes yes 45 yes Eý F7 &C 
11 yes yes yes yes 64 yes F, D&E 
12 yes yes yes yes 80 yes B, F&E 
13 yes yes 70 Sze y0 F) D&C 
14 yes yes yes 100 es E2F&A 
d 
15 yes yes 55 yes D), E&F 
16 yes yes 20 yes A, C&F 
17 yes yes yes yes 30 yes EJ&C 
18 yes yes yes yes 45 es CJ& 
19 yes yes yes yes 50 yes yeý D, B&F 
20 yes yes 70 yes C, G 
Kev to Columns 
Column A: - Acreage cultivated by customer. 
Column B: - Availability of funds. 
Column C: - good customer i. e. one previously dealt with, in another market. 
Column D: - Duration of loan. 
Column E: - Credit/market interlinkage. 
Column F: - Fear of the 'rebel' war situation 
Column G: - Availability of collateral. 
Ranking: - The three most important fhctors (in order of priority). 
Source: -The Survey, 1994. 
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Table 4.12 Actual Transaction Costs of Moneylenders for Previous Year (1993) 
(Summarv of Data) 
_Lender 
A B c D E F 
1 24 . 
060 . 
332 
. 
0296 
. 
4216 1.757 
2 30 . 
020 
. 
166 
. 
0084 
. 
1944 0.648 
3 20 . 
020 
. 
166 
. 
0197 
. 
2057 1.029 
4 20 
. 
020 
. 
083 
. 
0066 
. 
1096 0.548 
5 20 
. 
020 
. 
166 
. 
0207 
. 
2067 1.034 
6 30 
. 
020 
. 
332 
. 
0109 
. 
3629 1.209 
7 15 
. 
040 
. 
332 
. 
0013 
. 
3733 2.489 
8 20 
. 
015 
. 
083 
. 
0112 
. 
1092 0.546 
9 15 
. 
030 
. 
332 
. 
0297 
. 
3917 2.611 
10 10 
. 020 . 
166 
. 
0102 
. 
1962 1.962 
11 30 
. 
045 
. 
332 
. 0257 . 
4077 1.359 
12 35 
. 020 . 
166 
. 0346 . 
2206 0.630 
13 30 
. 
030 
. 
332 
. 
0099 
. 
3719 1.239 
14 40 
. 
010 
. 
083 
. 
0132 
. 
1062 0.266 
15 30 
. 
040 
. 
166 
. 
0396 
. 
2456 0.819 
16 20 
. 
030 
. 
166 . 0139 . 
2099 1.049 
17 10 
. 
025 
. 166 . 
0264 
. 
2124 2.124 
18 15 
. 
020 166 
. 
0102 
. 
1962 1.308 
19 20 
. 
030 
. 
166 
. 
0231 
. 
2191 1.096 
20 30 
. 
020 
. 
332 
. 
0396 . 3916 1.305 
Total 464 0.535 4.233 0.3845_ 5.1525 25.028 
Mean 23.2 . 02675 0.2117 
j 
. 0192 . 2576 1.251 
, 
Kev to Columns: - 
Column A: - Amount loaned (Le 000). 
Column B: - Cost of collecting information about borrowers i. e. number of days used 
multiplied by the agricultural wage rate (in LeOOO). 
Column C: - Opportunity cost of lender's time ( in Le, calculated as number of days used 
to collect information multiplied by the agricultural wage rate i. e. Le 
166.00/day42 (in Le '000') 
Column D: - Opportunity cost of lender's funds delayed after due date (the savings rate in 
the RBs is used as a proxy; i. e. 20 percent per annurn (in Le '000) 
Column E: - Total transaction costs (B+C+D). 
Column F: - Total transaction costs as percentage of total amount loaned. 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
42 FAO, 1992. 
141 
of the non-recoverable debt. it would, therefore, be fair to conclude that the screening 
actions of the moneylender tend to be more successful compared to rural banks and 
those of predecessor credit institutions in Sierra Leone. The screening process of 
moneylenders is, however, not perfect. Delinquent loans involving late repayment were a 
constant source of concern to moneylenders surveyed. As indicated in Table 4.12, the 
lender faces a significant risk of losses in terms of default and opportunity costs of time 
when repayment is delayed with the period of delay being, on average, 1.5 months with a 
range of 1-3 months (Table 4.8). The above discussion suggests that the moneylender 
faces high costs in his lending operation as Table 4.12 indicates. Total actual transaction 
costs for the previous year, 1993 are, on average, 1.25 per cent of total loans with a 
range of 0.2-2.5 per cent. This is high considering the average mean loan size of Le 23.2 
thousand (US$ 41.13 at 1993 exchange rate). This level of transaction cost is, however,, 
low compared to RBs (see Chapter Six). But to be able to explain the relationship 
between the interest rates observed and the factors influencing them, a linear regression 
model is used. 
4.31. Model specification. 
Several variables influence the interest rates charged by the moneylender. Some 
of them are easily quantifiable. The discussion that follows will indicate the various 
variables used to develop the model. 
4.32. Monopoly variable. 
The monopoly profit has been ascribed the difference between the observed 
interest rate and the total cost of lending. The existence of monopoly profit in IFMs is, 
however, still not clear. For example, Long (1975); Bottomley (1975) and Wells (1980), 
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using hypothetical cost curves strongly affected by administrative cost and risk pren-ýium 
conclude that monopoly profit is not an important feature of RFMs in LICs. Nisbet 
(1967) and Wai (1957) using different assumptions regarding default rates and returns on 
investment conclude that monopoly profit is important. In the Philippines, Floro and 
Yotopoulos (1991) found that the issue of monopoly profit is still inconclusive. For 
example, Gapud (1958) and TBAC (1985) found evidence of monopoly profit. But 
Quinones (1982) and Serrano (1983) distinguishing between premium risk,, 
administrative cost and opportunity cost of capital among transactions costs, found little 
incidence of monopoly profit. Since many aspects of transaction costs are not directly 
observable and quantifiable, measurement of these leaves room for much speculation. As 
Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) have stated, the deductions about the evidence of 
monopoly profit must be viewed as an analyst's construct. 
The above notwithstanding, other approaches have been used to assess the 
evidence of monopoly surcharge in the IFM. In Sierra Leone, the theory of the firm 
offers a satisfactory compromise in explaining the presence or non-presence of monopoly 
profit in the lending activity of moneylenders. One of the best known outcomes of 
competitive pricing is that no firm can make abnormal profits; and firms operate at the 
minimum point of their long-run average cost curve (Lipsey, 1990). Using that as a basis, 
let us consider the entry of a non-profit maximising government lending agency with 
subsidised interest rates into the credit market. If it charges a lower nominal interest rate 
than moneylenders (as the RBs do in Sierra Leone), the tendency will be for borrowers 
to flock to it for the cheap loans. A moneylender will, therefore, be forced to close down 
if this government agency can satisfy the demand for credit. From what we know, 
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however), such agencies can rarely satisfy the total demand. Government agencies are 
usuafly forced to aflocate credit through non-price means (rationing). They tend to lend 
to borrowers whom they consider low risk, leaving the high risk borrowers to be catered 
for by the moneylenders. In this scenario, which is typical of RFMs in LICs, the 
presumption is that interest rates in the EFMs will not fall. It should be noted, however, 
that the opportunity cost borne by a moneylender can be reduced by the presence of a 
DID 
Rus causing moneylenders to reduce their interest rates. This could happen if 
moneylenders are able to borrow from RBs to on-lend to their clients. It could also occur 
if moneylenders face an increasing cost of funds schedule (i. e. in securing loanable funds) 
and competition from the RB pushes them down to a lower cost of funds schedule. 
In this model it is assumed that the IFM in Sierra Leone operates under 
competitive market conditions and there are numerous moneylenders. By implication, 
therefore, if a rural bank (with its subsidised interest rate) enters such a market, we 
would expect rural residents to take advantage of the lower interest rate it offers. It is 
expected that this would reduce moneylenders' clients and those moneylenders who lose 
enough clients to the extent that their credit operations become unprofitable, would close 
down. If the situation remains competitive and no rationing occurs, the long run 
consequence is a reduction in interest rates charged by moneylenders. The caveat, 
however, is that the interest rate in the IFM wifl remain constant or rise. The reason 
being that RBs have limited funds and the huge demand will force them to ration or 
select borrowers using non-price means. It will be shown in Chapter Six that RBs in 
Sierra Leone tend to be rationing credit. 
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In this model, the presence of an RB is ntroduced to assess the effect on the 
interest rate charged by moneylenders. To assess this effect, a dummy variable xvhich 
takes the value of I. for the presence of a RB where a moneylender operates and 0,, 
where no RB is present. If the coefficient is large enough and negative. we can 
reasonably argue that a monopoly surcharge is an important component of the interest 
rates charged by moneylenders. The rate will however be measured against the level of 
interest rate charged by RBs. lqbal (1987), used this technique to measure the incidence 
of monopoly surcharge in Bangladesh; but found the incidence to be negligible. 
4.33. Credit-Marketing Interlinkage (Tie-ins) variable. 
Tie-in sales is one of the variables whose effect is difficult to measure in credit- 
market interlinkage deals in the IFMs of LICs. Moneylenders combine various services - 
trade, farn-ting, marketing - in the rural areas (lack of specialisation). They trade in a 
variety of goods ranging from consumer to production items. The linking of these 
activities with credit deals makes the separation of the returns from tie-in sales difficult. 
Since prices at the time of harvest could be higher or lower than the price agreed at the 
time the tie-in sales contract was drawn up, the true interest rate from interlinkage is 
subsumed and could only be considered as implicit (Aleem, 1990; Floro and Yotopoulos, 
1991). Thus we have used a dummy variable as a proxy for tie-in sales. A value of I is 
used where the moneylender reported that more than 10 per cent of his lending operation 
involved tie-in sales and 0 if fie-ins are less than 10 per cent of his lending transactions. 
4.34. Risk of default variable. 
The risk of default is one of the variables that has been investigated by many 
researchers including Bottornley (1975); Aleem (1990) and Yotopolous (1991). All of 
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them found it to be significant in its influence on the level of interest rates charged in the 
informal sector. Discussions with our sample of moneylenders indicates that risk of 
default is one of the worrying aspects in credit operations. To reduce its effects on 
lending, moneylenders often engage in credit-marketing interlinkage. In this model 
expected default is expressed as a percentage of loans extended. A positive sign is 
expected because an increase in the probability of default will tend to increase the 
interest rate charged. 
4.35. Number of years in business variable. 
The longer a moneylender has been in business the more insight he has into the 
character of his clients and potential borrowers. In other words, he is high up the 
learning curve. This increases his chances of reducing the adverse selection of risk and 
the moral hazard problems. He is also in a better position, compared to newly established 
moneylenders and formal lenders, when it comes to the use of social and cultural 
measures of loan enforcement because of his familiarity with the socio-cultural mifieu. 
The length of time a moneylender has been in business has been recognised. in the 
literature as an important factor (Besley, 1993; Aleem, 1990; Floro and Yotopoulos, 
1991). Our model has thus included it as one of the variables to explain the level of 
interest rate observed. In our sample about 60 percent have been in business for 10 years 
and above (Table 4.6). 
4.36. Information costs variable. 
The study was unable to separate administrative from information costs because 
moneylenders did not keep records of administrative costs. They regard administrative 
costs as part of the costs incurred in the coflection of information and repayment when 
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loans are due and none of them reported of having agents to collect repayment. Their 
areas of operation tend to be small and the volume of business (granting loans) at the 
time of the survey, was on a small-scale probably on account of the on-going 'rebel' war. 
In the Sierra Leone context then moneylenders do not incur significant costs on loan 
administration. Given that initial runs of the model produced serial correlation between 
information cost and administrative cost. The two variables were combined to form a 
valiable called INFO, which was expressed as a proportion of total loans granted. The 
indication from the survey was that the collection of information is very vital and it is a 
continuous process given the moneylender's desire to reduce adverse selection of risk. 
4.37. Acreage variable. 
Different types of variables have been used to measure risk of default. The one 
commonly used is the income of the borrower (Iqbal, 1987). But this variable is not 
directly measurable in the Sierra Leone context. People's wealth and income are treated 
as confidential matters, and businesses in the informal sector do not disclose quarterly, 
half-yearly or yearly accounts. Farmers are mostly illiterate and do not keep records of 
operations. The lender is therefore unlikely to base his decision to lend on the borrower's 
income. One factor which could be used as a proxy for income is the average acreage 
cultivated by the borrower. It should be recalled that one of the activities in the 
collection of information about the borrower is a visit to the latter's farm or business 
location (Table 4.6). This is done to assess the probability of default in relation to the 
size of the applicant's business. Iqbal, (1987) used this variable in Bangladesh and found 
it to be a good proxy for income and significant in explaining differential interest rates 
charged by moneylenders. In our survey, moneylenders informed us that the size of a 
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man"s farm tells a lot about him. It conveys how serious he is with his work and how 
hard working he is. As one of the moneylenders put it, "it would be foolish to lend a 
huge sum of money to a farmer who you know is lazy (i. e. cultivates a small farm)". 
Spencer (1977), calculated that the minimum acreage for subsistence for a family of 
three in Sierra Leone is 1.5 acres. Experience has taught moneylenders in Sierra Leone 
that lending to farmers who cultivate small acreages increases the risk of default. Table 
4.11 gives an indication of the factors influencing moneylenders' decision to extend 
credit. The size of farm (acreage) is one of the important ones. But the most important 
are the 'rebel' war, followed by interlinkage and 'good customer' defined as one with 
whom the lender had dealt with in another market. The borrower's family size could also 
be a proxy for the size of farm; but most farmers now send their children away to schools 
in urban areas. In the rural areas of Sierra Leone, the size of a farmer's family used to 
influence the size of his farm (Spencer, 1977); but in present-day Sierra Leone, the desire 
to educate children as an insurance against old age and illness tends to reduce fann 
family labour. Therefore, family size was not used in our analysis. Instead, the acreage a 
ifumer can cultivate on his own with the available labour, gives a close approximation of 
output and hence income. 
4.38. Duration of loan variable. 
Duration of loans is also likely to be affected by the instability and uncertainty in 
the country. Lenders informed us that they were afraid to lend for periods longer than 9 
months for the same reasons discussed earlier. It is expected that the longer the period of 
loan, the higher will be the interest rate charged. 
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On the whole, the results of the analysis should be treated with caution as the 
true picture could have been influenced by the on-going 'rebel' war. This 
notwithstanding, the results of the analysis provide a fair assessment of the costs facing 
the moneylender and the factors affecting the level of interest rates they charge at this 
point in time. 
To understand these factors, a simple multiple regression model (NMM) has been 
fitted for parameter estimates. The MRM is based on the simple equation approach 
where the independent variables are assumed to have a relationship with the dependent 
variable. The indicative interest rate is thus assumed not to be influenced by any other 
relationships within the economic process. Parameter estimate of the multiple regression 
are derived through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In addition to the conventional 
assumptions underlying the multiple regression model the selected variables, average 
acreage cultivated, cost of collecting information about borrowers, default risk, average 
duration of loan, the presence of a rural bank and tie-in contracts are assumed to be 
important factors influencing the level of interest rates charged by the moneylender. 
The equation can, therefore, be implicitly expressed as; 
y : -ý 
f(XI, X2, X3j, X4:, X5,, X6, X7, F-) 
Where, 
Y= Indicative interest rate charged by the moneylender. 
Xl= Administrative costs and resources allocated to the coflection of information 
about boffowers. 
149 
X2 -Presence of an RB in the operational area of the moneylender. (Dummy variable 
which takes the value I, for the presence of a RB and 0, where no bank is 
present). 
X3 = Tie-in sales (Dummy variable which takes the value of 1, where moneylender's 
lending operation involves over 10 per cent of tie-ins and 0, where tie-in 
transactions are less that 10 per cent of transactions). 
X4= Expected default risk as a proportion of loans granted. 
X5 = Number of years the moneylender has been in business. 
X6= Duration of the loan (in months). 
X7= Average acreage cultivated by borrowers. 
F, - Error term for unquantifiable factors influencing level of interest rates. 
The list of variables is; 
Dependent Variable 
1. fNDRT (Indicative interest rates observed). 
Independent Variables Expected Sign 
2. BNKPR (Presence of a RB, Dummy variable). 
3. TIEIN (Tie-in sales, Dummy variable). + 
4. DFRK (Default risk). + 
5. YRBU (Number of years in business). 
INFO (Administrative cost and resources allocated 
to the collection of information about borrowers). + 
7. DURA (Average duration of the loans in months). + 
8. ACRG (average acreage cultivated by borrowers). 
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The equation for the model stands as: - 
INDRT=bo+b, (BNKPR)+b2(TEEIN)+b3(DFRK)+b4()("Lý+ 
b5(MO)+b6(DURA)+b7(ACRG)+& 
The first step towards the development of the model was the construction of a 
correlation matrix of all the variables used to explain the dependent variable. This is 
given in Table 4.13. It is implicit in the above relationship that variations in the 
dependent variable (indicative interest rate charged) can be explained by the variations in 
the independent variables 
4.40. Results of the Regression Analysis 
The regression was run using the stepwise method to eliminate the variables that 
were not significant in explaining the level of interest rates observed. 
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the small size of the sample, the 
model's coffelation coefficient (Multiple R) is high at 0.89, suggesting that the model go 
a considerable way in explaining the situation as observed. The adjusted coefficient of 
deterruination (R), 0.80, indicates that 80 per cent of the variation in the interest rates 
observed can be explained by variance in the variables used in the model. The variables 
had the expected signs. 
On the basis of the correlation matrix (Table 4.13) it can be suggested that the 
most important variables for the data set and the model are the duration of the loan, the 
default risk and tie-in sales. All three variables were significant at the 99% level. The 
positive sign on the coefficient of the duration variable (Table 4.13), suggests that 
interest rate would increase with increase in the length of time the borrower wants the 
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loan for. Iqbal (1987) and Aleem (1990) came to the same conclusion when they studied 
factors influencing the level of interest rates observed in India and Pakistan respectively. 
Table 4.13 Correlation Matrix 
fNDRT ACRG BKPR DFRK DURA INFO TIEN YRBU 
INDRT 1.0000 
ACRG 
. 0337 
1.0000 
BKPR -. 2160 . 
0101 1.0000 
DFRK 
. 
8390 
. 
1858 -. 0867 1.0000 
DURA 
. 
8261 
. 
1047 -. 1100 . 
7144 1.0000 
INFO 
. 
2157 
. 
1739 . 1238 . 
2870 
. 
0627 1.0000 
TEEIN 
. 
7074 
. 
0788 
. 
0000 
. 
8518 
. 
5185 
. 
2444 1 1.0000 
YRBU -. 1927 . 
1277 -. 2262 -. 2080 
1 
-. 1952 
1 
-. 3110 -. 2584 1.0000 
Table 4.14 Summarv of Reeression Analysis 
Coefficient of multiple regression 
Coefficient of Determination (R Square) 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Analysis of Variance 
DF 
Regression 2 
Residual 17 
F Ratio = 35.975 Sig. F= . 
000 
. 
899 
. 
808 
. 
786 
1.335 
Sum of Squares 
128.248 
30.301 
Vafiables in the Equation 
Mean Square 
64.122 
1.782 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig. T 
DFRK 3.377 1.006 
. 
051 3.354 . 
004 
DURA 
. 
780 
. 
255 
. 
463 3.056 
. 
007 
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Default risk also had the expected sign suggesting that an increase in default risk 
would lead to an increase in the interest rate that will be charged. Bottomley (1975), 
Iqbal (1987), Aleem (1990) and many others have all observed that default risk had a 
positive correlation with interest rate in the IFMs of LICs. The actual default risk of 
from I to 8.0 per cent (with a mean of 3.8 per cent) is high relative to the average size of 
total loans of Le 23.2 thousand granted (Tables 4.10 and 4.12). Aleem (1990) observed 
a default risk of around 6 per cent in the IFM in the area he studied in Pakistan. As with 
the duration of the loan, the anticipated default risk was high due to the instability in the 
country, underlying the fear of moneylenders about default risk. 
Tie-in sales are a common feature of IFMs in LICs. In Sierra Leone over 60 per 
cent of the moneylenders we interviewed reported having linked their loan operations to 
other transactions such as input/output sale and repayment in kind (Table 4.4). The 
interest rate in this kind of credit/trade interlinkage is subsumed in the prices ruling at the 
time the contract is concluded and the prices at harvest for the commodity used in the in- 
kind payment. The matrix shows that tie-ins are significant with a high and positive 
correlation with interest rate charged, at the 99 Per cent level and the result is consistent 
with conclusions reached by others (Iqbal 1987; Aleem, 1990), who have studied the 
IFMs in LICs. However, the final model did not include tie-in sales probably because 
interest rates charged by moneylenders are subsumed in the credit/market interlinkage. 
Although the other variables are not significant at this point in time, some 
comment about their magnitudes is warranted. The information cost (i. e. administrative 
cost and resources allocated to the collection of information about borrowers) is low and 
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varies from between 1.0 to 1.6 per cent of average loan size of Le 23.2 thousand, mainly 
because of the experience of lenders, a majority of whom had operated for over 10 years 
(Table 4.15). Table 4.12 provides a breakdown of these costs. Total transaction costs 
(administrative cost, information cost and opportunity costs of time and outstanding 
Table 4.15 Variables Information 
INDRT ACRG BKPR DFRK DURA INFO TEEIN YRBU 
1 49 2.0 1 3.0 9 120 1 10 
2 45 1.5 1 2.6 6 20 0 15 
3 48 2.6 1 2.7 9 20 1 12 
4 51 2.1 0 3.1 9 25 1 8 
5 47 2.3 0 3.0 6 40 1 20 
6 42 1.9 1 2.1 6 40 0 15 
7 43 2.5 1 2.0 6 40 1 24 
8 45 2.5 0 2.6 6 20 1 23 
9 46 2.3 1 2.7 6 60 1 10 
10 48 1.2 1 2.8 9 20 1 10 
11 45 1.6 1 2.5 6 60 0 14 
12 44 1.8 0 2.3 6 20 1 18 
13 45 1.6 1 2.6 6 30 0 20 
14 43 1.5 0 1.7 6 10 0 16 
15 52 1.4 0 3.2 9 40 1 20 
16 45 1.8 1 2.6 6 30 0 10 
17 40 - 1.8 1 1.3 3 25 0 11 
18 46 2.0 0 2.6 9 20 1 14 
19 46 2.5 1 2.8 9 30 1 15 
20 47 2.0 0 2.6 6 100 1 9 
Total -- 
_ 38.9 -- 50.8 138 770 -- 294 
Menn 4 1. -- 
1 2.54 6.9 38.5 14.7 
Notes: -INDRT = Indicative interest rate charged by moneylender (1/6). 
ACRG = Average acreage cultivated by clients of moneylender. 
BKPR = Presence of RB (Dummy variable -0 for no bank, I for bank presence). 
DFRK = Expected default risk (percentage of amount loaned). 
DURA = Average duration of loans (months). 
INFO = Average administrative and cost of information collection about clients. 
TIEIN Tie-in sales (Dummy variable -0 for no tie-M sales, I for tie-M sales). 
YRBU Number of years in business of lending. 
Source. - The Survey, 1994. 
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loans) are on average 1.25 per cent of average loan granted. It suggests that 
moneylenders face high costs, especiafly in view of the smallness of the amounts loaned. 
Aleem (1990) also reported an average transactions costs of around 1-6 per cent in his 
study of the IFM in Pakistan, but he considers it to be low when compared to formal 
credit institutions in the same country. 
The model also suggests that interest rates observed were not influenced by 
monopoly surcharge. The presence of a RBs in the area of operation of moneylenders 
did not influence the rate charged by moneylenders. This may be due to the ineffective 
competition posed by RBs. It is therefore not surprising to see that BNKPR is not 
significant in explaining the level of interest rates observed, although it had the expected 
sign. 
It must be emphasised that the result of the regression, though important, may 
have been influenced by the unstable situation in the country. In addition, although the 
sample of moneylenders was chosen on availability of respondents as against 
representativeness, the results give a fair idea of their mode of operation and lessons can 
be learnt from it by RBs and policy makers who are interested in creating viable RBs. 
The variables which are not significant at this point in time, may be important when a 
relatively stable enabling enviromnent returns in Sierra Leone. It would, therefore, be 
necessary to test the model when the situation returns to normality. 
4.41. Conclusion. 
Over thirty years of government intervention in rural credit markets suggests that 
the creation of institutional alternatives has failed to replace the traditional moneylender 
in the credit markets of rural areas in Sierra Leone. Whatever competition government 
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institutions have provided, interest rates charged by traditional moneylenders remain high 
in nominal terms when compared to those charged by RBs. 
Their flexible mode of operation, nearness to their clients,, little or no delay in 
granting loans and the use of socio-cultural means to extract repayment put 
moneylenders in a more advantageous position when compared to other formal credit 
institutions. In addition, moneylenders perform useffil services which RBs have been 
unable to undertake and for which they were not designed. Moneylenders provide a 
market through credit interfinkages and lend without being too fussy about collateral or 
too woffied about the end-use of the loan. 
Their transaction costs are typically low compared to RBs (Chapter Six) and 
costs incurred by clients when borrowing from them is next to zero mainly because they 
are part of the village set-up. Moneylenders seem to be exercising a high degree of 
control in rural credit and marketing of inputs and output. Mechanisms they employ 
involve the expending of resources on screening applicants and enforcing loans 
repayment. It follows that the relatively high nominal interest rates they charge reflect the 
high cost of these activities. More importantly, these mechanisms may suggest a 
monopolistic competitive structure with interest rates spread between different segments 
of the rural credit market; it further suggests that the moneylender's power is unlikely to 
be broken by entry of formal credit institutions unless such institutions (including RBs) 
find substitutes for or integrate the kinds of mechanisms used by moneylenders into their 
operating policies in order to overcome the problems of screening, incentives and 
enforcement. 
156 
Although our discussion suggests barriers to entry and exit in the IFM in Sierra 
Leone, these barriers are not insurmountable. What is needed is more effective 
competition to reduce the profit of the moneylender, thereby forcing a reduction of 
interest rates and provision of a wider choice of lenders for borrowers. 
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Chapter V Analysis of the Operation of the Osusu in Sierra Leone. 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides a continuation of the discussion on the informal financial 
sector through focusing on the Osusu, the local version of the Rotating Savings and 
Credit Association (ROSCA) in Sierra Leone. Because of the osusu's pervasiveness in 
both the urban and rural areas, its different mode of operation compared to a 
moneylender's and the variety of services it performs for its members, it warrants a 
chapter of its own. The objective is to highlight its importance for savings mobilisation 
and as a source of credit, to outline the variety of needs it meets and to examine its 
linkage with FFIs. The chapter is organised, into five sections. The first provides a 
theoretical perspective for analysing the ROSCA. The second discusses the operations of 
the osusu, highlighting the various types which can be found in Sierra Leone, The third 
discusses the rationale for membership and the uses to which funds are put. The fourth 
examines some efforts to link ROSCAs with FFIs in some Affican countries and the fifth 
concludes the chapter with a discussion on a new perspective for providing assistance to 
these self-help groups by Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international 
Donor Agencies (IDAs) in LICs. 
5,10 Theoretical Perspective 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) have been reported in most 
LICs including more than half of the countries in Affica (Miracle et al., 1980). They have 
also been reported to operate among immigrant groups in the United States of America 
(Light, 1972; Bonnet, 1981). The basic form of the ROSCA is "an association formed 
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upon a core of participants who agree to make contributions to a fund which is given, in 
whole or in part, to each contributor in turn" (Ardener, 1964, p. 201). The modes of 
operation of this basic form can vary from one country to another and from one locality 
to another within the same country (Bouman, 1995; Ardener, 1995; Burman and 
Lembete, 1995). In many countries ROSCAs are popular among the poor who have been 
rationed out of banking services (Von Pischke, 1994). They are also often popular 
among the inteflectuals and the pofitical efite even though they may have easy access to 
formal banking systems (Adams, 1993, Ardener, 1995; Bouman, 1995). ROSCAs have 
been reported to be operated by workers of FFIs in both high-income and low-income 
countries. Adams (1993) gives examples of some FFIs in Bolivia, Belize, Papua New 
Guinea., the Philippines and E gypt43 where worker have been engaged in the practice. 
ROSCAs have also been reported among Somali and Asian Women in the United 
Kingdom (Summerfield, 1995) and Koreans in Los Angeles (Deng, 1995). A ROSCA is 
even known to have been operated by employees of the International Monetary Fund 
(Adams, 1983, p. 13-14). 
The names by which ROSCAs are known in various countries are numerous. 
Miracle et al. (1980, p. 704) gives a list of local names applying in some African 
countries. In Nigeria, for example, they are known by a variety of names including esusu, 
isusu, dashi, adashi, oba, bam. In Liberia, they are called Asusu. In the Cwneroon, 
djanggi in Ghana, susu and in The Gambia and Sieffa Leone they are called osusu. In 
Francophone west Affica, they are generally known as tonfines. In Egypt they are called 
Gam'iya (Baydas, et al., 1995). 
43 Bavdas, et al (1995) reports that a high proportion of employees of the Principal Bank for 
Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) have been participating in Gam'iyas in Eg-, pt. 
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ROSCAs are of two basic forms: those with rotating fimds and those with non- 
rotating funds. According to Bouman (1995, p. 371), "the scope of the ROSCAs extends 
beyond the frontiers of the financial landscape, revealing the gradual changes taking 
place in the tribal and political arenas and in the economic, cultural and normative 
systems of society at large". In many places ROSCAs have spread in financial climates 
and cultural contexts where FFIs have floundered, due to the inability or unwillingness of 
creditors to meet their obligations (Ardener, 1995, p. 2). ROSCAs are sometimes also 
initiated in response to sudden needs of liquidity, to take advantage of unpredictable 
income flows or to acquire desired durables (Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey, 1995; Bouman, 
1995). The discipfine of regular contribution and payment in the ROSCAs is thought to 
have influenced new forms of financial arrangements. The ChU44 funds in India are 
believed to have influenced the establishment of credit unions and the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh (Ardener, 1995, p. 3). In South Africa, FFIs have introduced new 
arrangements to attract ROSCA savings and have even used them to provide security 
and insurance for housing loans (Burman and Lembete, 1995). These developments 
suggest that the notion of FFIs and IFIs operating independently is no longer tenable. 
Participants can belong to more than one ROSCA (Niger-Thomas, 1995; Bortei- 
Doku and Aryeetey, 1995; Bouman, 1995), paying into one fund while contributing to 
another fund, which can be caHed on in an emergency. As Ardener (1995, p. 3) notes, 
"the speed with which ROSCAs can usually react to their members' needs can rarely be 
matched by distant, impersonaL banking systems". Other uses of the ROSCAs which go 
beyond the group dynamics are also emerging. For example, family planning in Indonesia 
41 See Radhakrishnan (1975) for more details. 
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directed at providing contraceptives for women has taken advantage of the discipline and 
moral imperatives of the ROSCA by setting up one to ensure that women present 
themselves regularly for treatment (Hospes, 1995). Members of a ROSCA can receive 
valuable services and economic information on a wide variety of topics. Nelson (1995) 
reports that a successful ROSCA organised by women beer-brewers in Kenya acquired 
the initial capital, organisational skills and confidence to deal with formal authorities and 
thereby acquire land, loans and ultimately substantial property assets. A similar success 
story is reported by Light and Deng (1995) about Korean clothing manufacturers in 
California having been aided by their use of ROSCA membership. Hospes (1995) also 
describes the accumulation of capital in Indonesian ROSCAs by all sections of the 
population - from police officers to traders to relatively impoverished housewives. 
Rowland (1995) reports on how the Bamileke businessmen in Cameroon establish 
networks of trust built up by membership of ROSCAs to share news and arrange 
business deals on a large scale. Almedon (1995) describes how Ethiopian women in war- 
torn Addis Ababa exchanged information at ROSCA meetings, while Burman and 
Lembete (1995) show how the rising middle-class women belonging to one ROSCA in 
Cape Town (South Affica) draw on each other's professional advice without financial 
payment. Ardener (1995, p. 8-9) notes that "in all these situations, friendship networks 
.. 
because 'social collateral' is a prerequisite for social and economic are a resource, 
survival", Financial and mutual aid ROSCAs are also reported to provide widespread, 
comprehensive welfare and insurance networks (Burman and Lembete, 1995). Their role 
is in guarding against expenses on illness and other fonns of misfortunes. Such a vast 
array of services would definitely form a compefling motive for participation especially 
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among marginal populations (Bouman, 1995). Against such a background, it would not 
I be wrong to suggest that evidence is strongly refuting claims that ROSCAs do not 
provide productive credit and that they are merely social gatherings rather than 
organisations performing indubitable economic fUnctions. 
Membership of ROSCAs can be single-sex or mixed. In countries such as 
Cameroon where Barnfleke married couples tend to lead almost independent and parallel 
lives, membership tends to be single-sex (Ardener, 1995). Generally, however, ROSCAs 
Table 5.1 Sex Composition of Rotating Susu Clubs in Accra 
and Kadiebi District (Gbana), 1991 
Susu Club Male Female 
Accra District 
(Public Departments. ) 
1 44 1 
2 7 3 
3 3 7 
4 24 1 
Nungua Ladies' Club 0 35 
Nupgua Savings Club 15 15 
Nungua Victory Bar Fan Club 10 70 
Makola Market nwn Obi so Na Ye 0 10 
Kaojebi District 
(Dodo Amanfrom Market) 
- Vegetable Sellers' Club 0 10 
- Kofinyor Club 0 10 
- Fish Seflers' Club 4 16 
- Agbesino's Club 0 16 
- Aboboitor's Club 0 10 
- Akpletor's Club 1 9 
Kadjebi Market 1 21 
Source: - Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey, (1995, p. 8 1). 
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membership takes into consideration similar circumstances such as the same neighbour- 
hood, same workplace, occupation or profession, tribal affiliation etc. Eldijk (1992) 
however, argues that trading activities, in particular, stimulate the emergence of new 
savings and credit groups which allow multiple speculation, bulk purchases, price fixing, 
the allocation of buying and selling territories and exercising market power. No single 
individual acting alone can possibly exercise such influence in the market place. 
Membership of ROSCAS varies considerably. In the Cameroon, for example, it is 
estimated that up to 80 per cent of the population and nearly all households (both men 
and women) participate in one form of ROSCA or another (Bouman, 1995). According 
to Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey (1995) membership of susu groups in Ghana is also high 
(about 73 per cent); but they note that these are predominantly women (market women). 
In offices, the composition tends to be predominantly men mainly because they are the 
majority office workers. But their research did not extend beyond the Accra and Kadjebi 
District and generalisations based on it cannot apply to the country as a whole. Table 
5.1 , 
however, support their statement that women predominate the susu groups in Accra 
(op. cit., p. 81). 
Research findings in LICs by economists on resource mobilisation and aflocation 
services performed by ROSCAs have generated interest and a tremendous amount of 
literature. It was reported that in several countries, amounts mobilised by informal 
financial sources including ROSCAs, have been as high as those mobi. lised by FFIs,, 
especially banks (Calfier, 1990). For example, Begashaw (1978, p. 249) reported that in 
Ethiopia, aggregate annual ROSCA savings were 8- 10 per cent of GDP. Schreider and 
Cuevas (1992, p. 54), reported that on the basis of a mean of US$ 777 for respondents, 
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the total national savings handled by rFIs in Cameroon was US$ 1.9 bil-lion, amounting 
to 54 per cent of total savings in the Cameroon in 1988. Another reason why economists 
have been interested in informal financial sources is the ability these informal sources 
have to solve problems that FFIs have either failed to handle properly or ignored 
(Adams, 1989). 
ROSCAs have been analysed in terms of financial intermediation, where members 
who have received the pot are seen as borrowers who borrow sums equivalent to their 
future contributions. These contributions are in turn regarded as future debt service 
payments. Members who have not received the pot are regarded as net savers as 
opposed to its recipients who have been regarded as net borrowers. Except for the first 
and the last members to collect the pot, all members switch from net savers to net 
debtors at some point in the cycle. The first is a net borrower and the last is a net saver 
throughout the entire cycle (Miracle et. al. 1980, p. 709-7 10). 
Besley et al. (1993,1994) used a model to examine the operations of two types 
of ROSCAs (the rotating and the random types) and showed that they do not in general 
produce efficient resource allocation. Whfle these findings may be valid, their model fails 
to take into consideration the effects ROSCAs have on poor people's lives in LICs and 
the range of services performed. The benefits of collective action cannot easily be 
quantified. For example, Callier (1990, p. 274), with the use of a simple formula 45 
showed that by collective action the average waiting time that would be taken to 
accumulate savings for the purchase of a bulky item if a member were saving in solitary 
fashion, could almost be halved. For instance, if the length of the cycle is 10 months and 
4-' If the amount of the pot is equal to the planned expenditure, the average waiting time W (expressed as 
a fraction of the entire circle of the osusu) for each of the n members is: W= [n + I]/ 2n. 
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the number of members is 10, the average waiting time, using Callier's formula could be 
a little over 5 months. The assumption is that the amount of the expenditure is equal to 
the total fund. The waiting time could be crucial for a poor farmer who does not have 
access to other forms of credit facilities. Bournan (1976), noted that the opportunity cost 
of time spent travelling to contract a loan from an FFI, the restrictions on deposits, rural 
residents' unfamiliarity with banking practices and the fear of rejection, contribute to 
making the ROSCA a favourable and easier option. The low transaction costs in saving 
and in contracting a loan are an added attraction of the ROSCA in LICs. 
Ardener (1995) notes a fundamental issue raised by Chapman (1992) that 
analysing the ROSCA using economic, political, social, ethnic, religious or gender terms 
separately, tends to ignore the 'imagery of the system' and can lead to spurious 
conclusions. Ardener adds that: 
"'the social and economic benefits commingle and are indissociable. The economic 
underpins the social, while simukaneously, the social supports the economic. The 
economic is the social and the social is the economic" (Ardemer, 1995: pp. 17-18). 
The discussion that follows, therefore, takes into consideration this fundamental issue in 
analysing the economic and social aspects of the osusu in Sierra Leone. 
5.20. The OSUSU in Sierra Leone 
The data and information in this section were obtained mainly from the three 
osusu organisers who fell within our sample of rural banks customers interviewed, from 
discussions with other respondents (non-customers) and commercial bank managers. 
While we note the limitations inherent in this we believe,, however!, that the information 
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on the osusu in Sierra Leone is fairly accurate and provides us with a basis for comparing 
with other financial intermediaries in the rural areas of Sierra Leone. 
In Sierra Leone, the osusu is practised within every stratum of society, from the 
rural to the urban areas and from the farming to the civil service sectors. It is also found 
among employees of most FFIs, such as commercial banks, the development bank, the 
rural banks,, the central bank and Government departments. Our survey did not focus on 
osusu groups per se, because of cost and time limitations; but we spoke to 5 osumi 
members who were also RB customers. Three of them were osusu organisers. The 
discussion that follows isl therefore, a mixture of what has already been found in other 
parts of the world and the information we obtained from the osusu members we 
interviewed. It should be noted that the only documented evidence of the omisu in Sierra 
Leone is from Banton (1957), who wrote about the practice during the 1950s among 
residents in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. Very little has been documented on 
the osusu since then. 
From descriptions of the operation of ROSCAs by different authors including 
Ardener (1964), Lewis (1976), Okorie and Mifler (1976), Begashaw (1977), Bouman 
(1977), Delancy (1978), Nfiracle (1980), Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey (1995) to name but 
a few, ROSCAs, especially in Anglophone West Africa, are fairly uniform in their 
characteristics and in the ways in which they operate. In Sierra Leone, the basic form is 
still predominantly practised. It is, however, slowly evolving and developing in several 
different ways 
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5.21 Types of Osusu in Sierra Leone 
There are two main types of osusu operating in Sierra Leone namely, the Fixed 
Fund (FF) osusu and the Rotating Fund (RF) osusu. The differences between these two 
are significant in both operational terms and in the services they offer their members. The 
FF type was the earlier version introduced by Nigerian traders. The date of its 
introduction in Sierra Leone is still doubtful and a matter for research (Banton, 1957). 
In the FF osusu, the number of members can range from five to hundreds, whereas in the 
RF, membership rarely exceeds fifteen. The FF type can run for several years but the RF 
osusu mostly operates on short-term basis and can disband after one cycle, although it 
can be reconstituted if the members so decide. Another difference is that, in the FF 
osusu, not all members know each other because of the wide membership and the area 
covered by the Master osusu (see below). In the RF type, members may be co-workers, 
or living in the same neighbourhood or in the same occupation or profession. In other 
words the membership of the RF type is relatively homogeneous. Because of this 
homogeneity and acquaintance, members seem to be familiar with each other's 
circumstances, background and integrity. In the RF type very little records are kept. The 
contributions are collected and handed over to the recipient whose turn it is in the cycle. 
In the FF type, however, each transaction is recorded in duplicate. In the FF type, an 
individual can become a member at any time even after the commencement of operation-, 
but in the RF type individuals are rarely, if at all, admitted after it commences operation. 
5.22. The Fixed Fund (FF) Osusu. 
The FF ovtsu in Sierra Leone is mostly popular among traders, particularly 
women. No figures are available, but the heads of osusu groups we interviewed, 
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commonly referred to as Master osusu (usually pronounced as Master susu), ' informed 
us that about three out of every five members of their FF osusu group are women. The 
Master osusu is more often than not a man of good standing in the society, though not 
necessarily the PC or Chiefdom counciffor. When asked why not these local dignitaries, 
the reply was that, one would have no one to go to seek redress if your Master omisu 
were the PC. This underscores the issue of the lack of a strong legal code relating to 
these kinds of operations in the rural areas. The osusu's operation, like that of the 
moneylender's, is based mainly on trust and information about prospective members. The 
members trust not only each other, but the Master osusu as well. He is equally vetted 
along with other members. His background is usually researched by members even 
before the osusu commences. Similarly, before a new individual joins, his or her integrity 
has to be verified. The Master osusu should preferably be married. If neither the Master 
osusu nor his wife is indigenous to the community, members will rigorously investigate 
their family backgrounds and their past social and economic activities. This screening 
process reduces the risk of the Master osusu absconding or behaving inappropriately 
with members' funds. Often, the Master osusu's credibility is further enhanced if he is an 
active member of a secret society or a religious group. The screening process is, 
however, not foolproof The risk is always there and members are aware of it. This is 
why the news of the Master osusu's failure to collect a member's contribution even for a 
single day, is quickly circulated amongst the members. Consequently, his home is visited 
to establish his whereabouts. Two of those we spoke to informed us of a case of one 
46 In the literature they have been identified as ambulatory bankers (Okorie and Miller, 1976, Timberg 
1984 ,p 43 ) and 'private 
deposit collectors' (Seibel and Marx, 1987. p. 2 1) 
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Master osusw absconding and tremendous pressure having been put on his family. The 
usual practice is that his family is expected to shoulder the responsibility of such liability, 
Basicafly, the FF requires each member to contribute an agreed sum of money 
either daily, weekly or monthly. The mode of contribution depends on the individual 
member's income flow. The Master osusu often travels to his members to collect 
contributions. Petty traders, especially market women, usually contribute on a daily basis 
because it offers them the opportunity to save the day's taking. Depositing the amount in 
an osusu prevents it from being utifised on less important matters. The transaction cost in 
saving funds this way, is low and close to zero compared to what it would have been if 
the individual had had to travel to a bank to save. 
It is not uncommon for one individual to belong to more than one FF osusu with 
different Master osusus. A person can also make more than one contribution in the same 
FF osusu with the same Master osusu, A single contribution is referred to as one hand 
and a member can make several hand contributions within the same FF osusu, depending 
on his or her needs and income flow. Although there is no restriction on the number of 
hand contributions one individual can make in an osusu, concern will be expressed by the 
Master osusu through explaining the penalties if a member disrupts the contribution 
rhythm. 
Contributions to the FF osusu vary from Le 20.00 per day to Le 2000.00 per 
month. An osusu member is issued with a membership card (passbook) on which his or 
her dafly, weekly or monthly contributions are recorded, with the duplicate kept by the 
Master osusu. Transaction details are recorded on both cards in the presence of the 
member. A member may decide to contribute with the understanding of collecting 
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monthly, quarterly or yearly. Most market women collect on monthly basis. At the end of 
the period, i. e. on the day payment of the bulk sum is made to an individual member, the 
Master osusu deducts one hand (i. e. the amount that is equivalent to a member"s single 
daily, weekly or monthly contribution). The rest of the money that is paid to the member 
is called the pot. The deducted sum is called the bode. The member is then ftee to 
continue or discontinue his or her membership. The bode from every individual member 
is the total income of the Master osusu. Thus his income depends on the number of 
members he has on his osusu list and the magnitude of the periodic contributions 
members make. There is, therefore, some competition among Master osusus to attract 
members. But the terms of payment to the head of a ROSCA in other countries varies 
considerably. In the Cameroon, according to Bouman and Harteveld (1976), the head of 
the djanggi, who is cafled the president, is not paid. But the secretary and the treasurer 
both receive a total of 5 per cent of the fund. Delancy (1978) found in one of the 
associations he studied in Western Cameroon in 1960 that officers were paid 2.2 per cent 
of the fund. In parts of Eastern Nigeria, Okorie and Miller (1976) observed that 64 per 
cent of associations they studied did not pay officers, and for those which did, the rate 
was below I per cent of the total fund. Adeyemo and Osuntogun (1981, p. 248), found 
that officers of ROSCAs in Liberia are typicafly paid 1-2 per cent of the fund. 
There are rules governing the FF osusu in Sierra Leone. For example, if a 
member decides to withdraw before the end of the period of contribution, two hatid 
contributions are deducted by the Master osusu. Where only one hand contribution has 
been made, the member forfeits that hcuid contribution. This is to ensure that members 
abide by the rules governing the osusu. If a member needs funds urgently, he or she is 
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allowed to ask for a loan, which is to be repaid with interest. The Master osumis we 
interviewed informed us that the interest rate charged for loans depends on three main 
factors namely, the amount of the loan, its duration and the length of time the borrower 
has been with the osusu. The interest rate varies from 10 to 25 per cent. They also 
informed us that it is illegal for the Master osusu to lend to an individual who does not 
belong to his osusu group. ff he did, it could cost him members, confidence in him could 
wane and it might eventuafly drive him out of the business altogether, because he would 
be regarded as dishonest and word about this could spread quickly, and as far as 
possible. This tends to confirms the seriousness with which osusu membership is 
regarded and it also underscores the point that the Master osusu and even ordinary 
members need to have a clean slate of honesty and reliability. 
The FF osusu members meet, if the need arises,, to discuss social,, cultural or even 
economic issues affecting the group. Although these meetings are usually brief and 
informal, market intelligence (supply and demand situations) are often exchanged, and 
old members are able to meet new ones and make fiiends. The possibility of meeting and 
exchanging economic information is a benefit to members. Such information is unlikely 
to be available from rural bankers who may be unfamiliar with the problems and 
constraints facing people operating in the informal market. Ottenberg (1968), Delancy 
(1978) and Miracle et. al. (1980) added that such infonnation is usuafly not available 
from radio, newspaper or television sources in LICs. Miracle (op. cit. ) also observed that 
the FF osusu serves as a social club. Members often make financial and moral 
contributions towards helping a fellow member who, for example, has been bereaved or 
has experienced some kind of misfortune or who is celebrating a rite of passage. 
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Participants in this informal banking arrangement seem to believe that they save 
more than they would, if they saved in solitary fashion. The sense of discipline arising 
from regularly meeting their 'banker' or the rest of the group helps the members to keep 
up with the act of saving (Okorie and Mifler, 1976, p. 27; Bouman, 1977, P. 3 and 5; 
Delancy, 1978, p. 222). 
It should be noted that the loans are usually small and short-term - seldom above 
six months. Against this background, the interest rate could be doubled or trebled 
depending on the number of times a member borrows from the fund in a year. According 
to our respondents, the interest rate is not the issue; the crucial factors are accessibility 
and dependability. The conditions governing the osusu ensure that members can get a 
loan as and when the need arises. An experienced Master osusu always keeps adequate 
funds at home to meet unexpected demands for withdrawals and loans. Such demands 
can be made anytime during the day or night. Depending on the amount in the osusu 
fund, Master osusus are known to have fostered links with banks. Those we interviewed 
declined to tell us the quantum of funds they managed and have with banks; but a rough 
estimate based on the number of members and the individual contributions in a particular 
osusu, suggests that the Master osusm could be managing funds ranging from Le 50,000 
- Le 500,000 (i. e. US$ 86 - US$ 862 at 1993 prices). The interest that accrues to funds 
which have been deposited in a bank, goes to the Master osusu. 
5.23. The Rotating Fund Osmsu 
The Rotating Fund (RF) osusu is basically a cycle. The members numbering 
between three and ten, on average, contribute a fixed sum on a weekly or monthly basis. 
The amount contributed by a member varies from Le 50 per day - Le 2,000 per month or 
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more. ROSCAs which require as low as a penny per day and as much as US$1,600 per 
month have been reported in other parts of Africa (Haggblade, 1978, p. 49). At the end 
of the period, the pot (total fund) is allocated to one member whose turn it is to receive 
payment. This procedure is repeated until every member has had his or her turn. When 
the cycle is completed, members may decide to disband the osusu or reconstitute a new 
cycle. 
The RF type can be subdivided into two versions - the Bidding and the Random 
versions (Besley et - al., 1994). In the bidding version, members are allocated the pot by a 
bidding procedure as in the chit fund in India (Radhakrishnan, 1975). The member who 
receives the first pot in the present period does so by bidding the most in the form of a 
higher contribution in future cycles. Individuals still receive the pot once in the cycle. 
Thus the bidding merely establishes priority (Besley et. al. 1994). In another variant of 
the bidding version, the individual who bids to forego the highest sum from the pot wins 
the bid. In the random version, as the name implies, members are randomly allocated the 
pot For each period, lots are drawn and the pot is allocated to one member. The process 
is repeated but with the previous winner(s) excluded from the draw. These variants are 
not yet practised in Sierra Leone as far as is known. 
5.24. The Fixed Rotating Circle (FRQ Osusu 
In Sierra Leone the RF type that is most common is the Fixed Rotating Circle 
(FRC) osww. The order of rotation, the duration, the number and calibre of members are 
all agreed upon before the osusu commences. These are financial decisions that require 
information about the character, motives, financial probity and leadership skills of the 
Master osumi as well as prospective members. After it commences operations, new 
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member(s) are rarely admitted, hence the idea of fixity and the circle as opposed to the 
cycle. However, members can swap turns with each other and with the knowledge and 
approval of the Master osusu. Membership is usuafly mixed with women usually in the 
majority. The screening of potential participants helps in minimising adverse selection of 
risk since uncreditworthy and dishonest applicants are prevented from becoming 
members. The screening process is still not perfect. The fisk of default is still there. 
Apart from the last person in the circle, any of the other members could disrupt its 
smooth operation by absconding after receiving the pot. To minimise such a risk, several 
measures are usually taken. First, participants in FRC osusu usually have intimate 
knowledge of each other either as co-workers, members of the same religious group, 
neighbourhood, secret society, occupation, tribe or viflage. Participants recognise that 
such cordial and friendly relationships with each other are the basis for successful 
transactions and that a person's worth in the eyes of others depends significantly upon 
his or her performance under their shared ties ('social collateral'). This promise and 
knowledge enable members to deselect potential defaulters. Second, in some white-collar 
job situations, the personnel department is usually informed about the osusu's existence. 
Rules governing the group's conduct are usually printed and circulated to members. 
Third, in the event of a default, a member loses the equivalent of a hand contribution, 
usually deducted from his/her salary and handed to the Master osusu. This should not be 
interpreted as an official recognition of the practice by employers. But because of the 
widespread nature of osusus, it is tacitly condoned. 
Ardener (1964, p. 220), argued that members are unlikely to default because they 
find it easier to offset a debt gradually, by paying in instalments, rather than a lump sum. 
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She did not, however, provide any data to support this hypothesis. Ifly (1973, p. 305) 
and Bouman and Harteveld (1976, p. 112) have noted that there is very fittle defaulting 
in some areas because the defaulter runs the risk of never being accepted in another 
ROSCA. Okorie and Mifler (1974) provided some evidence to support this hypothesis. 
They found that the default rate is less than I per cent (0.64 per cent) in the 18 emisu 
clubs they studied, although they did not make any distinction between the FF and the 
RF types. Our discussion with osusu members revealed that in Sierra Leone, default in 
the osusu is low and rare because of the need to establish credibility in the community 
and the prospects of becoming a member in another osusu in the future. 
The duration of the FRC osusu depends on the number of members and the 
period between contributions (i. e. weekly or monthly). The order of rotation, as already 
pointed out, is determined by negotiation among members. Many researchers have 
reported that it is not uncommon for the Master osusu to be aflocated the first pot 
(Ardener, 1964; Haggblade, 1978; Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey, 1995; Bouman, 1995). 31 
5.30. Rationale for Osusu membership 
The osusu members we interviewed informed us that the reasons why people 
join an osusu are many. Individuals often come together to form an osusu in order to 
raise money individually, to purchase bulky and expensive household items such as 
furniture, planting materials, fertiliser, and sometimes to pay fees and to meet other 
school expenditure. Most often osusu funds are used for procurement of food and other 
consumption items. In a situation where incomes are inadequate to meet basic needs, and 
credit facilities from the banking system are not easily accessible, the funds from osusu 
clubs serve as 'supplementary' income. In the rural areas osusu groups have helped 
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members who suffer misfortune such as bereavement, accidents and Wness by quickly 
switching turns in the circle or by contributing a purse which is given to the member. It 
should be noted that because of the closeness of the rural society and members 
acquaintance with each other's circumstances, it is difficult for an individual to fake a 
tnisfortune or engage in rent seeking behaviour. 
The Osusu, in general, is highly dependable. Although risk of default is always 
present, it has typically been found to be low. But even in FFIs in developed countries, 
the risk of default is also always present. In the ROSCAs, those who default run the risk 
of being excluded from future participation and of being discredited for a long time. In a 
situation where alternatives for saving and access to credit are few and far between, the 
ROSCA often represent the best option. 
Geertz (1962, pp. 260-261) noted that ROSCAs help communities to adapt to 
economic modernisation while maintaining ties of reciprocity and solidarity. Bonnet 
(198 1) pointed out that the ROSCAs have helped to cushion people from severe socio- 
economic shocks resulting from their movement from rural to urban locations. For 
example, immigrant groups in the USA have used the ROSCA mechanism to overcome 
these kinds of shock (Light, 1972, Bonnet, op. cit. ). Banton (1957), also made a similar 
observation about rural tnigrants in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Von Pischke (1991), observed that ROSCAs have six major characteristics that 
recommend them. First, they are known across different localities, a feature which 
suggests adaptability and applicability. Second, they intermediate between savers and 
borrowers without any bias. Third, they signify coflective action suggesting acceptability 
and congruity with the norms of the diverse cultures in which they have been identified. 
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It is hard to attribute such features to any FFI anywhere in the world. Fourth, ROSCAs 
are private and voluntary, enjoying high levels of immunity from rent-seeking behaviour 
by their members. Fifth, they manage risk effectively and sixth, they create incentives for 
responsible behaviour and performance which accounts for their continued popularity in 
many places around the globe. 
5.31. Uses of osusu funds 
Funds acquired from the osusu are put into various uses, some of which have 
been listed by Miracle et. al. (1980, p. 715). Table 5.2 from Okorie and Miller (1976, p. 
22), gives the uses to which ROSCA funds have been put in two West African countries 
- Nigeria and Cameroon - where they have been studied in detail. The uses range from 
production to consumption, financing trading activities, buying planting material (seeds 
etc. ) and financing rites of passage. Fragmentary evidence from other countries tends to 
support the hypothesis in this table. In Ghana, for example, a ROSCA of high school 
teachers was reported to have bought refrigerators for its members (Massing and Seibel, 
1974, p. 64). These same authors also reported that a Fixed Fund ROSCA among the 
Mano and Loma tribes of Liberia loaned US$ 1,000 to each of its members in order to 
purchase a taxi in 1967. This same ROSCA paid US$ 700 the year before to a German 
construction company to build an access road to their village. The purchase of 
production items such as seeds for planting has also been reported in Ethiopia (Hamer, 
1970, p. 295). Cameroonian women are also reported to have pooled their savings to 
purchase a grain miH (Bournan, 1977, p. 11). The above evidence suggests that ROSCA 
funds have been utilised for both consumption and production needs is some African 
countries. Although our osusu interviewees confirmed uses of funds for purposes similar 
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Table 5.2 Uses of ROSCA Funds - Quantitative Data (%) 
Use Nigeria' 
1976 
2 Cameroon Cameroon3 
Buy land 1.9 ... ... Buy livestock .I ... 
"Trade expansion" 9.3 
"Trade investment ... 7.0 ... "To open business" ... ... 3.6 
Payrn oftaxes 3.2 14.0 
Hiring labour 16.2 ... ... House construction 12.7 10.9 
"Housing improvernent") 4.0 ... Financing education 13.4 17.0 18.2 
As funds for loans .4 
As funds deposited in banks 6.0 ... As saving for participating 
in rotating funds 
... 7.0 ... 
As funds given to relatives 
to invest 
2.8 ... ... 
_ As savings ... ... 12.7 Purchase of durable goods 8.4 
Pý ýent of debt ... 6.0 ... Purchase of clothing 7.4 ... "To buy things" ... ... 23.6 "To meet normal expenses" ... ... 14.5 _ Christmas expenses ... ... 12.7 "Medical care" ... 8.0 ... "Dowries, obligations to in-lawe' ... 8.0 "To marry" 3.6 
"As pocket money" .2 ... ... Purchase of food 10.8 ... 
Total 100 too 99.8 
Sources: - Okorie and Miller (1976, p. 22); Harteveld cited in Bouman Q 977, p. 17); 
Delancy, (1977). 
Notes: - 
From 100 members of savings and loan associations interviewed on Ohaozara 
subdivision in East Central State, December, 1974. 
2 From 69 members surveyed in Cameroon. Information is not available on where 
survey was done but none of these uses is more than 3 percentage points 
different from those reported by Harteveld for 54 members he interviewed mi 
Babanki, West Cameroon In 1971 (see Bouman and Harteveld, 1976, p. 113) 
'From 56 members of three fixed-fUnd associations, West Cameroon, 1968. 
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to those fisted in the Table 5.2, they informed us that consumption is the ma or use of i 
osusu funds in Sierra Leone. Further research is, however, required to provide 
quantitative data on membership, operations and quantum of savings, uses of funds, 
credit extended and services provided by this financial self-help organisation in Sierra 
Leone. 
5.40 Linking the Formal and Informal Financial Markets in LICs 
The link between the IFMs and the FFMs in LICs has recently caught the 
attention of researchers. Linkages have been observed in several countries including 
Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, Bolivia, Indonesia (Seibel and Marx, 1987). 
Three general strategies have been used to link IFMs and FFMS. One of them is 
the 'upgrading' or the 'bottom-up' approach involving the evolution of an informal 
financial institution into a formal one. This has occurred in the Cameroon and has 
culminated in the establishment of an FFI (a bank) by a group of ROSCAs. In another 
example, the Kou (a ROSCA in Japan), described as a precursor of modem finance, has 
evolved into co-operatives in the rural areas and into Mujin-companies in the urban 
areas. The Mujin-comPanies have further evolved into modem financial institutions 
(Izumida, 1992, p. 175). 
The second strategy is the 'down-grading' or 'top-bottom' approach. The main 
objective of this approach is to create an environment for an FFI to reach out and 
develop financial arrangements with self-help groups and individuals. Several countries 
have used this strategy. In Indonesia, several small banks have been engaged in domestic 
resource mobilisation at the doorsteps of rural and low income people (Seibel and 
Paruhsip, 1992, p. 240). A 'pigmy deposit' scheme is operated by the Bank of India, in 
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which outsiders i. e. non-employees of the Bank of India are hired as agents to collect 
deposits at the homes of small savers on a regular periodic basis. Access to credit is used 
as a reward for the maintenance of scheduled deposits over a period of time. It has been 
reported that unit cost of 'pigmy deposits' varied between 3 and 5 per cent per annum. 
This is significantly lower than the cost of a three to five year fixed deposits (Bhatt,, 
1988, p. 289; Vogel and Burkett, 1986). Significant linkage between ROSCAs and FFIs 
has also occurred in South Affica (Burman and Lembete, 1995). 
The third approach used is the direct litýg of IFMs to FFMs. For example, in 
I"N I- 
%inana the anago (wnbulatory bankers) are registered as tax-paying enterprises. Three 
hundred of these deposit collectors have formed The Greater Accra Susu Collectors 
Association (GASCA) which in turn is registered. They have their accounts with the 
National Savings and Credit Bank of Ghana. Other banks in Ghana are tentatively 
attempting direct involvement in this field (Seibel and Marx, 1987; Bortei-Doku and 
Aryeetey, 1995). In Sierra Leone, osusu funds are sometimes deposited into banks by 
Master osusus. But the osusu members are yet to benefit from the interest accruing to 
these funds. The evolution of the osusu in Sierra Leone has not yet reached the level of 
similar ROSCAs in the Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria or Indonesia. However, some of the 
omisu members we interviewed have begun to think of some form of sharing of the 
interest accruing to the Master osusu from funds deposited in the bank. They expressed 
the feeling that the Master osusu is already getting enough compensation for his services 
with the hand deductions (the bode) that he makes from the pot. When asked why they 
want to change this affangement, they replied that from news of what is happening in 
other countries such as Ghana and the Cameroon, they think that the osuvi arrangements 
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should be re-examined to create a basis for deployment of funds in the community and 
for equitable distribution of benefits. 
As stated by Seibel and Marx (1987, p. 91), linking IFIs and FFs in LICs can be a 
complex affair. A change or modification to the existing mode of operations of both the 
IFM and the FFM are required if success is to be achieved. For IFMs, a high level of 
organisation will be required, which will entail introduction of paperwork, coding, and 
other administrative techniques characteristic of FFMs. These kinds of changes require 
some research to establish the mochis operandi that wifl suit the socio-cultural context 
within which the new institution will operate. This would in turn detemiine the 
appropriate linkage to be adopted. For example, within a ROSCA, considerable amount 
of trust is exercised. Members carefidly choose each other and the success or failure of 
the association depends on a variety of rules, regulations and the conduct of members 
secured by sanctions and reciprocity. Social control also depends on numerous social 
relationships which hold members together. Seibel and Marx (1987), however, warn that 
these ROSCAs are one hundred per cent self-help ventures. When this aspect is 
disturbed by their internal affkirs being determined from outside or where participants are 
not allowed to benefit from their own effort, the self-help spirit may be destroyed, One 
major ingredient of change, however, might be to allow participants to decide on the 
utflisation of resources. 
One other issue that needs to be taken into account in interlinking IFIs and FFIs 
is secrecy. Niger-Thomas (1995) notes that ROSCA savings may be preserved by 
elaborate ruses that prevent a husband, for example, from knowing when his wife 
receives money, lest she be subjected to unwelcome persuasion or pressure to meet his 
181 
needs. A ROSCA may be operating in a situation where such a group is considered 
illegal, or charging interest rates considered too high and therefore illegal or where 
registration of such an activity is required for tax purposes etc.. In such circumstances. 
secrecy would be a paramount concern of members and any attempt to link it with an 
FUR may drive it underground or may destroy it altogether. But such antagonism to these 
financial self-help groups is now fading away. The debate on the operations and the 
impact these organisations have in rural communities or even urban settings, has created 
informed opinion about them. The evidence of the economic and socio-cultural functions 
they provide has captured the imagination of academics and politicians alike. Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Donor Agencies (IDAs) have 
also been captivated by the array of support these self-help groups provide for their 
members; thus funding and assistance is now being directed at them. 31 
5.50. The Non-Govern mental Organisations -A new perspective 
for financing the Informal Sector in LICs 
A significant proportion of the economic activity in LICs is conducted by self- 
employed persons, in small economic units or micro-enterprises using funds mostly 
derived from the informal sector (Mosley, 1993). For increasing numbers of poor people, 
including farmers in LICs, there are very few alternative sources of credit, income and 
employment opportunities. In order for business to prosper, micro-enterprises must have 
sufficient supply of working capital to purchase inputs. Lacking access to formal credit, 
they must find ways of providing this finance themselves either from their profits (which 
are usually very low) or they must turn to moneylenders, pawnbrokers, money collectors 
or ROSCAs. Most traditional self-help groups such as ROSCAs tend to have restricted 
capital in accordance with the resources of its members. In consequence, micro- 
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enterprises have often failed to secure the capital they need and have missed the 
opportunity for increased growth in both their business and incomes (Mosley, 1993, p. 
1). 
To attempt to solve this problem, foreign donors (both government and non- 
governmental) have tried to reach this substantial market; although their success has 
been limited in the past. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of financial institutions began 
experimenting with new ways of providing formal credit, with interest rates that are 
close to market rates to these groups. Some of them have reached more people than 
previous credit programmes. Repayment rates have been very high and they are 
approaching financial self-sufficiency (Mosley, 1993; Campero, 1995). 
This new dimension has involved the evolution of self-help groups (ROSCAs 
included) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) into full-fledged FFIs, mainly 
banks. The major objective of these new institutions is to provide support, mainly credit, 
training and technical assistance to individuals and groups to establish and or expand 
smaH enterprises in the infonnal sector (Mutua, 1995, p. 1). Such ventures are supported 
by funds from USAID and the World Bank (Bosley, 1994). In a conference on 'Finance 
Against Poverty', held at Reading University in March, 1995, it was revealed that some 
of these programmes have produced encouraging results (Mosley, 1993). 
The first fiffly private bank in the world specifically devoted to micro-enterprise 
financing in Bolivia, is Banco Solidario S. A. (BancoSol),, which is an outgrowth of the 
Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarrollo de la Micro Empresa (PRODEM), a 
successful NGO providing credit and training to rriicro-entrepreneurs in Bolivia 47 
47 For a fidl discussion of the evolution of PRODEM into BancoSol, see (Mosley, 1993). 
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PRODEM has been funded since 1985 by USAID through an American NGO, ACCION 
International". Using conventional financial indicators, BancoSol has performed 
impressively. Repayment rates for the first six years have been 99 per cent, although 
there was a slight decline in 1992. Loan impact on beneficiaries has been significant; and 
some 27 per cent of sampled households were able to move above the poverty line in 
1992. It should be noted that the loans are made at the market rate of interest, of 60 per 
cent. BancoSol's case has helped to refute the traditional view that the poor cannot save 
and afford market rates of interest. A total of about US$ 3.05 million savings have been 
mobilised. In terms of outreach, BancoSol has granted loans worth US$ 27 million to 
61,255 boffowers as at end 1992 (Mosley, 1993). 
Another success story in micro-enterprise lending is the Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Programme (K-REP), established in 1984 as an USAIID funded project and incorporated 
as a Kenyan NGO in 1987. There were initial problems. The strategy adopted involved 
the development of micro-enterprises through promotion of Kenyan NGOs credit 
programmes with the objective of building institutional capability in as many Kenyan 
NGOs as possible. It became apparent that the integrated method of developing micro- 
enterprises, largely through grants and subsidised loans, had limited impact on 
beneficiaries (i. e. the local NGOs). It was costly and could only be sustained or expanded 
through grant funding. A new strategy was therefore adopted in 1989. Four of the most 
promising NGOs were selected and the focus of lending and method of credit delivery 
was changed from the integrated approach to the 'minimalist' approach, adopting the 
Grameen Bank system (Mutua, 1995). The financial assistance to K-REP-assisted NGOs 
48See Campero (1995) and Mosley (1993) for more details. 
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which took the form of 100 per cent grants and no loans was changed to a ratio of 70 
per cent loans and 30 per cent grants. 
The K-REP programme was broadened to include direct lending to rural 
residents (farmer, blacksmiths, tailors, etc. ). Over a period of three years, performance 
under the new strategy has been described as encouraging (Mutua, 1995). Five K-REP 
assisted NGOs made over 9,000 loans amounting to 70 million Kenyan Shillings at 
market rates of interest of 14 per cent. The cost per shilling lent declined from 96 cents 
to 25 cents. Repayment rates improved from 78 per cent to 98 per cent. Deposit 
mobdisation is over 12 million Kenyan Shillings. All programmes are servicing their loans 
from K-REP with 100 per cent repayment. 
The cases discussed above have used the 'financial intermediation' or 'financial 
systems' approach to micro-enterprise development which emphasises institutional 
sustainability as a crucial element in providing credit services. There are, however, some 
questions to be resolved in relation to the use of NGOs as agents of change. Can existing 
welfare programmes (granting food, seeds etc. ) run by some NGOs, such as the Catholic 
Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) implement effective credit programmes? Who 
should benefit from NGO credit programmes? Should NGOs pursue financial self- 
sufficiency goals?. The answers to these questions are legion. Some objectives and 
activities of welfare programmes conflict with the principles of good credit management. 
This is evident in cases where both welfare and credit services are provided in the same 
community by the same organisation. The CARE services in Sieffa Leone are a case in 
point. In other cases, credit policies are based more on humanitarian grounds than 
workable financial models. For example, some NGOs argue for below-market rates of 
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interest using the traditional assumption of the poor being unable to afford market rates. 
Others consider expelling defaulters from schemes as being too harsh and incompatible 
with their humanitarian mission. 
Credit for micro-enterprise development is becoming a very specialised operation 
as demonstrated by the two success stories cited above, and relies on sound credit 
management principles. If these principles are compromised, efficiency could be 
sacrificed to the disadvantage of the beneficiaries. In our view NGOs and IDAs in 
whatever country or locality they concentrate their support, should study the socio- 
cultural and economic environment before deploying funds. We will argue in chapter 
seven that the role of the NGOs and IDAs should be limited to institution building and 
creating a conducive envirorument for indigenous institutions to develop expand and 
become self-sustainable. Wholesale adoption of models that have been successful in one 
particular enviromment could be counterproductive if deployed in another setting without 
prior research and testing (Bouman, 1995). This new dimension should, therefore, be 
carefully and thoroughly tested before it is replicated on a large scale throughout the 
world. Africa is replete with examples of credit programmes that have been implemented 
using traditional assumptions and which have Wed. Thus the above caution should be 
seriously considered to avoid what we are attempted to label 'financial joy-riding' 49 on 
the issue of credit supply in LICs. 
5.5 1. Conclusion 
The discussion on the ROSCAs' mode of operation shows that these self-help 
financial organisations are indigenous, one hundred percent self-help. They have 
49Financial joy-riding is defined here to mean the use of a credit supply model NNithout testing its 
efficacy and fails lea-ving the target population vvorse-off than before the credit programme. 
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provided services which are appreciated by their members and they have proved to be 
adaptable and acceptable in whatever setting they operate. They are providing social 
security to marginalised populations in a variety of places all over the world (Bouman, 
1995). This record of adaptation tends to be superior to that of FFIs because of their 
lack of bureaucratic red-tape and less cumbersome procedures. The linkage between 
them and FFIs in many countries shows that their mode of operation are flexible and can 
be linked successfully if the mode of linkage is carefully researched and judiciously 
executed. In the Sierra Leone context, therefore, we wifl argue in chapter seven that 
their positive effects could be used by RBs to improve credit supply and financial 
intermediation for the benefit of not only the target population but the rural banking 
scheme as well. 
The major limitation of the ROSCAs, in a majority of cases, is the limited 
resources it mobilises and may be inadequate to satisfy the varying demands of farmers 
who have specific seasonal requirements for capital. 
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Chapter VI Analysis of the Performance of 
Rural Banks in Sierra Leone 
6.10 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the operations of rural banks 
(RBs) in Sierra Leone. The focus wifl be on the four RBs surveyed (see Chapter One), 
Yoni Rural Bank (YRB), Marampa/Masimera Rural Bank (MVIRB), Kunike Rural Bank 
(KRB) and Mattru Rural Bank (NIRB). They have all been in operation for over six years 
(Table 6.1) and have generated enough data to allow some meaningful analysis. Of the 
remaining four (i. e. DRB, MOARB, SRB, and BRB), two (DRB and MOARB), ceased 
operations in 1991 due to the 'rebel war' while the other two only commenced 
operations in the second half of 1992. The analysis will, however, include DRB, 
MOARB, SRB and BRB where data are available. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides a theoretical 
perspective on finance and development and describes the organisation and structure of 
D'D 
Mis in Sierra Leone. The second section analyses the operations of the four RBs 
surveyed using Outreach Analysis. Section three analyses the lending operations, and 
cost of administration and gives the reasons for existing levels of default. The fourth 
section carries out viability analysis using the Subsidy Dependence Index and, the fifth 
interprets the results. 
There is no universal or widespread methodology for analysing the performance 
of rural financial institutions (RFI) (Yaron, 1992a). Conceptually, however, several 
performance indicators have been used to determine the level of achievement. This study 
uses two performance criteria namely, Outreach and the Subsidy Dependence Index 
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(SDI)50 because of their robustness and their ability to aflow for some international 
companson. This type of analysis has been used in assessing RFls in countries including 
the Philippines, India and Bangladesh, as well as some countries in sub-Saharan Affica 
such as Togo, Cameroon and Rwanda. This study is the first to use this type of analysis 
on RBs in Sierra Leone and is the first critical analysis of their performance. 
The data used in this chapter comes from the survey, the audited statements of 
accounts, financial statements and other returns sent by RBs to BSL. There are some 
limitations in these data, especially the financial statements and audited statements of 
accounts. The conventional accounting practice followed measures cost of funds priced 
at their actual cost. The opportunity costs of borrowed funds, that is the price the RB 
would have paid for its funds if access to concessional funds were eliminated, is ignored 
partly as a way of concealing operating costs. Therefore profits in the profit and loss 
accounts do not convey the true picture. In addition, subsidies are not disaggregated in 
the accounts. Data from these sources have, therefore, been computed using the SDI 
model (Section 6.40) developed by Yaron (1992a) of the World Bank, which takes these 
shortcomings into account and produces an index that can be used for international 
comparison with institutions providing similar services in other LICs. The above 
notwithstanding, results should be interpreted with caution for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the SDI is a lower bound measure of the level of subsidy dependence; but even so, 
generates valuable information on the subsidy dependence of the RBs. Secondly, the 
calculation of loan default/repayment rates varies from one institution to another even 
within the same country. Thus making comparison difficult. 
50 The SDI Nvas developed by the World Bank, in particular Jacob Yaron (1992b) 
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6.10 Theoretical Perspective on Finance and Development 
There is a subtle debate between development experts and experts in 
development aid about whether finance is important for development and whether it has 
been given recognition in development aid. On one side of the debate, traditionalists 
claim that because of the long tradition of providing financial assistance to developing 
countries sufficient evidence exists that due regard has been given to finance. The other 
side argues that finance has only been recognised in the past few years as exemplified by 
the World Bank Development Report (1989). The difference between the two camps is 
due mainly to the different meanings attached to finance. The term is ambiguous and has 
two visible aspects. The first is the provision of investible funds, in accord with which 
finance is seen as capital provided for development. The other involves the means of 
providing the funds i. e. the financial system or the institutions involved in the process. It 
therefore appears that the issue of whether due recognition is given to finance may refer 
to the aspect of capital or to the financial system or to both or their relative weights. In 
this debate, four views emerge on finance for development, which are distinguished 
mainly by the importance each gives to capital and the financial system providing it. 
After the second World War, development was largely seen as equivalent to 
macro-economic growth. Consequently, development theory was treated as an applied 
growth theory (Lewis, 1954 and 1955), according to which growth in real output and 
income were regarded as consequences of growth in factor inputs. With a simple macro- 
economic production function, assuming that aggregate supply of labour is exogenous, 
the growth in input factor i. e. capital, is regarded as the most important determinant of 
output and income growth. Growth of capital is the result of savings (foregoing 
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consumption out of current income). Marginal productivity of capital measured in terms 
Of output is treated as a technological issue (Khranen and Schmidt, 1995). In this view 
the viscious circle of poverty (low income => low savings => low investment =: > low 
productivity => low income) underlies underdevelopment. It presupposes that for 
development, savings should be present either internally or supplied from external 
sources. 
The main criticism of this view is that growth as the accumulation of capital is 
too narrow an understanding because development is a multi-dimensional process. 
Another criticism is that the distributional aspect is ignored. The traditional view 
emphasised finance in the sense of capital and ignored finance in the sense of the financial 
system by implicitly assuming that some invisible hand or mechanism would transform 
savings into investment. The transformation was also assumed to be perfect i. e. it was 
held that the marginal productivity of capital was not influenced by any working 
mechanism which mobilised and allocated these savings. This implicit assumption led to 
development aid policy which emphasised that if capital leads to growth and if local 
incomes are low and cannot lead to local savings, foreign savings (aid) are required to 
close the savings gap (Lewis, 1955). But aid is a flow of real resources and has been 
used to pay for the foreign exchange component of development projects. Projects were 
believed to have positive linkage effects such as increased employment and equitable 
distribution of wealth. It was convenient to believe that 'trickle-down' process would 
save developed countries from incurring extra costs in monitoring projects (Lewis, 
1955). But institutions that were most suited to distribute the foreign funds were absent 
or if present were not well equipped to do the job. Consequently, Development Finance 
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Corporations (DFCs) were established to fill this gap. But these institutions were not 
banks. They were merely administrative entities. They did not take deposits, nor provide 
liquidity nor transform terms to maturity or take risks. A further criticism of the 
traditional view is that it is not clearly supported by empirical facts. The relationship 
between capital input, as measured by savings and or real investment and economic 
growth remains unclear (World Bank, 1989). According to the World Bank, there are 
many low growth countries with high savings or investment rates as well as countries 
with moderate savings/investment which grow at very high rates. Thus, there was still 
something missing in explaining the development process. 
The missing link in explaining growth was provided by the second view which 
was put forward in the 1970s (Penny, 1968 and Adams, 1971). This view maintained 
that the infusion of foreign capital into development projects in LICs did not contribute 
significantly to Gross National Product (GNP). According to Penny (1968) and Adams 
(197 1), it led rather to a deterioration in the economic and social situation in most LICs. 
Instead of the trickle-down or linkage effects that had been expected, the policy was 
counterproductive, Dualism was induced, poverty was reinforced, unemployment 
increased and migration became a problem. The reaction to this critique was to regard 
development aid policy as a world-wide social policy, focusing on income generation, 
poverty alleviation, employment creation (Levitsky, 1986). The poorer strata comprising 
farmers, small businesses and small entrepreneurs were regarded as target groups. 
However, the basic understanding of finance remained the same as under the traditional 
view and credit was still identified as an important bottleneck. Development experts did 
not care to find out whether demand for credit existed on the part of the intended 
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recipients. Instead they used the "supply-leading" approach (Patrick, 1966) as the 
guiding philosophy and emphasised need. Credit was said to be needed because it was 
assumed to have a positive development impact. 
Thus the provision of credit (capital) to specific target groups became a public 
policy issue (Farbman, 1981, Ashe, 1985). It was felt that farmers and business people 
should be induced to use capital and other inputs in order to produce employment, 
income, and increased food supply. How was credit to be channelled to this target 
groups? Existing banks were unwilling and unsuited to act as purveyors of these funds 
mainly because of the high costs of administering numerous small loans to a widely 
dispersed clientele and the lack of skilled personnel to appraise and monitor such 
projects. Since banks were in business for profit, this was not surprising. The solution 
was the establishment of specialised development banks for agriculture, industry and 
housing. The expectation was that they might be effective in reaching the target 
population and creating the desired impact. Since the target groups were deemed to be 
poor, they had to be lured into taking out loans by charging them highly subsidised 
interest rates (Adams, 197 1). Thus the development banks needed huge funds for on- 
lending as well as subsidies and technical assistance to maintain themselves. 
The failure of this model is well documented (Von Pischke, 1983 and Adams, 
1984). The reaction that followed blamed partner institutions for behaving too much like 
banks and governments for interfering in the operations of these development 
institutions. Non-bank and non-governmental organisations were drafted into the picture 
to reach the target population. But these channels had their own drawbacks. Their 
operations were still costly, unstable and unprofitable. They were unable to have a long 
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lasting impact (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1995) because of the huge number of farmers and 
businesses they had to reach. It could be argued that from the perspective of this second 
view and from that of donors the understanding of finance and the notion of a financial 
system have been broadened and received the recognition they deserve. But funnelling 
funds in order to provide credit (capital) as an input for production in order to fill a gap 
did not provide the answer to the development problem (Levitsky, 1986 and 1989). The 
next move was to look at why the focus shifted to the financial system, which was 
ignored in the second view. 
The financial systems of most developing countries have been operating under 
financial repression regimes (World Bank, 1989). Thus, the third view entailed an attack 
on the policy of financial repression". It argued that the financial system had been used 
as an instrument and thereby had been misused and misunderstood (Von Pischke, 1983). 
The policy implications of the third view encompasses both macro-economic 
(liberalisation) and n-ficro-econornic (institution-building) aspects. The macro-economic 
aspect is associated with Shaw (1973) and the micro-economic with the Adams (1984) 
of the Ohio State University. Their common argument is that a financial system 
unconstrained by unnecessary regulations will be able to mobilise a large volume of 
savings, transform them with respect to terms, size and risks and allocate these funds to 
socially valuable investment projects. This view, therefore emphasises financial 
intermediation as the essence of the financial system. It has three main propositions, (a) 
that the quality and quantity of financial intermediation available to a given society is an 
51 Econometric models (Shaw and McKinnon, 1973), have shown that financial depth measured as 
broad money W2 over GNP) is important for growth as savings for investment. In countries where 
financial systems are more developed and less restricted i. e. deeper, a given savings rate is usually 
associated with higher growth compared to those with the savings rate but repressed financial systems. 
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important determinant of development, (b) that the quality and quantity of financial 
intermediation is determined by the type of policy pursued by the respective government 
and (c) that the best policy is a drastic deregulation of the financial system (Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 1995). The focus on financial intermediation is based on the fact that financial 
institutions take deposits from savers and lend them to potential investors. By this 
function, they meet the demand of both depositors who want to transfer resources to the 
future and of borrowers who want to use funds before receiving income. The main 
difference between the third view and the first two is that the first two views held that 
the fixing of interest rates below market rates would have important effects by (1) 
inducing more investments because of the low cost of capital and (2) inducing social 
justice because poor people are assumed to be unable to bear high interest costs. The 
third view argues that more investment can only be undertaken if more savings were 
available in a form suited for on-lending i. e. in the form of financial savings. But low 
interest rates make people save less. It argues further that financial repression leads to 
less savings which leads to less investment. In addition, financial repression is regarded 
as having a negative impact on the quality of investment leading to lower growth. To 
demonstrate these points, McKinnon (1973) states that financial repression normally 
includes ceilings for interest rates on loans which are below the level that market rates 
would reach had there been an efficient and properly functioning market for financial 
services. Because capital is subsidised, borrowing is attractive for some investors with 
projects which would not yield a high enough return to enable them to pay the market 
interest rate, Under financial repression, banks would ration credit according to non- 
economic criteria such as political influence. Because these criteria for allocation of 
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resources are not designed to exclude such borrowers, the allocation system leads to a 
lower average productivity of all the investment projects which receive funding and in 
the final analysis, to low growth. 
The financial repression school argues further that if financial institutions are not 
allowed to charge market clearing rates of interest, bankers wifl prefer those borrowers 
whom they regard as personal fiiends, those with political clout, those who can pay 
bribes, those whose credit requests are easier to evaluate and those who request large 
loans with relatively low administrative costs (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984b), Thus the Iron 
Law of Interest Rate Restrictions holds true in this situation (see Chapter Two for more 
detailed discussion). But the objective of making loans affordable for lower income 
segments of the population is never realised (op. cit. ). Instead the subsidy goes to those 
who least need credit and can borrow large amounts of loans (Ladman and Tinnermeier, 
1983). Moreover, financial repression has a negative impact on the financial institution 
itself, by preventing it from performing its economic roles of intermediation and 
transformation of capital. Low lending rates force banks to pay low deposit rates, wl&h 
in turn reduce the bank's lending capacity in terms of volume and prevent it from 
realising economies of scale and increasing its efficiency (Adams, 1984 and Gonzalez- 
Vegas, 19984a). The overall impact is that a majority of the target population are denied 
access to credit and other services. 
Financial repression also has a negative impact on the whole financial system. 
The artificially low lending rates apart, clever and influential borrowers avoid repayment, 
leading to an inefficient and financially fragile banking system, unavailability of credit for 
most potential borrowers and conspicuous lack of deposit facilities (McKinnon, 1973). 
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The policy implications are clear. At the macro level they entail financial liberalisation 
involving deregulation of interest rates to permit the banking system to perform its true 
economic functions, an increase in the flow of capital through the financial system, 
improved allocation of resources and enhance economic growth (Shaw, 1973). In recent 
years the World Bank has made liberalisation. of the economic system, including the 
financial sector, a central condition of its Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for 
LICs. At the n&ro level, banking is regarded as any other industry which provides 
services at a cost. If left to its own devices, according to Shaw (1973), competition Will 
occur and it will provide services and products as long as clients are willing to pay cost- 
covering prices for them. Thus according to the financial repression view, development 
aid projects should not provide foreign funds, as this will only weaken the savings 
mobilisation incentive and undermine the local financial system. Instead they should 
provide technical assistance and support to governments for the creation of a conducive 
environment so that deregulation of the financial system can be achieved. Although there 
has been criticism that empirical evidence to support these propositions is limited to only 
a few countries, this perception is useful in explaining what is happening in the credit 
markets of LICs,. including Sierra Leone's. 
Further criticism, however, that deregulat on is not sufficient to solve the 
problems characteristic of repressed financial markets, namely information asymmetry 
and incentive problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) was instrumental in ushering a fourth 
perspective. Information asymmetry is at the heart of this fourth view. Associated with 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) it holds that the lack of economic development 
in LICs is due to the unavailability of 'good institutions' which are in turn a consequence 
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of poor financial systems. Institutions are regarded as good if they proVide the type of 
incentives which promote savings, capital accumulation and allocation of resources in a 
way that leads to growth (Stiotz and Weiss, 1981). It is also held that in financial and 
labour markets information is asymmetrically distributed and costly and that it is 
impossible to write and enforce contracts which would cover all contingencies. Financial 
contracts almost always create incentive problems which are characterised as moral 
hazard (Arklof, 1970; Stiglitz, 198 1). Stiglitz (I 986b, p. 20), further argues that because 
of the pervasiveness of information and incentive problems in financial markets, it is 
unlikely that fiberalisation would solve them. 
The issue is,, therefore, not either free market or bureaucratic intervention, but 
which institution functions, in what way, on the basis of the information it has and the 
incentives to which its agents are subject. Moreover, institutions themselves are regarded 
as products of long-term competition or market processeS52 . Thus to 
improve the 
financial system (both informal and informal sectors) of a country, one would have to 
study how existing institutions operate in solving the information and incentive problems, 
because market allocations are not always efficient in reality and institutions are not 
always optimally designed (Stightz, 198 1). It is difficult to find the right starting point 
for intervention. But to avoid counterproductive intervention, it is imperative to begin by 
analysing the status quo i. e. the relevant market institutions functioning in the current 
state (Stiglitz, 198 1 ). 
The NEE perspective provides a deeper understanding of the problems of 
financial systems and development in LICs than previous ones. In recent literature the 
52 McKinnon (1986.1989 and 1991). has revised earlier views in the light of the work by StIglitz and 
Weiss (198 1) 
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fourth view has included and emphasised the importance of reducing transaction costs to 
improve savings mobilisation and the costs incurred by customers when dealing with the 
RFI (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). This chapter is strongly influenced by the third and 
fourth views because, as discussed in Chapter Three, the financial system in Sierra Leone 
during the 1980s and early part of the 1990s operated under financial repression and it is 
within the same context that RBs have been operating since 1985. 
6.11 Organisation of the Rural Banks in Sierra Leone 
A variety of strategies for the development of the RFM including RBs 
have been tried in many LICs. Rural Banks in LICs can be divided into four categories 
namely co-operative development banks, development banks, commercial banks and 
independent RBs. The strategies have enjoyed different degrees of success in different 
settings, but rural banks have shown particular promise, 
Co-operative development banks are based on regional co-operatives. China and 
Kenya have tried this approach (Von Pischke, 1983) as have Pakistan and India. In 
Pakistan in 1976, the goverment established a Federal Bank for Co-operatives (Aleem, 
1990), bringing co-operative finance under state control. The state co-operative banks in 
India have played important roles in mobilising rural savings, extending credit and 
bringing socio-economic development to rural areas. The State Co-operative Bank in 
Assam in the north-eastern region of India, for example, has 43 branches spread 
throughout the rural areas and has recorded high levels of savings deposits (Desai, 
1983). A study of the activities of these state co-operative banks indicates that they have 
played important roles in the socio-economic development of the rural areas. However, 
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their ability to perforin these roles is predicated on effective co-ordination between 
governmental agencies and other banks (Desai, 1983). 
In Tanzania, state-run development banks have made a tremendous effort in 
extending branches to rural areas. Studies, however, have found that these banks are 
doing the things that private banks did prior to nationalisation and that is they had Wed 
to achieve their objectives and credit rationing was practised (Doriye, 1988). 
In the quasi-commercial bank model, governments encourage and sometimes 
compel, commercial banks to open branches in rural areas through central bank 
directives, with a view to taking banking activities to the doorsteps of, and providing 
credit to,, rural residents. However, it is reported that commercial banks are invariably 
reluctant to carry out these directives in full. In Nigeria, for example, commercial banks 
did not meet the target number of rural branches that central bank directives requested 
because of cost considerations and the lack of bankable collateral in the rural areas 
(Ogundipe, 1980; Okorie, 1991). 
The independent rural banking model is exempfified by the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh as well as RBs in Ghana and Sierra Leone. The Grameen Bank model has 
been hailed as a success story and it has been replicated and adapted in several countries 
including the United States of America (Balkan, 1993). Rural banks in Ghana, on the 
other hand, have produced mixed results (Owusu and Tetteh, 1982). 
6.12 Rationale for Rural Banking In Sierra Leone 
Aa 
Aner the disappointing performance of credit programmes instituted in the last 
four decades (chapter three), the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL) was approached by the 
government to seek ways of mobilising rural savings, providing credit to rural people 
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and filling the gap created by the phasing out of LADPs and the reluctance of CBs to lend 
to the agricultural sector, with a view to enhancing production and productivity and 
"minimising the exploitative hold over farmers by moneylenders and traders" (Bank of 
Sieffa Leone., 1984). It was decided to organise RBs as unit banks on similar lines as 
those in Ghana and in 1985, the rural banking scheme was launched. Rural banks are 
organised as Joint-Stock Companies, with each being a separate entity and operating 
within the ambit of the Banking (Amendment) Act 1970 and RBs' bye laws, which 
A 
stipulate that the BSL and any private organisation(s) in collaboration with indigenous 
peop e in te rural areas can set up an RB 53 . 
Ownership was to be spread as widely as 
possible among the inhabitants of the locality (service areas) through subscriptions to 
equity capital (BSL, 1984). 
In Sierra Leone, as in Ghana, each RB operates independently and its staff 
members are employees of that RB and can only keep their jobs if it survives. The 
standard organisational structure in Sierra Leone is given in Fig. 1. Each RB is run by a 
separate Board of Directors, a Manager and support staff who cannot be transferred to 
another RB. The average staff strength of RBs in Sierra Leone is 12 (Table 6.3). The top 
three positions (Manager, Accountant and Loans Officer) are usually filled by graduates 
and retired central bank personnel. It should be noted that with the exception of BRB 
and SRB all the other RBs had their Managers and Accountants deputed to them from 
the BSL mainly because of the lack of qualified. personnel motivated enough to give up 
the 'glare' of the city for the 'darkness' of the rural environtnent. The rest of the staff are 
-" In the Bank of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act 1970 (section 30), proNision is made for the Bank of 
Sierra Leone to contribute directly or indirectly to development projects. On the basis of this provision. 
the Bank of Sierra Leone has contributed to the share capital of RBs. 
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TABLE 6.1 OPERATING RURAL BANKS IN SIERRA LEONE (as at December, 1993) 
(lAwation, Date of establishment, and Co% e rage) 
Narneof 
Rural Bank 
Date established Province 
Uwation 
District 
Location 
CIdefdonts 
Serviced 
CINUdom 
Pop. * 
Total 
Population 
yonj 8 March. 1985 Northern Tonkolih Yom 59584 
(YRB) Rochen Malal 1402- 'r 
Kholifa Mabang 1105' 84666 
Mararnpa/ 10 December, 1986 Northern Port Loko Marampa., 'Mastrnffa 63230 
Masinwra 
(MMRB) 
Buya Romende 24013 87243 
Daru 16 March, 1987 Eastern Kailahun Jawi 22829 
(DRB) Malema 10113 
Mandu 13857 
Njaluahun 30522 77321 
Kunike 20 March, 1987 Northem Tonkolili Kunike Barina 12496 
(KRB) Kunike Folawoso 20237 
Tane 17029 49762 
Mattru 18 September. 1987 Southern Bonthe Jong 21783 
(MRB) Sogbeni 5179 
Kpanda Kemo 7531 
Yawbekaw 3299 
Impem 1307'. 50864 
Moamale 20 October, 1989 Eastern Kailahun Peje West 10667 
(MOARB) Peje Bongre 10263 
Malegohun 11852 
Ya,. Nei 9514 42296 
sewaxna 24 April, 1992 Eastern Kenema SImbar-u 13897 
(SRB) Gorarna Mende 25327 
Falla Wandor 16403 55 627 
Bornbah 20 May, 1992 Northern Bombali Bombali Sebora 22078 
(BRB) Paki Massabong 11277 
Biriwa 24546 
Pendembu Gowa 22141 
Libeisaygahun 8384 
Makari Gbanti 19696 
Safroko Limba 16612 12-4734 
TOTAL 572513 
Note: - 1985 census Figures. 
Source: Development Finance EXpartment, BSL, 1984 
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Table 6.2 MOVEMENT OF SHARE CAPITAL OF ALL RBs IN SIERRA LF-ONE 
(As at December, 1993) 
(in Lc 000) 
RB Shares 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
YRB Authonsed 250 250 250 500 1000 2500 3000 3000 3000 
Total paid up 174.8 214 284 500 646,5 1559 2607 2848.2 -1994 
Indigenous 49.8 88.8 159 250 396.5 1309 2357 2598.2 2744 
BSL 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 12 5 
Others 125 125 12 5___ 12 ý 125 125 
MMRB Autliorised 500 500 500 500 1000 5000 30W 
Total Paid up 403.2 401.8 403.2 448 8 81.2 1140.4 2267.8 2010 7 
Indigenous 153.2 151.8 153.2 198 632 2 890.4 2017.8 
- 
', 60,7 
BSL 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 io 
Others 
DRB Authorised. 500 1000 2000 2000 2000 2M) 2 O(k 
Total Paid up 761.8 869.3 1058.4 1299.9 1299.9 12999 1299 9 
Indigenous 511.8 619.3 708.4 749.9 749.9 749.9 749 1) 
BSL 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
Others I W) 300 300 300 300 
KRB Authorised. 500 1500 1500 2000 2000 2(X)() 2()()() 
Total Paid up 664 592 903.1 1187.5 12 56 1181 5 2()4() 7 
1 ndigenous 414 4592 653.1 937.5 1005 5 1131.5 1790 7 
BSL 250 250 250 250 2 
-5 
250 2;, () 
Others 
MRB Authorised 500 1000 1000 5000 ý000 5000 ý000 
Total Paid up 709,9 765.2 921.3 152T8 1790.2 2456 1 () 16 5 
Indigenous 459.9 515.2 671.3 1277,8 1540 2 2206 270() 
BSL 250 250 250 2 50 1410 250 2) 
Others 
MOARB Authorised 1000 1000 1000 INY) 1000 
Total Paid up 1183.3 1279 2 1279,2 1279 2 1271) 
Indigenous 583.3 679.2 679.2 679.2 679.2 
BSL 250 250 250 250 250 
Others 350 35( ) 
_3 
350 350 
SRB Authorised . 10000 HKO) 
Total Paid up 3290 1147 
Indigenous 2 790 284' 
BSL 4100 4100 
Others 
BRB Authorised. 20000 
-) 
()(H)() 
Total Paid up 3347 4021 6 
Indigenous 3347 416 
BSL 
Others 
All RBS Authorised 250 750 2500 4500 7000 13500 18000 46000 48000 
Total Paid up 174.8 617 2822 3379 5160.6 7735.4 9 '1 7-2 5 18170.3 20009 
Indigenous 49.8 242 1697 2129 3210.6 5585.4 72-12.5 15220.3 17159 
BSL 125 375 1125 1125 1375 1375 1375 1875 1875 
Others 125 575 775 775 775 775 
Total (shareholders) 489 950 1561 2040 2477 2794 2828 3684 3765 
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Table 6.3. Staff Position in R-Bs as at March, 1994 
Position YRB MMRB KRIB MRB 
Manager I I I I 
Accountant I 1 0 1 
Asst. Accountant 1 0 1 1 
Loans officer(s) I 1 0 1 
Asst. Loans officer(s) 1 0 1 1 
Loans clerk(s) 0 1 0 0 
Cashier(s) I I I I 
Counter clerk(s) 2 2 0 3 
Bookkeeper(s) 2 1 1 1 
Messenger(s) I 1 0 0 
Cleaner(s) I I 1 0 
Security or 
watchmen 
3 3 3 1 
Driver(s) 0 0 0 0 
Total staff 15 13 9 11 
Source: - Survey of RBs in Sierra Leone, 1994. 
mainly school leavers who, according to the RB Managers, were using the RBs as 
stepping stones to more lucrative jobs or waiting for opportunities to enter university. It 
is therefore no surprise that there has been a high staff turnover. For example, eight or 
about 30 per cent of staff have left the YRB since its inception, the NMM lost six or 46 
per cent, the KRB five or 30 per cent and the MRB and KRB have lost three each (The 
Survey, 1994). Some staff have left RBs and joined other institutions with better 
conditions of service. A cashier in an RB, for example, earns less than one-tenth of the 
salary of his or her counterparts in commercial banks (CBs, 1978). There are virtually no 
opportunities for finther training and professional advancement. Commercial bank 
managers informed us that staff turnover in their institutions has been below 10 per cent 
in the last ten years and most of those who left did so not because of poor conditions of 
service but to go to university or abroad for advanced educational training. Few were 
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relieved of their positions because of malpractices. They also confirmed that apart from 
mining companies, commercial banks have better conditions of service than other 
indigenous establishments. It could reasonably be assumed, therefore, that RB staff are 
not well motivated and prepared for work in rural areas. In the Grameen Bank, part of 
the incentive system provides a proportion of the loans recovered as a bonus payment to 
staff and there is room for professional advancement (Wahid, 1993). In the absence of 
such incentives, the lack of motivation in RB staff is reminiscent of the situation with 
past credit schemes that failed (chapter three). 
The rural banking scheme was to be implemented in three phases. In phase one, 
three pilot RBs (one each in Northern, Southern and Eastern provinces) were to be 
established within three years. These pilot RBs were to serve as models for the 
establishment of others. In phase two, thirteen RBs (one in each of the thirteen Districts, 
including the Western Area) were to be established. This second phase was expected to 
form part of a new Agricultural Development Plan (AGDEV 5) jointly funded by the 
World Bank, other international donor agencies and the government of Sierra Leone 
(MAFF, 1989). The third phase was scheduled to be implemented at Chiefdom level, 
where one or a group of Chiefdoms, after meeting the necessary guidelines on 
management and capitalisation, could apply to the BSL for a licence to open an RB. The 
imidelines stated that at least one quarter of the authorised share capital should have 'I, - 
been raised from the indigenous people and residents of the service area. In addition, 
there should be proof that at least two Directors of proven rectitude are available; and 
these are to be indigenous to the service area (BSL, 1980). Phase three would have been 
spread over a period of five years. 
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Fig. I STANDARD ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A RURAL BANK 
IN SIERRA LEONE. 
I 
Security 
I 
Driver 
Source: - Development Finance Department, Bank of Sierra Leone. 
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On an area meeting the above requirements, the BSL conducts a socio-economic 
survey of the proposed area to detern-ýine its suitability. Where the BSL is satisfied that 
the area can provide a conducive enviromnent 54 permission is granted for publicity, sale 
of shares and preparations for establishment to commence. It should be noted that a 
large proportion (at least 75 per cent) of pre-establishment expenses" are borne by the 
BSL. 
The first pilot RB (the YRB) was established in March, 1985 at Mile 9156 in the 
Northern Province. Soon after its establishment, events overtook the programme. 
Politicians seized the opportunity and used the rural banking scheme as a campaign tool 
by promising their constituencies that RBs would be established in their constituencies in 
order to provide loans for farming and other enterprises. The BSL was inundated with 
applications from politicians of all persuasions. The BSL was initially reluctant to yield to 
this political pressure, but with government interference, it had to relent. In other words 
politicians hijacked the rural banking scheme and brought pressure for RBs to be 
established in their constituencies. By the end of 1993, eight RBs had been established 
(Table 6.1) and the pilot phase was abandoned. The reluctance of the World Bank and 
other international donor agencies to invest in this development venture under AGDEV 
5 may not be unconnected with this turn of events. 
Rural banking in Sierra Leone is based on the concept of financial intermediation, 
accepting deposits and extending loans. These savings are to be deployed vAthin the 
54 A conducive environment is narrowly defined as one with enough economic activity (trade, 
agriculture and other businesses), some government departments, a project(s), a police station and a 
market (Bank of Sierra Leone, 1984). 
55 These expenses include per them allowances, salaries and transport costs for central bank staff 
engaged in publicity campaigns and building materials for reffirbishing buildings to house the RB. 
56 Mile 91 is approximately 91 miles from the capital, Freetown. 
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areas from which they were mobilised, by granting loans to agriculture, trade, transport, 
and other small-scale enterprises; and contributing to development projects such as road 
repairs, building of market infrastructure, schools and clinics, with a view to influencing 
increased production and productivity. One of the first policies to be adumbrated is that 
an RB should confine its operations within a twenty-five mile radius (the service area). 
This is to prevent residents within one service area from acquiring loans in another. 
Secondly, any rural resident who wishes to avail himself or herself of the loan facilities 
should either become a shareholder or maintain an account (demand or savings) with the 
lR%B (Bank of Sierra Leone, 
1984)57 
6.13 Objectives of the Rural Banking Scheme 
The objectives of the rural banking scheme are not prioritised. Taken together 
they include (1) the mobilisation of savings, (2) provision of supervised credit to rural 
residents, (3) taking banking to the doorsteps of rural residents, (4) influencing increases 
in production and productivity through the use of modem inputs, such as fertilisers and 
improved seed, (5) monetising the rural economy, (6) creating investment funds and 
enhancing employment opportunities in the rural areas thereby reducing out-migration, 
(7) contributing to development projects such as those mentioned earlier from retained 
profits, (8) creating an environment in which rural dwellers will assume greater 
responsibility in the decision-making process of RBs through the purchase of shares, 
membership of Board of Directors (BODs) and Local Loans Committees (LLCs), (9) 
helping to create markets for inputs and output in collaboration with other government 
57 This policy is silent on the amount of loan an individual is entitled to, vis-i-vis the amount of savings 
in his or her account. In Togo and Cameroon, a boffo-*ver is not allowed to boffo, *,,, more than two or 
three times respectively, of his or her savings (Gurgand, et aL, 1994). 
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A Or 
agencies and development projects 
located in the service areas and (10) "minimising the 
exploitative hold of moneylenders and traders over farmers" (BSL, 1984). 
6.14 Board of Directors 
Each RB is run by a seven-member Board of Directors which meets once a 
month to review operations and policy. Each BOD is peculiar to its RB and its members 
are appointed as follows: - 
One member representing Class 'A' shareholders. this class of shares" is 
reserved for the BSL and carries veto powers. The exercise of veto powers is confined 
to issues relating to the operations of an RB which border on the contravention of the 
Banking (Amendment) Act 1970; or the RB bye laws as laid down in the Memorandum 
and Articles of Association (M & A)9 and to ensuring prudential banking practices. It 
was expected that the Class 'A' shares held by the BSL would be sold and converted to 
Class 'C' shares when demand for them is demonstrated by the indigenous people of the 
service area. 
One member representing Class 'B'60 shareholders: these shares are reserved for 
other financial and development institutions operating in the service area. Such 
institutions include IADPs,. Co-operative Societies, Development projects, Commercial 
banks and other financial institutions, and any other business or project operating within 
the service area. 
58 These shares are Preference shares; they do not attract dividends and the BSL is committed to selling 
them off as class 'c' shares when the demand for them is established Class 'A' shares constitute 1/4 of 
the authorised share capital of the RBs (Bank of Sierra Leone, 1984). 
59 The M&A of all RBs in Sierra Leone are the same except for the name of the RB, its BOD and the 
authorised share capital (Survey, 1994). 
' Class 'B' shares constitute at least 25 percent of the authorised share capital of the RBs (Bank of 
Sierra Leone. 1984). 
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Five members representing Class 'C' shareholders- these Directors are the 
indigenous people and hold office for three years, but can be re-elected at the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM). 
The functions of BODs are: (a) authorising and sanctioning loans and advances 
granted by Managers and LLCs, (b) reviewing RB lending policy and (c) directing policy 
on management and administration. A major stipulation connected with the appointment 
of directors is that no sitting member(s) of Parliament or PC(s) within the service area 
should become a director. The rationale is to Prevent an RB from being politicised and to 
eliminate bias in the provision of services to customers. One of the members of the BOD 
should be resident in the area and he or she should act as Chairperson of the Local Loans 
Committee (LLC) which is comprised of four memberS61 . The LLC is a 
body created to 
help RBs identify high risk borrowers by using their knowledge of the area and the 
residents, a function akin to that performed by moneylenders who reside near their 
customers. The LLCs effort is expected to assist in reducing the adverse selection of 
risk and moral hazard problems. It should, however, be noted that the risk of patronage 
is still present. 
Due to lack of specialist training and experience, most BODs cannot interpret 
financial statements. The MMRB was the only RB that had a Chairperson with a 
commercial banking background. Therefore the ability of the BODs to execute their 
duties is questionable. There has been only one training session which was organised for 
BODs in 1989. The emphasis, however, was on administrative and policy issues as 
opposed to diagnostic tools and evaluation of rural bank's operations. In contrast, Bank 
61 One resident Director and three members appointed from among shareholders resident uithin the area 
serviced kv the RB (Bank of Sierra Leone, 1984). 
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of Ghana organises training and reftesher courses regularly for such Directors which 
emphasise, among other things, interpretation of balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements of accounts (Owusu, 1985). 
6,15 Share Capital Analysis 
The authorised share capital (ASC) of each RB was originally fixed at Le 
250ý000 (BSL, 1984); but various BODs have revalued and even doubled this amount, 
reflecting the demand and, even more so, the inflationary situation (Table 6.2). Newly 
established RBs such as the BRB and SRB have ASCs of Le20 million and LelO million 
respectively. Each share is valued at Lel. 00 to be purchased in multiples of fifty. 
Another restriction imposed is that no single individual is allowed to own more than 
Le40,000 worth of shares (BSL, 1984); but this figure was revised to Le200, OOO in 1990 
(BSL, 1992). This is expected to prevent one shareholder from exercising a controlling 
influence on an RB. 
The total paid up share capital (TPU) of the eight RBs has been high. It increased 
from LeO. 174 to Le20. O million between 1985-1993 (Table 6.2). At the commencement 
of each RB, TPU was over 50 per cent of ASC, indicating an initial enthusiasm by rural 
people to have a financial institution they could call their own and would invest in if 
opportunities were offered. This tends to rebut the traditional notion that rural people do 
not save. The TPU of the eight RBs, as at March, 1993, was 41.7 per cent of the ASC. 
The BSL's contribution was 3.9 per cent and other institutions contributed 1.6 per cent. 
The proportion of Class 'C' shares to TPU is 86 per cent. However, excluding the 
BSL's and other institutions' contributions, paid up Class 'C' share capital is 36.2 per 
cent of the ASC (Table 6.4). 
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In some RBs there has been a decline in paid up share capital. For example, in the 
YRB in 1990,, it declined by 3 percentage points following an inflation-led upward 
revaluation of ASC by 150 per cent from Lel. 0 million to Le2.50 million (Table 6.2). 
But the savings rate (Table 6.11) continued to be below inflation, although increased by 
5 percentage points from 15 to 20 per cent in 1991. It was lowered again in June, 1993, 
to 10 per cent per annum mainly due to a fall in inflation (see Table 3.3). 
Overall, the rural banking scheme has not succeeded in spreading ownership of 
DID 
Was among the target population. The proportion of Class 'C' shareholders, as at March 
1993, was less than I per cent (approximately 0.66 per cent) of the total population in 
Table 6.4 Contribution to Share Capital in Eight RBs- - 1985 to Dec., 1993 
(in million Leones) 
Item 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
5 (5) (6) 
ASC 0.25 0.75 2.5 4.5 _ 7.0 13.5 18.0 46.0 48.0 
Class 0.125 0.375 1.125 1.125 1.375 1.375 1.375 1.875 1.875 
'A' 
Class nil nil nil 0.125 1.575 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 
'B' 
Class 0.049 0.242 1.697 2.129 3.211 5.585 7.223 15.22 17.36 
CC, ) 
TPU 0.175 0.617 2.822 3.379 5.161 7.735 9.373 18.17 20.01 
0 
No. of 489 950 1561 2040 2477 2794 2828 3684 3765 
share- 
holders 
'c' as 19.6 32.3 67.9 47.3 45.9 36.5 40.1 33.1 36.2 
% of 
ASC 
Notes-- ASC Authorised Share Capital. 
TPU Total Paid Up Capital. 
Figures in brackets indicate the number of RBs in operation during that year. 
Source. - The Surygy. 1994. 
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the service areas of the eight RBs (Tables 6.1 and 6.4). Managers of "s informed us 
that the majority shareholders (owning about 60 per cent of paid-up Class 'C' shares) 
were the Chiefdom Authorities, members of BODs and affluent individuals residing in 
urban areas who claimed to be indigenous to the RBs' service areas. They also informed 
us that these people purchased shares in the names of their family members, most of 
whom were invariably unaware that they 'own' RB shares. It could, therefore,, be 
reasonably assumed that these directors, chiefdom authorities and affluent people 
circumvented the policy which limits the amount of shares an individual can own, by 
purchasing them in the names of family memberS62 . Thus the policy of spreading the 
owner-ship of the RBs among rural residents may not have been achieved. It may rather 
have created a small group of rural elite who are indirectly controlling RB operations and 
determining the direction of loans by co-signing/guaranteeing loan applications (see 
Section 6.3 1). 
6.20 Evaluation Criteria 
Several performance indicators can be used to determine the level of achievement 
of an RFI. Two methodologies, Outreach and the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI), 
have been used here to analyse and assess the level of achievement of RBs in Sieffa 
Leone. These methodologies provide a closer look at various aspects of operations 
including those not covered by financial statements such as the level of subsidies received 
by an RB. They also facilitate international comparison, an aspect not easily achieved 
with the use of conventional financial ratios (Yaron, 1992b). 
62Rural Bank Managers did not pro, %ide names for fear of contravening the secrecy code-. but they were 
firm about the existence of 'fictitious' shareholders. 
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6.21 Outreach Analysis 
Outreach refers to the degree of achievement in reaching the target group which 
could be the whole population or a segment of it. In Sierra Leone's rural banking 
context, the target group is the rural residents of the service area (farmers, traders, small 
industrialists and other entrepreneurs). Outreach will be measured in terms of the value 
of total savings deposits, the number and average value of savings accounts, loans to 
savings ratio, the amount of loans extended, the number of branches or units established, 
the proportion of the target population reached and the rate of women's participation. 
6.22 Savings mobilisation 
Although savings mobilisation has been described as "the forgotten half of rural 
finance" its importance has been emphasised by Vogel (1984). Such neglect can largely 
be attributed to the traditional but faulty assumption, already discussed in Chapter Two, 
that rural people do not save. Informal financial institutions such as the osusu in Sierra 
Leone provide sufficient evidence to contradict this assumption (see Chapter Five). 
Savings mobilisation creates a continuous source of funds that is independent of 
government and international donors and provides information on clients and potential 
borrowers. Thus, savings mobilisation is the basis for a developed financial market 
capable of bringing about improved resource allocation and of allowing financial 
institutions to perform their intermediation role. This aspect relates to the role of interest 
rates in savings mobilisation. In theory, an economic agent's reaction to variation in 
interest rates is not clearly defined because of two opposing effects (Fry, 1977). When 
interest rates increase, opportunity cost of current consumption rises and f6ture 
consumption is prefeffed, savings are expected to rise. This is the substitution effect. But 
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there is an opposing income effect, where high interest rates raise expected income and 
induce individuals to increase both present and future consumption. The net effect of 
these outcomes depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between 
present and future consumption and the marginal propensity to save (Fry, 1977 and 
1988; Giovannini, 1985). According to Balassa (1989), the size of these parameters is an 
empirical issue. Empirical studies have not provided strong evidence that interest rates 
create efficient incentives to save. In contrast, the safety of deposits appear to be a more 
significant factor in relation to deposit rates. The implication is that given a moderately 
positive deposit interest rate, in real terms, an RFI may be more successful in inducing 
savings by improving access to deposit services. Rural Banks in Sierra Leone rely mainly 
on savings mobilised. from clients; but access to its services have been limited to larger 
customers (see below). 
Table 6.5 depicts an overall increase in growth rate of savings mobilised by the 
D'D 
Rus between 1985 and 1993. The growth rate of deposits was high during the first two 
years of the rural banking scheme; but slowed down after 1990 even with an increase in 
the number of RBs in operation. On a bank to bank basis, the fluctuation in growth rate 
was most pronounced at the YRB, where it dropped from 23.5 per cent in 1988 to minus 
15.7 per cent in 1989, increasing again in 1990 and dropping the following year by 31.9 
per cent. This fluctuating trend was due mainly to the liquidity crisis experienced during 
1989 to 1990 followed by an increase in parallel market activity (Chapter Three). 
Although more currency notes were printed, this government decision, among other 
things, helped to fuel year-on-year inflation from 76 per cent to 103 per cent from 1985 
and 1991 (Table 3.3) without a corresponding increase in savings rates. 
215 
Some caution is required in interpreting these savings mobilisation figures, given 
that there were 1,040 dormant accounts, as at March, 1994, representing 15.9 per cent 
of the total number of accounts. These dormant accounts held Le9.75 million, or 3.2 per 
Table 6.5 Growth in Total Deposits (Demand and Savings ) in Four RBs (Le M). 
RB 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 
YRB 
. 
33 2.9 5.7 7.1 5.9 11.8 8 20.3 15.8 
(784.4) (96.6) (23.5) (-15.7) (96.5) (-31.9) (1516) (-21.9) 
NMA" 1.1 3.3 5.8 15.4 16.9 11.9 30.9 
(195.6) 165.6 (9.2) 
KRB 1.5 2.3 1.7 2.2 6.1 3,1 5.4 
(50.3) -27.3 (177.4) (-50.9) (75.5) 
MRB 
.8 3.2 11.6 15.7 17.6 28.3 43.5 (320) 35) (11.9) (61.4) 
Total .3 2.9 9.1 15.9 25.0 45.1 48.6 63.6 95.6 
1 (866.7) j (213.8)1 (74.7) 1 (57.2) 1 (80.4) 1 (7.8) 1 (30.9) 1 (50.3) 
Note: - Figures in brackets are percentage change over the previous year. 
* up to June, 1993. 
Sources: - Financial Statements of RBs, 1985 - 1993. 
Table 6.6 Analysis of Savings in Dormant Accounts in Four RBs (1985 - 1993)s 
RB Total Total no. No. of Deposits Dormant Deposits in 
deposits of dormant in accounts dormant 
(Le M) accounts accounts dormant as % of accounts 
in RB accounts total no. as % of 
(Le M) of total 
accounts deposits 
YRB 77.8 2668 195 2.5 7.3 3.2 
MIMIRB 85.3 1573 461 3.16 29.3 3.7 
KRB 22.3 897 231 1.48 25.7 6.6 
MRB 120.7 1386 153 2.61 11.0 2.2 
Total 306.1 6,524 1,040 9.75 15.9 3.2 
Source: - Financial statements of RBs. 1985-1993 . 
cent of total deposits mobilised by the four rural banks (Table 6.6). The KRB has the 
highest percentage (6.6 per cent) of total deposits. This situation may not be 
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unconnected with the cross-firing of cheques incident" in 1990 which may have led to a 
confidence crisis. 
It may also have introduced a systemic risk in the rural banking system. The 
incident brings into question the ability of BOD members and Bank of Sierra Leone to 
monitor and supervise the operations of RBs. Another reason for the high number of 
dormant accounts is that many clients open accounts for the sole purpose of acquiring a 
loan and when it is acquired, the operation of the account ceases (interview with 
Managers of RBs). 
6.23. Savings Outreach 
When a financial intermediary is genuinely independent and not just a credit 
outlet it generally provides savings services to a significant number of depositors, with 
the number of savers normally exceeding the number of borrowers (Yaron, 1992a). In 
this regard, none of the RB has been successful. All the four RBs had more borrowers 
than savers (Table 6.7). The overall ratio of depositors to borrowers in the four RBs as 
at December, 1993, is 1: 2.8. reflecting the unattractive savings options provided (Yaron,, 
1992a; Gurgand, et al, 1994). For most clients, the exposure to deposit and savings 
facilities is usually the only way of becoming associated with services offered by an FFl 
6'Huge loans were granted by the manager to Lebanese diamond mining customers under the cross- 
firing of cheques incident in 1989/90. These customers also had accounts in several commercial banks 
and drew cheques at divers dates. These cheques were honoured without reference checks or clearing 
because most were treated as overdrafts, This cross-firing of cheques almost brought a run on the KRB. 
It appeared to be a case of collusion between the manager and some officials of other commercial banks 
and the Lebanese customers, to take advantage of the poor communication links between RBs and 
commercial banks and the long bank clearing period. It should be noted that due to the poor means of 
communication (no telephone or fax links between commercial banks and between RBs and BSL as well 
as poor roads), chcques drawn on RBs could take at least 4 weeks before clearing takes place. During 
this periocL several cheques could have been issued and encashed by an unscrupulous customer. but not 
without coflusion between a senior commercial and or a RBs official. 
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(Yaron, 1992a). Savings mobilisation is important for the sustainability of operations. 
The idea of group savings as it is operates in Togo, Cameroon and Rwanda and the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has not yet been considered by R. Bs in Sierra Leone64 
Table 6.7. Ratio of Savers to Borrowers in Four RBs (1985 - 1993) 
rural bank period number of 
savers 
number of 
borrowers 
ratio of savers 
to borrowers 
YRB 1985-1993 27668 45821 1: 1.8 
N"VI" 1986-1993 15,573 95200 1: 5.8 
KRB 1987-1993 897 27626 1-2.9 
NM 1987-1993 13 86 1ý870 1: 1.3 
Total 1985-1993 6,524 
_T 
18,517 1: 2.8 
Source: - Computed from Tables 6.8,6.9 and financial state ents of rural banks. 
In Sierra Leone, high inflation has been a persistent problem. Nominal interest 
rates paid on savings by RBs (15 per cent from 1985; 20 per cent from 1991 to June, 
1993 and 10 per cent after June, 1993), have been negative in real terms (Table 6.11) 
because of the high rates of inflation (Table 3.3). This negative real interest rate returns 
may have contributed to potential depositors holding savings in value-appreciating real 
assets such as crop inventories, animals and jeweflery, since these provide a more 
effective way of hedging against inflation. The initial increase in deposits observed (Table 
6.5) may have been induced by the need to be eligible for loans. Another factor which 
may have contributed to low savings mobilisation is the on-going 'rebel' war, which has 
created instability in the whole economy. It has already caused the closure of two RBs - 
DRB and MOARB - and may lead others to cease operations if it continues. 
Although RBs offered lower interest rates on savings deposits compared to 
commercial banks,, the initial increase in deposit mobilisation may reflect an increase in 
64 See Gurgand et al. ( 1994) for more details. 
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the monetisation of the rural economy, rather than the reallocation of existing financial 
resources from one institution or sector to another. One major achievement of RBs in 
Sierra Leone., however, is that they have brought new clients into the formal sector who 
were not serviced by commercial banks. In this regard RBs have made a net contribution 
to financial intermediation. Furthermore, women now form a substantial part of the RB 
clientele. Fifteen per cent of the clients of the four RBs are women contributing almost 
31 per cent of total deposits as at end of December, 1993 (Table 6.8). Considering the 
increase in the number of business women (ELO, 1985), it is likely that the proportion 
will increase significantly in future. Commercial bank managers informed us that less 
than 10 per cent of their customers, especially in the rural areas, are women due mainly 
to women not wanting their husbands and other relatives to know about their savings 
and to avoid unwelcome pressure and requests. Other factors include distrust of formal 
institutions and inferiority complex, They added that the widespread use of osusu groups 
Table 6.8. Women Clients in Four RBs tas at March, 1994) 
Rural 
Bank 
No. of 
savers 
Women 
savers 
Total 
savings of 
women 
(Le M) 
Women a as 
% of total 
savers 
Women's savings 
as % of total 
deposits in RB* 
YRB 2)668 352 18.4 13.2 23.7 
MMRB 1,573 102 12.6 6.5 14.8 
MRB 1ý386 234 49.1 16.9 40.7 
KRB 897 309 14.7 34.5 65.9 
Total 6,524 997 94.8 15.3 30.9 
Note*- * as per cent of total deposits (see Table 6.5). 
Source: - The Survey, 1994. 
by women also makes them uninterested in banking institutions. But the high proportion 
of women saving with RBs may also be the result of women asserting themselves and 
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becoming more economicafly independent as they become more educated (Table 1.1) 
and as development progresses (ELO, 1985). The KRB has the highest proportion of 
women clients (34.5 per cent), and their savings are a significant proportion of total 
savings mobilised from 1987 to March, 1994 mainly due to the gold mining activities 
which attracts a large number of traders, especially women, to its service area and hence 
attracts borrowers. But this is only part of the explanation, as will be seen in Sections 
6.34 and 6.35. 
6.24. Lending Outreach 
In terms of lending outreach (number of borrowers reached), the RBs have made 
limited progress (Table 6.9). By end 1993, the eight RBs had reached just 21,020 
borrowers i. e. 3.7 per cent of the population in the service areas. This is low compared 
to RBs in Ghana which had reached over 20 per cent of their target population between 
1973 and 1983 (Owusu and Tetteh, 1982). Eighty per cent of the control sample in the 
survey informed us that they are observing the RBs' operations for a while before 
participating because of the unpleasant experience rural people have had with past formal 
financial institutions, such as co-operatives (see Chapter Three). These co-operatives 
failed because of misappropriation of funds, among other reasons. The IADPs also 
provided grounds for scepticism because extension officers were accused of falsifying 
credit accounts and inflating repayments due ftom borrowers (Johnny, 1985; Reddy, 
1985). It may therefore be that rural residents still regard formal institutions with 
suspicion and tend to shy away from them. Rural bank managers informed us that though 
the issue of misappropriation of funds in past credit institutions may be fundamental, the 
main reason for the low client base and the high number of dormant accounts is the lack 
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of mobility of personnel. Apart from the YRB and the KRB which had a vehicle each (up 
to 1989), no other RB had any means of transport. Thus, the unavailabflity of transport 
facilities have prevented RBs from embarldng on savings mobilisation drives. In similar 
RFIs such as the Grameen bank in Bangladesh, weekly deposits are collected by bank 
personnel on the doorsteps of customers and potential clients. In India, the Syndicate 
Bank appoints rural agents on a commission basis to collect deposits through what is 
known as the 'pigrny deposit scheme' (Padmanabhan, 1988). In Niger a savings bank 
makes daily deposit collection at market sites (Gurgand, et al. 1994). Savings mobilisers 
Table 6.9. Outreach Anal-vsis (Lending) for the Eight RBs, 1985 - 1993. 
Pop. in 
service 
area 
No. of 
groups* 
No. of 
members 
in 
groups 
Indivi- 
dual 
borrowers 
Total no. 
of 
borrowers 
Borrowers 
as % of 
pop. in 
service 
area 
YRB 84fi66 228 4,560 261 4ý821 5.7 
MMRB 87,243 55 131100 81,100 9ý200 10.5 
KRB 497762 102 27040 586 2,626 5.3 
NM 50)1864 86 1: 
0720 
150 1ý870 3.7 
DRB 77,1321 65 17300 333 13,633 2.1 
MOARB 42,296 30 600 63 663 1.6 
SRB 55fi27 0 0 18 18 0.03 
BRB 124,734 4 80 109 189 0.15 
Total 572,513 570 11,400 9,620 219020 3.7 
Note: - * These groups are loose associations formed mainly by farmers and cloth dyeing 
(gara) women's' enterprises mainly to take advantage of loan facilities. 
Source. -- Financial statements and other returns from RBs. 
were also employed by the Self-Employed Women's Co-operative (SEWA) in 
Ahmedabad in India. These agents explain to illiterate clients the procedures for 
depositing and withdrawing funds; and it is reported that in the first year, eleven of them 
were able to mobilise as much as 1.1 million Rupees from 3,000 clients (Padmanabhan, 
1988). In Ghana, RBs have used school savings schemes to increase savings (Owusu 
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and Tetteh, 1982). In contrast, RBs in Sierra Leone wait for customers and potential 
customers to come to the bank to transact business. Apart from the initial publicity, prior 
to the commencement of operations, no follow up campaigns have been undertaken by 
any RB. 
6.25 Loan-to-deposit Ratios 
Table 6.10 provides a trend in loans-to-deposit ratio in the RBs, for which data 
are available. Although the ratios look impressive and reflect an overall increase in loan 
volume, as far as intermediation is concerned,. they do not reflect prudent liquidity 
management, especially when we consider the high default rates observed (Section 6.3 1). 
Table 6.10 Loan-to-Deposit Ratios in the Eight RBs 
Year Natio 
nal 
AR 
RBs 
YRB KRB MM 
RB 
MRB DR-B MOA 
RIB** 
S 
RB 
B 
RIB 
1985 29.1 22.3 22.3 
1986 19.4 9.4 9.4 
1987 17.7 23.2 37.5 9.9 
1988 22.1 49.9 73.8 50.6 28.9 11,9 218,2 
1989 37.6 50.5 100.6 89.2 24.3 10.9 218.2 
1990 41.7 563.8 107 11812* 81.9 23.2 218.2 
1991 48.1 751.6 102.8 6315.7* 59.8 58.7 218.2 120.4 
1992 40.6 480.6 93.4 1047.2* 115 47 218.2 120.4 28.4 
1993 N/A 334.8 79.3 
. 
6046.6* 169.6 30.6 218.2 120.4 13.5 38.7 
Note: -* effect of the cheque incident. 
** closed down due to 'rebel' war. 
N/A = Not Available. 
Source. - Financial Statements of RBs and Commercial banks, 1986-1993. 
Losses incurred from the extension of huge loans to not more than five clients 
(the cross-firing of cheques incident) without consideration to liquidity management 
brought the KRB to near collapse, but for the intervention of the BSL. The manager of 
KRB informed us that about seven-eighths of this amount has been recovered but this 
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was not reflected in the subsequent audited statement of account. The effect of this 
overextension of loans will become apparent in the default (Section 6.3 1) and SDI 
analysis (Section 6.40). Poor liquidity management focuses on the quality of 
management and supervision of RBs by both the BSL and the BODs. The lack of proper 
and adequate training in financial management for RB staff may be a contributory factor. 
The BSL organises a training course each year for loans officers and managers-, but it is 
limited to administrative policies and lacks a critical analysis of operations and 
explanations for low levels of achievement (Harrison, 1990). This is reminiscent of the 
past credit schemes. 
6.30 Lending Operations 
Lending is one of the major functions of RBs and is guided by directives from the 
central bank (Bank of Sierra Leone, 1984). The main directives include the following: - 
(1) Sectoral allocation 
(a) Agricultural production (including agro-industries) - 40% of total loans 
(b) Trade 3 0% "C 1) C 1) 
(c) Industries and services 20% "tC 
(d) Personal/General 10% 41) 
Interest rates on loans 
(a) Agricultural production 
(b) General trade 
(c) Industries and services 
(d) Personal/General 
(3) Sanctioning finits 
(a) Manager 
(b) Local Loans Committee 
(c) Board of Directors 
(d) Bank of Sierra Leone 
35% 
40% 
35% 
40% 
up to Le50, OOO 
from U50,001 - Le 1001,000 
from Le 100,901 - U200,000 
above U200,000 
Sou-rce-- BSL,,. 1984. 
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The lending policy of the RBs provides for short-term, medium-term and long-term 
lending (BSL, 1984). But none of the RBs has been able to give medium- or long-tenn 
loans due mainly to low liquidity and high default. Tables 6.12 - 6.18 proVides the 
analysis of RB lending from 1985 to December, 1993, for the four RBs. 
Table 6.11. Prescribed and Actual Interest Rates in RBs , 1985-1994 
Instru - ment Policy Actual 
1985-1990 
Actual 
1991-1993, 
(June) 
Actual 
After June, 
1993 
Savings 30 15 20 10 
Lending Rates 
Ag. Production 40 40 40-45 30 
Ag. Marketing 35 35 4045 30 
Gen. Trade 35 35 50-55 35 
Industry 35 40 50-55 35 
1 O/D (personal) 1 40 1 60 1 50-55 1 40 
Note: - A3 per cent Commitment or Administrative Fee is charged on loans sanctioned. 
This Fee was reduced to I per cent in 1992 (Survey, 1994). 
Source: - Rural Bank Survey, 1994. 
Table 6.12. Sectoral Distribution of Loans bj Four RBs, 1985 - Dec., 1993 (LeM) 
Type of loan YRB MMRB KRB MRB Total loans 
Agricultural 
Production 
16.9 (48.0) 24.3 (36.2) 18.1(4.1) 13.1(39.6) 72.4(12.7) 
Agricultural 
Marketing 
7.7(21.9) 6.4(9.5) 5.5(l. 3) 13.8(41.7) 33.4(5.8) 
General 
Trade 
7.2(20.5) 36.4(54.2) 43.9 
(10.1) 
3.6(10.8) 91.1(15.9) 
Animal 
Husbandry 
0(0) 0(0) 4.6(l. 0) 0(0) 4.6(0.8) 
Industry 
(cottage) 
1.6(4.5) 0(0) 0(0) 1.9(5.9) 3.5(0.6) 
Mning 0(0) 0(0) 364(83.4) 0(0) 364(63.6) 
Personal 1.8 (5.1) negligible 0.5(. 01) 0.7(2. 2.9(0.5) 
Total 35.2 67.1 436.6 33.1 571.9 
Note: - Figures in brackets are percentages of total loans. 
Source. - Financial statements of RBs. 
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The total volume of loans extended (up to December, 1993) by the four RBs we 
surveyed was about Le572 million to 18,517 borrowers, an average loan size of 
Le30,, 890 (US$ 53.3 at 1993 prices). A closer examination of the sectoral distribution, 
however, shows that the largest proportion of loans has gone to the mining sector. The 
KRB cheque incident provided Le 364 million, an average of Le 72.8 million (US$ 
627,586) per borrower. It could be concluded that these customers took advantage of 
the low interest rates, the long clearing period and lack of communications between RBs 
and coffunercial banks. 
If we exclude mining loans, the picture is different. Total volume of loans to 
other sectors is just Le208 million (about US$ 358,621), an average loan size of Le 
11,236 (about US$ 19.4). This amount is less than half the cost of cultivating 1.5 acres 
of upland rice (FAO, 1992). Table 6.12 shows a sectoral distribution in favour of trade. 
Trade (agricultural marketing and general trade) received about 60 per cent of total loans 
granted by the four RBs. Agricultural production only received about 35 per cent. On a 
bank to bank basis, YRB aflocated 48 per cent, XM 39.6 per cent and the MMRB 36.2 
per cent of loans to the agricultural sector. All the four RBs satisfied the sectoral 
allocation to trade (agricultural marketing and general trade). It should be noted that 
general trade is mostly on imported goods such as second-hand clothing, provisions 
(milk, sugar, bread flour etc. ). This sector received the highest percentage allocation (44 
per cent) apart from the mining; and this bias has prompted some observers (Reddy, 
1985; Conteh 1987), to note that the RBs are behaving like the commercial banks in 
directing their loans towards financing consumption instead of production. The industry 
(mostly cloth dyeing) is dominated by women who are usually in small groups of five to 
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Table 6.13 Gender Distribution of Loans in Four RBs (1985 - Dec., 993) 
Sector Total 
Loans 
(Le M) 
Total 
Benefici 
aries 
Women 
benefici 
aries 
Women 
as % of 
beneficia 
ries 
Total 
loansto 
women 
(Le M) 
loansto 
women as 
% of total 
Agriculture 72.4 10,126 608 6.0 6.3 8.7 
Agric. Marketing 33.4 891 254 28.5 10.6 31.7 
General Trade 91.1 71,095 47852 68.3 65.4 71.8 
Animal Husbandry 4.6 15 0 0 0 0 
Industry 3.5 284 269 84.7 3.2 92.4 
Personal 2.9 101 3 2.9 0.6 2.1 
Mining 364.0 5 0 0 
_0 
0 
Total 571.9 18,517 59986 32.3 86.1 15.1 
Source-- The Survey, 1994. 
to ten members. The allocation to this sector (about 2 per cent) is well below the 
guidelines. 
Overall, however, the guidelines have not been followed and agriculture, the 
major sector of the economy, received less than 40 per cent of total loans. In terms of 
lending outreach, the four RBs have only reached 18,517 borrowers or about 6.8 per 
cent of the combined population of 272,535 in their service areas from 1985 - December, 
1993 (Tables 6.1 and 6.13). Although 32.3 per cent of loan beneficiaries are women, 
they received only 15.1 per cent of the total loans. But excluding mining loans, women 
received about 41.4 per cent of total amount loaned. If we reasonably assume that 60 per 
cent of all loan beneficiaries are repeat borrowers, as is the case in most credit 
programmes in LICs (Adams, 1984), the proportion of the target population reached by 
the four RBs is below 5 per cent (approximately 4.1 per cent). These figures are 
relatively low compared to RBs in Ghana which have been able to reach at least 15 per 
cent of over 8 million of their target population between 1973 and 1983 (Owusu and 
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Tetteh,, 1982). The Grameen bank's figures is 932,574 borrowers i. e. over 20 per cent of 
65 
the target population, between 1986 and 1994 . 
On a bank to bank basis, the MMRB 
has the best performance among RBs in Sierra Leone. It extended loans to 9,200 or 10.5 
percent of its target population. The YRB reached 5.7 per cent, the KRB 5.3 per cent 
and the URB 3.7 per cent of the population in their respective service areas. 
Group lending has been a major factor in reaching potential clients of RBs in 
many countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, and Niger to name but a few 
(Gurgand et al., 1994). The YRB extended credit to 228 groups, the KRB, 102; the 
MRB, 86 and N4NM,, 55. The number per group in the RBs in Sierra Leone has been,, 
on average, 20 people for men's groups. Women's groups ranged from five to ten 
members. About 4 per cent of the groups are of mixed sex; 82 per cent and 14 per cent 
are male and female groups respectively. Group membership is high compared to the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh where the average size is five members (Mizan, 19935 p. 
128). 
The emphasis on groups is intended to minimise default problems using the built- 
in joint-liabilitY and peer pressure mechanisms (Stiglitz, 1990). Keeping the group to a 
manageable size (as in the Grameen Bank) is very instructive for monitoring purposes. It 
ensures choice of low risk members and reduces monitoring costs within the group itself 
It also allows the enforcement of proper credit use and facilitates repayment. The small 
size of groups is one of the factors that has enabled the Grameen Bank to record 
impressive repayment rates of 98 per cent (Rahman and Samad, 1993; pp. 175-177). 
And while the Grameen bank has branches scattered in the remote areas, none of the 
65 See Wahid (1994. p. 34) 
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D'D 
R"s in Sierra Leone has established branches with the exception of the KRB which runs 
an Agency" about 15 miles away from its Headquarters. This is mainly due to 
inadequate reserves resulting from poor liquidity management, high default rates and 
losses. 
6.31. Default rates in RBs 
The default rates in the RBs in Sierra Leone are at institutional-life-threatening 
levels. Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show default rates of the four RBs. On a bank to bank basis, 
the KRB has the worst default rate, with an average of about 74 per cent (1988-1993), 
mainly because of the cross-firing of cheques incident which occurred in 1990. Excluding 
that incident (mining loans), the KRB is still the worst performer with a default rate of 
about 45 per cent. The manager reported that most of the loans were acquired ostensibly 
for agricultural production and trade but were diverted mainly into mining activities. 
Overall, default rate in the four RBs is 65.4 per cent (as at March, 1994). Excluding the 
KRB, the reported average default rates was about 37 per cent (Table 6.14). Rural banks 
do not have disaggregated figures for repayment by gender; but managers reported that 
Table 6.14. ASP-regate Loans, Average Loan Size (LeM), Beneficiaries 
and % Default. 
RB period Amt. 
disbd. 
Amt. 
recovd. 
No. of ben. Av. Loan 
size 
% 
eflt. d 
YRB 1985-93 35.2 21.9 4821 
. 
0073 ' 37.8 
KRB 1987-93 436.5 113.2 2626 
. 
1662 74.1 
NINMB 1988-93 67.1 41.3 9200 
. 
0073 38.5 
NM 
- 
1988-93 33.1 21.2 1870 
. 
0177 35.9 
All RBs r 1985-93 571.9 197.6 18517 . 0106 65.4 
Source: Financial statements of RBs 1985 - 1993. 
' The Agency was a compromise between two chiefdoms (Kunike Barina. and Kunike Fola,, Noso) which 
vied to have the RB located in their chiefdom headquarters. 
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repayment by women was as high as 96 per cent, which suggests that the high default 
rates observed are mainly caused by male borrowers. 
Two important issues should, however, be noted. Firstly, members of BOD have 
also received loans. At the NUARB, loans to Directors constituted, on average, 3.2 per 
cent of total loans to all borrowers. Total loans to Directors in the four RBs were 0.40 
per cent of total loans to all their borrowers. The average size of loans to 21 DirectorS67 
was Le I 10,000 compared to Le7,100 for agricultural production, Le 12,800 for trade 
and Le 37,500 for agricultural marketing. We do not have disaggregated data on 
Directors' repayment; but the size of the loans indicates a loan bias in their favour and 
tends to suggest the existence of credit rationing. 
Another factor that suggests the existence of credit rationing is the proportion of 
the population reached by the four rural banks (6.8 per cent) and the number of 
applications rejected. The four RBs received a total of about 9,682 loan applications 
between 1985 and 1993, of which 7,336 or 75 per cent were rejected, mainly on the 
grounds of the lack of a co-signer (guarantor). The main co-signers used by borrowers 
are the wealthy traders, Chiefdom councillors and influential individuals who would 
normally only co-sign if they knew the group or individual. It is unlikely that they would 
guarantee borrowers who are not 'loyal' to them (The Survey). This also lends credence 
to the proposition that these influential people, who are invariably majority shareholders, 
may be influencing the direction of RB loans. Applications are also rejected on the 
grounds that projects are unviable. However, the method of determining the viability of 
projects is not clearly defined. 
This figure excludes one RB for which information on loans to Directors was not available. 
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Table 6.15. Summary of Loans Anaivsis of Four RBs (LeM) 
RB item '85 '86 '87 188 189 490 1191 '92 193 Total 
YRB 
disb. 
. 
086 
. 
28 1.7 3.7 4.9 6.6 3.9 9.8 4.2 3 5.2 
rcvd. . 
016 . 14 .4 1.6 2.3 3.9 3.6 6.8 3.1 
21.9 
dflt. 81.4 50.0 76.5 56.8 53.1 40.9 7.7 30.6 26.2 37.8 
KRB disb. 
... . 
14 1.5 3.0 411.7 1.97 7.2 11.0 436.5 
rcd. ... ... . 
13 1.4 2.9 100.1 1.91 6.4 5.4 113.2 
dflt. 
... ... 
7.1 6.7 3.3 75.7 3.0 11.1 50.9 74.1 
NUVIRB disb. 
... ... .9 
2.4 9.4 21.6 22.1 10.7 67.1 
rcvd. ... ... . 
84 2.0 8.0 16.9 8.9 4.7 41.3 
dflt. 6.7 16.7 1 14.9 21.8 59.7 56.1 38.5 
NHW disb. 
... ... . 
16 1.4 2.9 6.3 10.5 11.8 33.1 
rcvd. ... . 
08 
. 
82 1.5 2.9 7.8 8.1 21.2 
dflt. 
... 1 
50.0 41.4 48.3 1 53.9 1 25.7 31.4 3 
Notes: - disb. = Amount disbursed in Le Million 
rcvd. = Amount recovered in Le Million 
dflt. = Percentage default. 
Source: - Financial Statements of RBs, 1985-1993 
Table 6.16. Loans to Directors of RBs (LeM) 
Item '85 186 '87 '88 '89 490 1191 '92 193 Total 
YRB Amt. 0 0 0 0 0 
. 
025 . 
054 
. 
055 0 
. 134 
MNffl Amt 
. ... ... 
0 0 
. 
004 
. 
013 
. 
018 
. 
47 1.63 2.14 
NIRB Amt. 1 
... ... 
0 0 . 0012 . 
036 0 01 01 
. 
037 
1 All 3 RB Amt 1 .. 0 0 0 0 . 005 . 074 
1 
. 072 . 53 
1 1.63 1 2.3L] 
Note -- figures do not add up due to rounding up. 
Source: - Audited Statements of Accounts of RBs 
Secondly, the KRB was not alone in experiencing misappropriation of funds from 
its accounts by staff members. In 1990, the MMRB had problems with defalcated 
accounts amounting to Le3, I million or 47 per cent of the total loans extended by that 
bank for that year. Other similar incidents, though minor, have also been reported in 
other RBs. These misappropriations, coupled with high default rates within an 
inflationary enviromment, have contributed to the erosion of the lending base of RBs and 
have posed serious liquidity problems. During our survey we witnessed an occasion 
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when MMRB could not meet customers' withdrawal demands. Mthough the manager 
explained to angry customers that blame should be placed on the central bank for 
shortage of cash, the problem was more complex. The MMRB faded to recall loans from 
borrowers some of whom were described as 'powerful' people (Directors, Chiefdom 
councillors etc. ). The NUVM management declined to provide us with further details 
concerning these 'powerful' people. 
Default rates have threatened the very survival of RBs in Sierra Leone. When 
compared to similar rural fmancial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, RBs in Sierra 
Leone have performed poorly. In addition, there is an apparent absence of legal and 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure repayment, In contrast, moneylenders use socio- 
cultural measures to enforce repayment (see Chapters Four and Seven). The types of 
collateral that have been accepted by RBs are, moreover, questionable in terms of 
foreclosure and their realisability in the event of a default. 
6.32. Collateral requirements 
It is generally acknowledged that rural borrowers do not have tangible assets to 
be used as collateral (Adams, 1983; Udry, 1990; Stiglitz, 1986b). In addition, the 
absence of well defined property rights, especially in land (due to the type of land tenure 
system), and limited ownership of physical and financial assets are frequently cited as 
contributory factors for lack of collateral. Even where land is used as collateral, 
foreclosure is impossible because of the absence of a legal framework and enforcement 
mechanisms. The process of foreclosure can also be very costly for the lender (Johnson, 
1972). This is the situation in Sierra Leone. Because of the above constraints, land is not 
included as a collateral in the lending policy of RBs (Chapter Three). 
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The most popular types of col-lateral used by RBs in Sierra Leone are the joint 
and several liability of groups and co-signers (guarantors) for individual borrowers. But 
no mechanisms have been put in place by RBs to surveillance the use of credit or to 
enforce repayment. The lack of mobility of the rural bank personnel, especially Loans 
officer(s), means that RBs rely on borrowers to come to the bank to make repayment. In 
some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, attempts have been made to improve loan 
collection. For example, the Credit Unions in Cameroon and Togo have partially 
overcome this problem by limiting loans to not more than two and three times, 
respectively, of the borrowers deposits. In addition, 100 per cent of the loans are 
gmaranteed by borrowers' and/or co-signers' savings. When a loan is delinquent, savings 
cannot be withdrawn (Gurgand et al., 1994). In the Grameen Bank, repayments are made 
in 56 weekly instalments. The Credit Solidaire in Burkina Faso follows the example of 
the Grameen Bank. But repayment of loans from RBs in Sierra Leone is at the end of the 
term of the loan, usually 12 months. In Sierra Leone, loans are usually over ten times the 
size of savings in the groups' or individuals' accounts. When default occurs, the RB has 
virtually notifing to fall back on. 
6.33 Reasons for Default 
There are several reasons why default occurs in RFIs, some of which have 
already been identified in Chapter Four. Reasons for default applying to the IADPs in 
Sierra Leone (Richards and Karimu, 1981; and Lappia, 1980; Johnny, 1985) are similar 
to those for default by RB customers. We will repeat some of them to emphasise their 
importance and to identify policy changes that are needed to improve the performance of 
DY) 
ixiis. In our survey 18 per cent of the RB customer sample reported that one of the 
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reasons for default was the delay in the disbursement of credit (Table 6.17). Some of the 
D 1) 
R-13s, such as the YRB,, co-ordinated, with the MAIDP (before it closed down) to supply 
inputs (fertiliser and seeds, hoes etc. ) to boffowers. Delays in the supply of these inputs 
were reported to be between three to five weeks and sometimes longer. This delay can 
have adverse effects on output because agricultural production processes are time 
specific (Moinuddhin, 1969; Spencer and Byerlee, 1977). Any delay in ploughing or 
seeding can adversely impact on yields. The respondents also informed us that when 
these delays occurred credit was often diverted to other uses. 
Indebtedness to informal financial intermediaries, especially moneylenders, is the 
most important reasons for default in RBs in Sierra Leone. Rural people depend on 
village moneylenders for credit especially during 'hungry season' (the period between the 
completion of ploughing/seeding and harvest) when food reserves are low. At the 
harvest, the moneylender is the first to arrive to demand payment, in kind or cash. The 
remaining portion of the harvest, after repaying of the moneylender's debt, is usually 
inadequate to repay RBs loans and at the same time feed the family. Fifty nine percent of 
our respondents gave 'indebtedness to informal lenders' (mainly moneylenders) as the 
reason for default. The closeness of the moneylender to the borrowers gives him an 
advantage in collecting repayment compared to an RB. 
Spencer and Byerlee (1977) and Lappia (1980) also reported that because of 
poor road network and lack of market infrastructure, the farmer is often forced to sell at 
the farrngate, sometimes to moneylenders after repayment of loan or itinerant traders. 
Other contributory factors to default are the poor seed quality, shortage of inputs and 
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use of traditional technology which lead to low output, low incomes and hence low 
capacity to repay. 
Table 6.17 Reasons for Default by Customers of RBs 
Reasons for default in RBs Frequency Percentage 
Late loan disbursement 35 17.5 
Indebtedness to informal sources 118 59 
Poor infrastructure and technology 26 13 
Low prices for output 11 5.5 
Institutional factors 10 5 
Total 200 
Source: - The Surygy, 1994. 
On the whole, RBs' savings and lending outreach have had little impact in terms 
of both savings mobilisation and lending. Some of the reasons alluded to in the foregoing 
discussion are only part of the explanation. There are other barriers as well to the 
successful operations of RBs in Sierra Leone. 
6.34 Barriers to Outreach. 
Effective outreach has been hampered, as stated earlier, by the lack of mobility 
(i. e. transport) of RBs staff. But factors which are specific to agriculture have also 
created barriers to outreach and have impaired performance. Many elements of the rural 
sector are underdeveloped, Markets for inputs and output, as well as land use in LICs, 
are frequently localised and inefficient (Knickel, 1988; Hoff et al. 1990). The financial 
system has often been impaired by fiscal imbalances, a volatile inflation, financial 
repression (Chapter Three) and a weak legal and regulatory framework. Sierra Leone is, 
however, not unique in this region in experiencing financial crisis. The financial crisis in 
Benin in 1987 also illustrates the weaknesses of the financial sector in sub-Saharan 
Affica (World Development Report, 1993). The poor infrastructure, especially roads, 
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further constrains RBs from reaching residents in remote rural areas. Another bottleneck 
to outreach is the lack of confidence in public II nstitutions. The unfortunate experience 
with co-operatives and LADPs still lingers. Therefore, the RBs need more publicity 
campaigns to educate potential customers and to restore confidence in formal 
institutions. 
The staff position, especiafly the ratio of loans officers to borrowers Is another 
contributory factor to poor performance. The ratio of loans officer to borrowers is 
1: 4,629 (The Survey, 1994), is even worse than the national extension worker/farmer 
ratio of 1: 1200 (FAO, 1992). In this context, even were transport is available, one loans 
officer is unlikely to meet and supervise loan distribution and loan use. 
The high transactions cost incurred by borrowers is another contributory factor 
to low levels of outreach. Rural bank customers surveyed reported that it takes at least 
four visits and three to four weeks, on average, before a loan is sanctioned compared to 
an average of two visits and one day to secure a loan from a moneylender (Chapter 
Four). This delay imposes high transaction costs on the RB customer. For example, a 
typical borrower residing 25 miles from the YRB, borrowing an average of Le30, OOO 
(US$48.4), could incur high costs exclusive of the nominal interest rate on the loan 
(Table 6.18). It should be recalled (Table 6.11), that a3 per cent conunitment 
(administrative) fee is charged the borrower (reduced to I per cent in 1992) and 
subtracted from the loan before it is disbursed. Therefore, a borrower who applies for an 
agricultural production loan of Le30, OOO, will receive only Le29,100; but interest is 
calculated on Le30,, 000. The total transaction cost (as a proportion of loan) incurred by 
such a borrower, exclusive of the interest rate charged, would be 12.2 per cent (Table 
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6.18). Thus the actual interest rate paid by the borrower for a Le30,, 000 loan is 52.2 per 
cent, which is higher than the average indicative interest rate (about 46 per cent) charged 
by moneylenders (Chapter Four). 
Table 6.18. Estimated Transactions Costs of a Typical Borrower 
Residinp. 25 Miles from YRB 
Expenditure items Cost (Le) % of total 
cost 
Fare to and from vifiage (average 4 visits @ LOOO/visit)' 2000 54.4 
Food/entertairtment (average 4 visits @ Le2o/ViSit)2 80 2.2 
Opportunity cost or an average 4 days visit (@ Le166/d 664 18.1 
Bribes to fill in, and get forms processed quickly 4 etc. 30 0.8 
Commitment Fee = 3% of Ioan5 900 24.5 
Total transaction cost 3674 100 
Notes (1) Average fare for 25 mile journey In rural areas at 1994 pnces (the Survey) 
(2) Average number of visits before loan is sanctioned ( The Survey). 
(3) Agricultural wage rate (Agricultural Sector Review, FAO, Aug., 1992). 
(4) As indicated by the Survey. 
(5) See Table 6.11 
Sources: - The Su L-N&y. 1994 and FAO Q 99ZI 
The transaction costs computed in Table 6.18 may not be typical for all 
borrowers in other RBs but considering that YRB is located in an area that is relatively 
motorable, the costs could well represent a lower boundary for transaction costs in other 
DID 
R"s. The above analysis suggests that a borrower could incur high transactions costs 
when borrowing from an RB compared to almost zero transaction cost (see Chapter 
Four) when borrowing from a moneylender. This may be one of the reasons, among 
others, why rural residents tend to prefer moneylenders for borrowing purposes. The 
policy implication is a reduction of borrowers' transaction costs to attract borrowers. 
In addition to the above constraints, the cost of operations especially 
administrative costs of RBs. can also have a significant impact on the level of 
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achievement. The following section examines administrative and other costs in the 
operation of RBs and provides a basis for the SDI analysis in Section 6.40. 
6.35 Cost of Administration. 
In this section the trends and level of operating expenses of RBs are examined. 
The analysis relates cost of administration to loans mainly because RBs' operations 
centre around mobilising the rural poor and the administration of loans and advances to 
them, 
The RBs' administrative expenses as a percentage of loans and advances has 
been very high (Tables 6.19 to 6.2 1). Ratios of total expenses to loans in all the four RBs 
studied averaged 54 per cent during 1985-1993, In the Credit Unions in Cameroon 
which now function as banks, the ratio ranges from just 4.9 to 7 per cent (1988-199 1)-, 
in Rwanda, it is about 7 per cent (1986-1992); in Togo it is between 2.3 and 7 per cent 
and in the Grameen Bank it is between 8.6 and 18.1 percent (1984-1986) (Gurgand, et 
al, 1994). This high ratio in RBs in Sierra Leone suggests that administrative costs have 
not been properly monitored and managed. The proportion of administrative expenses 
observed, should be regarded as lower-bound estimate of the level of transactions costs 
in RBs compared to what would be the case if subsidies were removed. 
Total staff salaries have been lower than administrative expenses because the 
salaries and allowances of the managers and accountants of the four RBs were paid by 
the BSL up to December, 1989; and those costs were not included in the accounts. From 
1990 onwards, salaries of the managers and accountants were borne by the RBs 
themselves and became significant expenditure items. 
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Cost of operations are higher in all the RBs during the first three years of 
operation than subsequently, mainly due to start-up costs (buildings, other fixed assets, 
etc. ). Economies of scale are normally expected to be realised as an institution grows in 
size (Yaron 1992a); but RBs' have not provided clear evidence in this regard. An item 
labelled "other expenses" in the balance sheets of all RBs has been loaded with costs 
which were not disaggregated (RBs Audited Statements of Account, 1985 - 1993). In all 
the RBs, this item has accounted for not less than 15 per cent of total expenditure for 
each year of operation, suggesting that accounting procedures need to be examined to 
ensure that various expenditure items are classified under their appropriate heads and 
sub-heads. This would enable management to identify escalating costs and initiate 
corrective action before a situation deteriorates. However, to be able to identify and put 
such costs under their appropriate heads and sub-heads, appropriate training is necessary 
(Conteh, 1987). 
The poor level of management is again evident in the actual cost of administering 
loans. On average, RBs spent Le 0.54 for every leone lent. The YRB, for example, spent 
an average of Le 1.23 for every leone lent during its first two years of operation. It 
dropped to Le 0,58 in 1987 and thereafter, it fluctuated upwards reaching Le 0.81 in 
1993. Compared to similar institutions in other countries, RBs in Sierra Leone have 
performed relatively poorly. In the Cameroon, for example, credit unions spent just CFA 
0.032 for each CFA lent; the Grameen bank averages 0.145 Rupees for each rupee lent 
(Yaron, 1992a). 
As mentioned earlier, the operations of RBs in Sierra Leone have been hampered 
by many factors, including high inflation, loan interest rates well below inflation and their 
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concomitant negative interest incomes, and poor infrastructure. It is interesting to note 
that since our survey in 1994, one of these RB (the MN4RB) has closed down mainly 
because it has been unable to recall loans and the Bank of Sierra Leone has become 
reluctant to provide further subsidies to RBs. 
With such high transactions costs coupled with high inflation and high default 
rates, the question is, how and why are these RBs still operating?. The answer to the 
above question lies in the level of their subsidy dependence. 
6.40 Subsidl Dependence Index (SDb Analysis 
A financial institution can achieve self-sustainability when the return on equity, 
net of any subsidy received, equals or exceeds the opportunity cost of its equity. This 
section analyses the level of subsidies received by RBs using the Subsidy Dependence 
Index (SDI). The SDI is the inverse of self-sustainability (Yaron, 1992a). 
Rural financial institutions have been sustained by various implicit or explicit 
subsidies in LICs; but financial statements of such RFIs do not usually reflect these 
subsidies (Gurgand, et al., 1994). Subsidies which have been used to sustain RBs in 
Sierra Leone include, interest rates differentials between market rates and interest paid 
on concessional loans and direct reimbursement of some operating costs. For example, 
each RB,, with the exception of the BRB and the SRB, initiafly had a Manager and an 
Accountant seconded to them from the B SL. These B SL officers served RB s for 4 3,41,3 3, 
and 3 years at YRB, NDM, KRB and MIRB resPectively. Their salaries and allowances 
were paid by the BSL; and such costs were not reflected in their financial statements. 
When a subsidy is extended to a RB, the value should be assessed against the volume of 
business (Yaron, 1992b). 
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The SDI methodology identifies the following conditions as important in 
eliminating subsidy dependence: (a) positive interest rates on loans that are high enough 
to cover non-subsidised financial costs as well as administrative costs and still maintain 
the value of equity, (b) an active policy which ensures that voluntary savings become an 
increasingly significant factor in financing the loan portfolio, (c) a high rate of loan 
repayment and low loan losses and (d) low administrative costs through implementation 
of efficient techniques and procedures in lending operations and the mobilisation of 
savings (Yaron, 1992b). 
The amount of subsidy received by an RFI is defined and assessed as follows- 
S= A (M-C)+ [(E * M)-PI +K 
68 
Where: 
S= Annual subsidy received by the RFI 
A= RFI's concessional borrowed funds outstanding (annual average). 
M= Interest rate the RFI would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds. 
if access to borrowed concessional funds were eliminated. 
C= Weighted average annual concessional rate of interest actually paid by the 
RFI on its average annual concessional borrowed funds outstanding. 
E= Average annual equity. 
P= reported annual profit before tax (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss 
provisions, inflation etc. ). 
K= The sum of all other types of annual subsidies received by the RFI 
(such as partial or complete coverage of the RFIs operational costs by the 
state and credit guarantee cover etc. ) 
The financial ratio which is the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) is defined as: 
S 
SDI = 
LP*n 
'ý8 Where figures for a particular year are incomplete or unavailable, the previous year's are used (Yaron. 
1992b). 
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SDI = index of subsidy dependence of the RFI. 
S= Annual subsidy received. 
LP = Average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the RFI. 
n= Weighted average on-lending interest rate of the RFI" 
An SDI of zero suggests that a RB achieved full self-sustainability; an SDI of 100 
per cent suggests that a doubling of the average on-lending interest rate is required to 
eliminate subsidies. Similarly, an SDI of 200 per cent indicates that a threefold increase 
in the on-lending interest rate is required to compensate a RB for subsidy elimination. A 
negative SDI indicates that a RB has achieved self-sustainability and that its annual 
profits, minus its capital (equity) charged at the approximate market interest rate, have 
exceeded the total annual value of subsidies. A negative SDI further implies that a RB 
could have lowered its average on-lending interest rate while simultaneously eliminating 
any subsidies received in the year for which the SDI is computed (Yaron, 1992b). 
6.41. Computation of SDI for Four RBs. 
The data used in this analysis come from computed financial statements of RBs. 
As stated earlier, there are liýnitations to this data. Firstly, subsidies are not reported in 
the audited statements of accounts and financial returns of RBs. Secondly, the extent of 
loans covered under the CGS is not reflected in the accounts. 
69 n is calculated as interest earned as a percentage of average annual loan portfolio. This implies that 
whenever interest is not accrued on non-performing loans, while no provision for loan losses arc made, 
n would be lower compared with the interest earned on performing loans. 
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Table 6.23 Assumptions for calculating the SDI for YRB 
Item/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1"l 1"2 IM 
A . 
71 . 
60 
. 
60 
. 
60 
. 
84 
. 64 . 
64 
. 60 
1.80 
m* (0/0) 12 14 16 16 16 55 55 45 30 
c (0/0) 10 10 10 10 10 30 30 25 20 
M-C (0/0) 21 4 6 6 6 25 25 20 10 
E . 
33 
. 
55 1.6 1.9 3.1 4.6 4.6 6.4 4.6 
P (loss) (. 04) . 
02 
. 73 . 
79 1.2 1.2 2.1 2.1 (. 69) 
K** . 
03 . 
06 
. 
83 
. 
81 1.0 
. 
81 
. 
53 
. 
03 . 
01 
n (0/6) 36 39 39 35 35 35 35 35 35 
LP . 026 . 045 . 87 . 64 . 85 
1.2 1.2 1.0 
. 
78 
Note: - Where not indicated, the unit is Le Million 
*central bank discount rate 
** Include Salaries and allowances of the Manager, Accountant and the credit guarantee 
cover. 
Source: - YRB's audited statements of account, and BSL records. 
Table 6.24 Computation of SDI for VRB 
ITEM 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1"1 1992 1"3 
1. Average annual borrowed . 
71 . 60 . 
60 . 60 . 84 . 64 . 64 . 60 1.80 funds =A (LeM) 
2. Market (reference) 12 14 16 16 16 55 55 45 30 
interest rate* = (LeM) 
3. Interest rate 10 10 10 10 10 30 30 25 20 
paid by RBs =C 1 
4. Subsidy on concessional rate . 
014 
. 
024 
. 
036 . 
036 . 050 . 16 . 16 . 
12 . 18 
of borrowing = A(M-C) (LeM) 
5. Annual Average Equity =E . 
33 
. 
55 1.6 1.9 3.1 4.6 4.6 6.4 4.6 
(Len 1 1 
6. Subsidy on equity = (E*M) . 04 . 
077 . 256 . 
304 
. 496 
2.53 2.53 1 2.88 1.38 
(Lem) 
7. Miscellaneous Subsidies" 
. 
03 
. 
06 
. 
83 . 
81 1.0 . 
81 
. 
53 
. 
03 
. 
01 
=K (LeM) 
8. Profit =P Oosses) (. 04) . 02 . 
73 
. 
79 1.2 1.2 2A 2.1 (. 69) 
(LeM) 
9. Total Subsidy = (4+6+7-8) . 
124 
. 
141 
. 
392 . 
360 
. 
346 2.3 1.12 . 
93 2.26 
(LeM 
10. Interest income = LP*n . 
0094 
. 
018 . 339 . 
224 
. 
298 
. 
42 . 
42 . 
35 
. 
273 
(LeM) I I I 
11. SDI(%) 1 1319 1 783 1 116 1 161 1 116 1 548 1 267 1 266 828 
Note: - * Central bank Discount rate 
** Include tax exemption, salaries and allowances of Manager and 
Accountant and cost of donated vehicle, and Credit Guarantee Cover). 
Source: - YRB's audited statements of accounts and BSL records 
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Table 6.25 Assumptions for Calculating SDI for MMRB 
Iteni/Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A 0 0 6.1 56.5 21.0 23.3 
M* 16 16 55 55 45 30 
c (% 10 10 30 30 25 20 
M-C 6 6 25 25 20 10 
E 
. 
19 
. 
05 
. 
48 (3.1) (6.7) 
P (10 (. 21) (4) 0.1) (7.1) (10.9) 
K** . 
015 
. 
012 
. 
012 
. 
01 
. 
014 
. 015 
n (%) 35 36 37 36 36 35 
LP . 
06 
. 
20 1.4 4.7 13.2 6.0 
Note: - Where not indicated, the unit is Le Million 
*Central bank discount rate 
** Include salaries of Manager, Accountant, and Credit Guarantee cover. 
Source: - MIMRB's audited statements of account and BSL records. 
Table 6.26 Computation of SDI for MMRB 
Item 1988 1989 1990 1991 1"2 IM 
1. Average annual borrowed funds 
=A (Le) 
0 0 6.1 56.5 21.0 23.3 
2. Market interest rate = M* (%) 16 16 55 55 45 30 
3. Interest rate paid by RB =C (%) 10 10 30 30 25 20 
4. Subsidy of concessional borrowing rate 
= A(M-C) (LeM) 
0 0 1.53 14.13 4.2 2.33 
5. Annual average equity =E (LeM) . 
19 . 
05 . 48 
(1.0) (3.1) (6.7) 
6. Subsidy of equity = (E*M) (LeM) . 
030 
. 
008 
. 
26 (1.39) 
7. Miscellaneous subsidies= K* * (LeM) . 
015 
. 
012 
. 
012 
. 
01 
. 
014 
. 
015 
8. Profit/(loss) (LeM) (. 21) (4) (7.1) 19 0 09 
9. Total subsidy =S ((4+6+7-8) (LeM) . 
255 
. 
42 2.91 17.49 9.92 1 Lý4 
ý4 
10. Interest income= LP *n (LeM) 
. 
021 
. 
072 
. 
52 1.69 4.75 2.1 
11. SDI (%) 1214 583 560 1035 209 535 
Note: -* central bank discount rate 
** includes salaries of manager, accountant and Credit Guarantee cover 
Source: - MNM's audited statements of account and BSL records. 
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Table 6.27 Assumptions for Calculating the SDI for MRB 
Item/Year 1988 1989 Mo 1991 1992 1993 
A 0 0 . 
011 0 0 0 
m 16 16 55 55 45 30 
c 10 10 30 30 25 20 
M-C 6 6 25 25 20 10 
E. . 
27 
. 
74 2.33 . 56 . 
56 
. 
56 
P. (Loss) (. 49) (. 17) (. 17) 4.6) (4.6) (4.6) (4.6) 
K** 
. 
03 
. 
15 
. 
12 
. 10 . 
03 
. 
01 
n (%) 36 35 35 36 36 36 
LP . 
08 
. 
58 1.4 3.4 2.7 3.7 
Note: - Where not indicated, the unit is Le Million 
Central bank discount rate 
** Include salaries, allowances for the Manager, 
Accountant and the Credit Guarantee cover. 
Source :- URB's audited statements of accounts and BSL records. 
Table 6.28 Computation of SDI for MRB 
Item 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1. Average annual borrowed funds =A 
(LeM) 
0 0 
. 
011 0 0 0 
2. Market interest rate = M* (LeM) 16 16 55 55 45 30 
3. Interest paid by RB =C Clo) 10 10 30 30 25 20 
4. Subsidy on concessional rate borrowing 
AN-C) (LeM) 
0 0 
. 
003 0 0 0 
5. Annual average equity =E (LeM) . 27 . 
74 2.33 
. 
56 . 
56 
. 
56 
6. Subsidy of equity = (E*M) (LeM) . 
043 . 12 1.282 . 
308 
. 
252 
. 
168 
7. Nfiscellaneous subsidies = K** (LeM) . 
03 . 
15 
. 
12 
. 
10 
- 
03 
. 
01 
8. Profit/(Loss) (LeM). (. 17) (17) (4.6) (4.6) 
9. Total subsidy = (4+6+7-8) . 
563 
. 
44 1.58 5.01 4.88 4.78 
10. Interest income =LP*n (LeM) . 
03 1 
. 
20 1 
. 
49 1.22 . 
97 1.33 
11. SDI (%) 1877 220 322 411 503 35 
Note: - *Central bank discount rate. 
** These include tax exeMption, salaries of Manager and Accountant 
and Credit Guarantee cover. 
Source: - MRB's audited statements of account and BSL records 
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Table 6.29 Assumgtions for calculating the SDI for KRB 
Item[Year 1987 1988 1989 Mo 1"l 1992 IM 
A 
. 
048 
. 
60 
. 
60 
. 
85 85 
. 
60 
. 
60 
M* 16 16 16 55 55 45 
. 
30 
c (%) 10 10 10 30 30 25 20 
M-C (%) 6 6 25 25 20 10 
E 
. 
56 
.81 1.84 8.38 8.38 8.6 8.6 
p (. 10) (. 034) (. 98) (13.5) (13,5) (8.1) 
K** 
. 
05 
. 
02 
. 02 . 
01 
. 
01 
. 
01 
. 
02 
n (%) 36 37 35 36 38 35 35 
LP I1 
. 
10 
. 
41 21.5 4.70 2.89 10.65 
Note: - Where not indicated, the unit is Le Miflion 
Central bank discount rate. 
** Include salaries and allowances of Manager and Accountant, and Credit 
Guarantee cover. 
Source-- KRB's audited statements of accounts and BSL records. 
Table 6.30 Computation of SDI for KRIB 
Item 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 IM 
1. Average annual borrowed funds 
=A (LeM) 
. 
048 
. 
60 
. 
60 
. 
85 
. 
85 
. 
60 
. 
60 
2. Market interest rate = M* C/o) 16 16 16 55 55 45 30 
3. Interest rate paid by RB =C 10 10 10 30 30 25 20 
4. Subsidy on concessional rate of 
borrowing = A(M-C) (LeM) 
. 
003 
. 
036 . 
036 
. 
213 
. 
12 
. 
06 
5. Annual average equity =E (LeM) . 
56 
. 
81 1.84 8.38 8.38 8.6 8.6 
6. Subsidy on equity = (E*M) (LeM) . 
089 
. 130 . 294 2.10 4.61 3.87 2.58 
7. Nfiscellaneous subsidies" 
=K (LeM) 
. 05 . 
02 
. 
02 
. 
01 
. 
01 
. 
01 _ 
. 
02 
8. Profit/(Loss) (LeM) 98 (8.1) (8.1) 
9. Total subsidy = (4+6+7-8) 
(LeM) . 
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. 
22 1.33 15.61 18.33 12.1 
0 
10.76 
10. Interest income =LP *n (LeM) . 
04 
. 04 . 
144 1.79 1.01 3.73 
11. SDI (%) 605 550 924 1024 119 288 
Notes: - *Central bank discount rate. 
"These include, salaries & allowance for Manager and Accountant and Credit 
Guarantee cover 
***SDI not computed fbr this year. The Manager claimed that 7/8 of these 'overdrafts' 
have been recalled but not yet In the accounts as the matter is still under investigation. 
Source: - KRB's audited statements of accounts and BSL records. 
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Table 6.31 Summary of SDI for YRB, MMRB, KRB and MRB (%) 
n l> 
N%" 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
YRB 1319 783 116 161 116 548 267 266 828 
KRB 
... . ... 
605 550 924 1024 1198 288 
MMRB 
... ... ... 1214 583 560 1035 209 535 MRB ... ... 1877 220 322 411 503 3591 
Note: - ***SDI is not computed because of the distortion caused by the cheque Incident. 
Sources: - Conuted from Tables 6.23 to 6.32 
However, the Subsidy Dependence Index isolates these costs and uses them in the 
computation to arrive at a close approximation. We have used the Central Bank's 
discount rate 'M' to be able to determine the extent of subsidy on the concessionary 
funds received by an RB. The BSL charges the RBs a modest rate, 'C'. In addition, the 
rural banking policy (BSL, 1980) provided that the BSL would make a loan of Le 0.6 
million to a RB at the commencement of its operations. The 'A' (in the model) includes 
this amount. It should be noted that not afl the RBs received this loan. 
6.50 Results of SDI analysis 
From the analysis, the RBs are highly subsidy dependent (Table 6.3 1). Their SDIs 
also indicate the magnitude of the subsidies they have received. For any of the RBs to be 
subsidy independent they would have had to increase their on-lending interest rate to the 
Table 6.32 
_New 
On-lAnding Interest Rate to allow RBs 
to be Subsidv IndeDendent 
RB 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
YRB 511 344 84 91 76 227 128 128 325 
KRB 
... ... 
254 241 358 427 454 136 
NfMRB 
... 
460 246 244 409 111 222 
MRB 712 112 148 184 - 217 165 
Notes: - The new interest rate is calculated by: [(n*SDI)+n] 
*** A new on-lending rate is not computed because of the distortion caused by the 
cheque incident. 
Source. - Computed from Table 6.32 
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level indicated for the particular year (Table 6.3 1). For example, for YRB to have been 
subsidy independent in 1985, it would have had to charge borrowers 511 per cent on 
loans. This new lending rate is arrived at by multiplying the on-lending interest rate (n) 
by the SDI and adding the result to the on-lending interest rate. Thus the interest rates 
that would have made RBs subsidy independent or self-sustainable are given in the Table 
6.32. Although we only have data for four RBs out of the eight in operation, we can 
reasonably assume that the others have also been kept afloat by subsidies because all RBs 
operate under an identical policy environment and received the same services from the 
BSL. Therefore, RBs in Sierra Leone would have had to raise their interest rates 
substantially if they were to become subsidy independent i. e. self-sustainable. 
Ass discussed earlier,, it is unclear what impact an increase in interest rates would IrxO 
have on savings mobilisation, demand for credit or loan recovery. Furthermore, a 
reduction in loan delinquency and expansion of operations into remote rural areas may 
not be sufficient to eliminate subsidy dependence (Yaron, 1992b). Wider issues relating 
to the economy including market infrastructure (roads network etc. ), input supply, 
output marketing and less government interference need to be addressed to provide the 
RBs with a more conducive environment before questions of subsidy independence can 
be seriously entertained. 
The absence of adequate emphasis on institution building (a common 
characteristic of supply-leading RFMs in LICs) constitutes the difference between an 
institution that will depend pennanently on subsidies and one that can eventually attain 
self-sustainability (Yaron, 1992a). The RBs in Sierra Leone are in the first category. 
They have devoted few resources to adequate and appropriate traiýg for both staff and 
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customers, management information systems, staff incentives and savings mobilisation 
drives. 
6.51 Conclusions 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that none of the RBs in Sierra Leone can 
be considered viable. All of them exhibited considerable weaknesses in their operations. 
Outreach (savings mobilisation and lending) has been limited by several factors including 
a hostile economic environment, lack of mobility and poor management. 
The ownership of the RBs which was to be spread among a large number of 
rural residents has been concentrated in the hands of a small percentage (0.66 per cent) 
of target population. The percentage of the population reached, in terms of loans, has 
been below 5 per cent. The rural banks have concentrated their loan portfolio in trade 
and mining to the disadvantage of agriculture. The concentration of loans in the trade 
sector and share capital in the hands of a few clients tends to suggest that there has been 
some credit rationing in RBs. 
Outreach in terms of savings mobilisation has also been low. The reasons for this 
low outreach involve a number of factors which the RBs cannot possibly solve on their 
own. The economy has been hostile during the mid 1980s to the first three years of this 
decade. Inflation has ranged between 72 and 110 per cent (1985-1993), while savings 
and lending rates have been negative in real terms, leading to an erosion of the RBs*) 
capital and loan portfolio. Ifigh transaction costs of RBs have also contributed to low 
levels of outreach and overall achievement. 
High transaction cost are related to poor management and or mismanagement of 
resources which can be linked to the poor calibre of staff and poor training of both the 
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Directors and the RB staff, as well as, poor supervision by the Bank of Sierra Leone 
(Harrison, 1990). 
fligh transaction costs incurred by borrowers create an added disincentive for 
customers to take advantage of services offered by the RBs. The transactions costs of 
the RBs themselves also placed added obstacle to expanding operations. 
The above factors contributed to low levels of achievement and hence to the high 
subsidy dependence observed. Rural banks' financial intermediation role is therefore 
questionable. It could reasonably be concluded that rural banks have been largely 
ineffective in the rural financial market. They also failed not only to counteract the so- 
called 'evil deeds' of the moneylender but also failed to attract clients from them. 
Overall, RBs have not met their objectives and the high subsidy dependence 
indicates that they have been incurring huge losses. Their mode of operation has also 
tended to discourage potential clients. For example, the long time spent in appraising 
loans is a disincentive to would be clients. 
Some RBs are on the verge of introducing innovations such as a school deposits 
scheme, group voluntary accounts and restrictions on the amount granted as loan in 
relation to the amount in the individual's or groups' deposit account. It is unlikely that 
these measures would ensure subsidy independence. What can the government of Sierra 
Leone, the central bank and owners of the rural banks do to save these RBs from 
collapsing and to make them self-sustainable? These issues, among other things, are the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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PART THREE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Chapter VH Restructuring the Rural Financial Market in Sierra Leone 
7.00 Introduction. 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the research and field studies on the 
operations of the rural financial market (RFM), particularly the rural banks (RBs), 
moneylenders and the osusu in Sierra Leone. It is divided into four sections, the first of 
which begins with a discussion on the problems and constraints of supplying credit to 
rural residents in Sierra Leone comparing, as it progresses, the modes of operation of the 
D'D 
Rjus, Moneylenders and the osusu. The second section discusses the main findings of the 
research, focusing on five major aspects: outreach (access), transaction costs, default, 
interest rates and viability using the results of the regression and SDI analysis carried out 
in Chapters Four and Six respectively Other findings will be highlighted as far as they 
apply to the level of achievement of these rural financial intermediaries. Section three 
lays down guidelines for a model of co-operation between the two sectors of the RFM, 
vvith a view to enhancing the supply of credit and rural financial intermediation. The final 
section concludes the chapter. 
7.10 Problems and Constraints of Supplying Credit to Rural Residents. 
The supply of credit to rural residents in Sierra Leone over the last four decades 
has been a difficult task. The policies that were adumbrated did not produce the desired 
results. Goverment intervention in the form of subsidies and influence over the direction 
of credit created distortions as well as problems and constraints in the credit market. 
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7.11. Problems Affecting the Supply of Credit 
The problems and constraints of credit supply can be viewed from several 
perspectives. The debate on the role of the informal credit sources in LICs has usually 
been tainted with emotion, lack of facts and limited understanding of the role they play 
and their mode of operation in the rural areas (Barton, 1979; Adams, 1980; Von 11 
Pischke, 1981; Bournan, 1981). The assumed existence of monopoly profit and the 'vice- 
like grip' of informal sources, especially moneylenders, has been part of the rationale for 
establishing specialised credit programmes such as rural banks to dispense cheap credit 
(Bouman, 198 1, p. 2; Adams, 1984). But rural borrowers tend to prefer moneylenders to 
RBs for their credit needs for several reasons (Adams, 1980). The loan portfolios of the 
latter do not accommodate non-production loans. According to Johnny (1985), 
subsistence credit forms between 65 and 70 per cent of the credit needs of rural residents 
in Sierra Leone. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, 87 and 43 per cent respectively, of farmers' 
subsistence credit needs are met by informal sources (Germidis, 1990). Moneylenders do 
not discriminate on the end-use of loans. To them, the assurance of repayment is more 
important (Bouman, 1977), 
Another problem of credit provision in Sierra Leone is the high administrative 
costs associated with the small size of loans demanded and the numerous and widely 
dispersed nature of borrowers in the rural areas. Hence supervision and follow-up are 
very costly. The lack of adequate mobility for RB staff further exacerbates the problem. 
Moneylenders' experience of such problems is minimal, because they are typically part of 
the 'rural landscape', residing and working along-side their clientele in the rural areas 
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and frequently in contact with them in other markets. Thus, they have more information 
about borrowers compared to rural banks and their transaction costs tend to be lower. 
A related problem associated with formal lending in Sierra Leone, as in other 
LICs, therefore, is the information asymmetry. A lender's willingness to lend to a 
particular borrower may depend on having enough information (as in the case of 
moneylenders 70 ) and to have confidence in a borrower's ability and capacity to make 
repayments (Aleem, 1990). Such information is not readily available to RBs and other 
formal credit institutions; and it is very costly to coflect and interpret. There are no 
references from which to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers and no 
complementary institutions to provide such information, as is the case in developed 
countries. In contrast, moneylenders continually collect information through their 
interaction with borrowers and potential borrowers. Thus, while RBs face adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, moneylenders minin-tise such problems mainly 
through credit/market interlinkages. Our survey of moneylenders revealed that over 60 
per cent were engaged in credit/market interlinkage. In other words, moneylenders have 
more information about clients and potential clients, as well as, the opportunity for 
developing trust, confidence and better understanding of each other's circumstances. 
Due to red-tape and cumbersome bureaucracy, RB customers complain about 
delays in the disbursement of loans, In addition, transport and opportunity costs are also 
high for farmers living far away from an RB, whereas almost zero transaction costs are 
incurred by a farmers borrowing from moneylenders. The moneylender also provides 
social support to clients in times of disaster or bereavement. Ninety per cent of 
See Chapter Four for details. 
256 
respondents in our samples (both customers and non-customers of RBs) reported that 
the village moneylender contributes to both social and cultural events affecting his or her 
clients. Formal institutions do not provide such services. Their loan portfolios do not 
make provision for such events. 
Rural banks, moreover, face risk of default by one or more large borrowers 
which can introduce systemic risk and endanger the whole financial system. The Kunike 
Rural Bank cheque incident7l is a case in point. What aggravates the default problem is 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms. The problem is further exacerbated by the absence 
of well defined property rights in the rural areas of Sierra Leone due to the communal 
land tenure systeM72. Moneylenders' experience of default is much lower compared to 
formal institutions. "le moneylenders reported default rates ranging from 1-6 per cent, 
DD t73 
Rus experienced defaults of between 36 and 72 per cen . 
Farmers readily honour their 
debt obligations to moneylenders to avoid loss of creditworthiness and respect in the 
community (Due, 1983) and to ensure access to loans the following year (Stickley and 
Tapsoba, 1980). In addition, moneylenders use socio-cultural methods to enforce 
repayment even after the death of a borrower. For example, in rural Sierra Leone, debt 
obligations are inheritable, so that the unpaid debts of the deceased are passed on to his 
or her survivors. This is demonstrated in a small ritual that usually takes place before a 
deceased person is buried. Before the burial ceremony, two important questions are 
asked: Who does the deceased owe? Who owes the deceased? Even where these 
questions are not asked, lenders are known to alert relatives to the deceased person I)s 
71 See Chapter Six for details. 
72 See Chapter Three for more details. 
73 See Chapters Four and Six- 
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outstanding debt obligationS74. in this way, outstanding debt obligations are identified 
and new arrangements made to effect repayment. Thus, socio-cultural sanctions may 
persuade individuals to repay loans where RBs are unable to do so (Udry, 1990a). The 
above findings and discussion tend to suggest that moneylenders are more effective 
credit agents in rural areas than formal institutions have proved to be. There are, 
however important constraints that undermine the smooth functioning of both formal and 
informal credit institutions in Sierra Leone to which attention must be drawn. 
7.12 Constraints Affecting the of Supply Credit. 
Some of the constraints formal credit institutions face in rural Sierra Leone are 
associated with the lack of enforcement and a harsh economic environment. Government 
has been reticent on the issue of foreclosure on loans in rural areas. It could, therefore, 
be concluded that government is part of the problem. Government-backed credit 
programmes have experienced high default rates since credit organisation began; but no 
defaulter has ever been successfully prosecuted or foreclosed (Deen, 1977; Johnny, 
1985; Reddy, 1985). Part of the reason may be that loans are concentrated in the hands 
of large, politically influential farmers and other economic operators. Because of the 
smallness of Sierra Leone rural society, default tends to have a demonstration effect. As 
a result,, borrowers take out loans in the well-founded expectation that they will not be 
obliged to repay. Consequently, one could suggest that borrowers have come to regard 
credit as their own share of the 'national cake. The failure to impose sanctions weakens 
incentives for borrowers to invest in good projects and strengthens those for rent 
4 Culturally. rural people believe that the consequences of unpropitious action(s) of a fhmily member 
can haunt the whole family. Creditors or people who have been offended usually seek quick redress 1-n- 
threatening to invoke a 'curse' (African voodoo) on the whole family. Moneylenders use this method 
with good effect to enforce repayment, 
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seeking. Given the political constituencies that government has to serve, it is unlikely to 
be able to enforce repayment in programmes that it backs. 
Operations of formal credit institutions are further constrained by the harsh 
macro-economic conditions that have characterised most Affican countries, including 
Sierra Leone, over the last two decades. The drastic devaluation of the local currency, 
the Leone, accompanied by an inflationary upsurge from 1985 through 1992,75 greatly 
reduced the funds available to RBs and other formal credit institutions. RBs have only 
been kept afloat by huge subsidieS7' and revaluation of physical assets. Formal financial 
institutions cannot increase interest rates because of the ceilings imposed. If these funds 
were operated, for example, by osusu clubs, the rate of circulation would have been 
faster, repayment periods shorter and there would have been fewer or no cash assets to 
depreciate. The osusu tends to be superior to formal credit institutions in several 
respects. It is adaptable to the circumstances of members and tends to be less costly 
(Adams, 1990; Bournan, 1994). There are no accumulated assets and therefore the 
temptation to be dishonest is minimal. The osusu combines savings with credit and 
demonstrates types of relationship that are conducive to the participation of the poor. 
Relationships are built on behavioural norms which ensure that participants are both 
accountable and disciplined 
77 
Other constraining econonk factors include urban-biased pricing policies 
(sometimes prices are artificiaBy controfled to appease urban dweflers), poor extension 
services to bring new technology to producers and poor market infrastructural 
-5 See Chapter Three for details 
See Chapter Six for details 
See Chapter Five for more details. 
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development. Improvements in production technology may raise physical yields, - 
but such 
changes do not result in corresponding increases in farm incomes unless marketing 
facilities, input supplies and prices create incentives to ensure the effective use of credit 
(Schultz, 1977; Brown, 1978). A number of commentators agree that production and 
equity objectives of credit programmes are often defeated by poor marketing conditions 
and urban-biased price policies. Credit per se is a weak instrument for promoting 
agricultural development if these distortions and constraints are not removed or 
minimised. 
In Sierra Leone, public investment in agricultural research, extension and 
infrastructure development has been decreasing in real terms over a number of years 
(Dahniya, 1993). Feeder roads that were constructed by IADPs have not been 
maintained. A study by ABCO (1980), revealed that 96 percent of the road network in 
the country as a whole, was in a state of disrepair. For LICs , including 
Sierra Leone, 
investment in infrastructure has afluring benefits. Where communication and other types 
of market infrastructure are inadequate, an increase in their supply can do much to boost 
productivity and growth. But where income and productivity are depressed by 
inadequate infrastructure, the financial resources needed to underwrite investment are 
difficult to mobilise (Eichengreen, 1995). Pricing policies have tended to be urban biased 
and infrastructure neglected, rendering agriculture unprofitable (Dahniya, 1993). Under 
such conditions, credit will be ineffective even at very low interest rates. 
7.20 Findings of the Research 
Despite the Optimistic view of the role RBs were expected to play in financial 
intermediation, the reality has been disappointing. This is not surprising. Based on an 
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extensive review of available literature on RFMs in Sub-Saharan Africa,, Meyer, Graham 
and Cuevas (1992) concluded that. 
"Tbe supply-leading approach has been shown to have several fundamental weaknesses. 
It ignored savings mobilisation and created a dependency syndrome mi which lenders 
became dependent on cheap government and donor funds. It created rent seeking 
opportunities M which non-targeted borrowers used political influence to gain access to 
cheap funds. Financial Institutions were undermined because they were often not allowed 
sufficient margins to cover their costs and risks. Finally, credit was treated as an input in 
production so its value as a fungible resource was ignored" (p. 13). 
The results of our study of RBs in Sierra Leone tend to lend support to the above 
conclusion. Like most other FFIs in the rural areas of countries in sub-Saharan Affica, 
WD 
R"s in Sierra Leone have been weakened by inflation, financial repression, high default 
rates and the absence of a strong legal and regulatory framework. The overall result has 
been low outreach, high transaction costs, and a high dependence on subsidies derived 
mainly from the central bank. Although there is no universal method of assessing the 
level of achievement in rural financial institutions (Yaron, 1992a), this study uses 
Outreach and the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) to examine levels of achievement. 
7.2 1. Outreach. 
The level of achievement of RBs in terms of outreach (savings mobilisation and 
lending) has been low, In terms of savings mobilisation, the four RBs studied reached 
only 6,524 or 2.4 per cent of the target population of 272,535 within their service areas 
during the period 1985 to 1993 inclusive (Table 6.7). The total volume of savings 
mobilised was Le 306.1 rtýillion (US$ 527,586), 78 with an average size of Le 46,919 
(US$ 80.9). Even this relatively low level of savings of the target population tends to 
rebut the traditional assumption that there are no savings in the rural areas. But internal 
-8 The average exchange rate in 1993 Nvas Le 580/JJS$ (Bank of Sierra Leone. 1993) 
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problems and external constraints have militated against the broader mobilisation of 
potential savings. Apart from the Kunike Rural Bank (KRB) which has an Agency at 
Masingbi, about 15 miles away from its headquarters, no other RB has established a 
second office. Rural banks in Ghana, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Co-operative 
d'epargne et de Credit in Togo, and the Credit Unions in Cameroon, to name but a few, 
have developed savings mobifisation schemes, involving mobile units and agents to reach 
potential clients in remote areas (Thiflairajah, 1993). In contrast, rural banks in Sierra 
Leone rely on customers to travel to the bank and effect transactions. Considering the 
low percentage of the population reached, it is not unrealistic, however, to suggest that 
the RBs could have increased savings considerably if more savings mobilisation drives 
had been mounted using, for example, mobile units to reach potential clients in remote 
areas. Even acknowledging constraints, Rural bank staff seem to have settled down to a 
quiet or even venal fife, providing no competition for moneylenders. 
There are other factors associated with the low savings mobilisation in RBs in 
Sierra Leone. Firstly, the nominal interest rates for savings have been below the rate 
charged by commercial banks (Tables 3.3 and 6.11). They have also been below the rate 
of inflation, suggesting a negative real rate of return on savings (Table 3.3). It could be 
deduced that potential savers may have preferred to hold their savings in the form of 
value-appreciating real assets, since these may provide superior returns to those of fixed 
rate financial assets and are a more efficient way of hedging against inflation. The initial 
increase in savings observed (Table 6.5) may have been induced by the need to be 
eligible for loans. This conclusion is supported by our interview with managers and the 
large number of dormant accounts observed in the books of RBs (Table 6.6). In the four 
262 
Dn 
lk"s we studied, there were 1,040 dormant accounts representing about 16 per cent of 
the total number of accounts. The volume of the savings in these dormant accounts was 
3.2 per cent of the total volume of savings in the four institutions. Our interviews with 
managers and loans officers further revealed that most of these dormant accounts were 
opened to fulfil one of the criteria for loan eligibility, which is that an individual Will only 
be granted a loan if he or she has bought shares, or opened an account with an RB (Bank 
of Sierra Leone, 1984). Consequently, some of these accounts ceased to operate after 
their holders have acquired a loan. Secondly, potential savers were holding out and 
waiting to see if RBs were reliable. Our interview with non-customers of RBs (the 
control sample in our survey) revealed that potential savers were suspicious of formal 
financial institutions, following their experiences with co-operative societies and IADPs. 
Mismanagement and corruption within co-operative societies left many farmers 
disillusioned (Samura, 1978 and Johnny, 1985). In addition, falsification of accounts and 
inflating debt repayments due from illiterate farmers in the AIDPs also left farmers with 
the impression that formal financial institutions are run by corrupt and dishonest officials 
(Johnny, 1985). This lingering distrust of institutions associated with goverment also 
tends to dissuade people from exposing their assets in a way which, they fear, might 
invite interference, control and taxation. This conclusion was also reached by Abebe 
(1987), who added that: 
"Consequently, African economies remain severely under-moneused, so depriving 
countries of the opportunity to make use of large amounts of development capital 
available literally at their doorsteps (op. cit.: p. 11). 
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In contrast, the operations of the informal financial sector (mainly moneylenders 
and the osusu clubs) are carried out in an atmosphere of trust and intimate knowledge of 
the parties concerned. In many respects, "its distinguishing characteristic, which in fact is 
also its primary rationale, is the informal nature of its activities" (Chandavakar, 1984). 
Almost free from central bank and government controls, moneylenders operate with a 
degree of flexibility which cannot be matched by RBs in their present form. 
Another factor which should not be ignored is the effect of the on-going 'rebel 
war' which has affected over three-quarters of the countryside. The instability caused by 
this war has affected major production areas and has also had the effect of savers 
converting their savings (financial or real asset) into foreign currency in the black market 
in readiness to flee the war affected areas or the country. Two RBs (MOARB and DRB) 
have already suspended operations on account of this 'rebel' war. 
Despite their poor performance, however, two positive effects of RBs are 
observed. One is the inclusion of women clients. Another is that they have brought new 
clients to the formal sector who were not serviced by other financial institutions. In this 
respect, RBs have made a net contribution to rural financial intermediation. 
But in order to analyse intermediation, we related loan volume to the volume of 
savings. The ratio of depositors to borrowers is 1: 2.8 (Table 6.7) which suggests, 
according to Gurgand et al. (1994), that savings options are unattractive. The ratio of 
savings to loans is 1: 1.8, suggesting an over-extension of loans. The loans-to-deposit 
ratios are high and they may be too high for prudential liquidity management. 
Inadequate training and lack of refresher courses for RB staff in the art of financial 
management and monitoring of lending costs are contributory factors. Another reason 
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may be political pressure on RBs to grant huge loans to influential and wealthy clients 
regardless of the costs involved. The over-extension of loans may also have been caused 
by 'agricultural demand illusion' which is a consequence of low interest rates on loans 
(Ladman and Tinnermeier, 1983). The high loans-to-deposit ratios cannot, therefore, be 
reasonably interpreted as an indication of good financial intermediation. 
The objective of spreading the ownership of RB shares widely among rural 
residents has not been realised. If we exclude Classes 'A' and 'B' shareholders, 79 the 
number of indigenous shareholders (Class 'C' shareholders') in all the eight RBs was 
just 3,765 (as at December, 1993), representing 0.66 per cent of the target population 
within their service areas (Table 6.1). It should be noted that some of these shares were 
bought by wealthy and influential rural and urban residents in the names of their relatives 
to circumvent the policy which states that "an individual will not be allowed to own 
more than Le 40,000 worth of shares" (BSL, 1984). Our interviews with Managers and 
Loans officers of RBs revealed that some of these relatives do not know that they own 
shares in these institutions. Considering the small proportion of the target population 
owning shares, and the fact that some of these so-called shareholders are 'proxies', one 
could conclude that, ownership of RB shares has been concentrated in the hands of a few 
wealthy and influential people. The concentration of ownership of RBs' shares may have 
also influenced decisions about the allocation of loans. 
Outreach in lending has also been low. Total loans extended (Table 6.9) by the 
four RBs for the period 1985-1993 inclusive, was Le 572 million (US$ 986,207 at 1993 
79 Class 'A' share are reserved for the Bank of Sierra Leone (the central bank) and Class 'B' shares for 
other financial and development institutions operating in the area seniced. by an RB. 
'0 Class *C' share are for the indigenous people resident in and hailing from the designated service area 
of an RB. 
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prices). The number of loan beneficiaries as at end December, 1993, was 21,020 or 3.7 
per cent of the target population in the designated service areas of the eight RBs. The 
average size of loan was Le 3 1,000 (US$ 53.4 at 1993 prices), which is inadequate to 
cultivate 1.5 acres of upland rice farm". It should be noted that most loan beneficiaries 
of formal financial institutions in LICs are repeat borrowers (Adams, 1979). According 
to the managers and loans officers of RBs, this applies to at least 65 per cent of loan 
beneficiaries. Therefore, if we reasonably assume that 60 per cent are repeat borrowers, 
the estimated proportion of beneficiaries in these four RBs is below 3 per cent of the 
target population. This observation lends support to the World Bank's (1974) conclusion 
that in Africa, less than 5 per cent of the rural residents have access to formal credit. 
Taking the four RBs as a whole, the policy of allocating 40 per cent of the loan 
portfolio to the agricultural sector was not achieved. The sector received about 13 per 
cent of the total loan portfolio (Table 6.12), while mining received 63.9 per cent of total 
loans funds extended. This sector is dominated by wealthy and influential businessmen 
who may have taken advantage of the low interest rates to create an agricultural demand 
illusion. Mining was not among the priority sectors to be financed by the rural banking 
scheme. One could, therefore, suggest that the RBs have been engaged in some credit 
rationing. The quantum of loans extended to marketing (agricultural and general trade), 
also dominated by wealthy and influential people, could also be the result of credit 
rationing. The average size of loans to this sector for the four RBs studied, was Le 
60,000 compared to an average size of Le 3 1,000 for agricultural production loans. it 
should be noted that the agricultural sector is dominated by small and poor farmers. It is 
The predominant ecology for rice farming is the uplands. According to the FAO (1992). estimated 
cost for cultiN-ating an average of 1.5 acres of upland rice is Le 60,000. 
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also instructive to note that three out of the four RBs studied granted loans to members 
of their Boards of Directors (BOD). The number of members of BOD for these three 
Dn 
R. Bs, excluding the central bank's and other institutions' representatives, is 19 
representing 0.09 per cent of total loan beneficiaries. The total volume of loans to these 
Directors was Le 2.31 million or 1.7 per cent of their total loans of Le 135.4 million 82 
(US$ 233,448.3) granted from 1985-1993 (Table 6.16). The average size of loan was Le 
12131600 (US$ 209.6) compared to an average size of Le 3 1,000 (US$ 53.4) for 
agricultural loans. This means that a few wealthy individuals received disproportionately 
large loans, while poorer borrowers received smaller loans. This conclusion tends to 
support the Iron Law of Interest Rates Restrictions (Gonzalez-Vegas, 1984), which 
states that: 
"When interest-rate ceilings become more restrictive, the size of the loans to non- 
rationed borrower classes increases, while the size of the loans granted to the rationed 
borrower classes diminishes" (op cit., p. 86). 
It can, therefore, be concluded that RBs have engaged in credit rationing and in general 
have not achieved their objectives of making credit more widely available to the rural 
population. 
Outreach (savings and lending) has been very low and influenced by a 
combination of factors that can be grouped into two categories. The first is internal 
factors which include lack of mobility, low moral and poor incentives for staff. The 
second is external factors relating to the unstable economic and political enviroment. 
Such factors include high inflation, low and restrictive interest rates on loans and 
savings, low technology, low output prices and a poor marketing infrastructure. All of 
This amount excludes loans made by the Kunike Rural Bank. 
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these factors combined to constrain outreach. However, the above factors are not 
exhaustive. This study identified four more, which are the focus of the subsequent 
sections. 
7.22. Default 
The default rates in the RBs have been on an institutional life-threatening scale 
since their inception. The highest default rate of 72 per cent, recorded in the KRB, was 
mainly a result of the cheque incident mentioned earlier. The other three RBs, however, 
also had high default rates ranging from 35-38 per cent (Table 6.15). In contrast, 
moneylenders reported default rates ranging between 1-6 per cent". Our survey shows 
that 59 per cent of RB customers surveyed gave 'repayment to moneylenders" as one of 
the main reasons for default (Table 6.17), suggesting that even with the presence of RBs 
rural residents still borrow from moneylenders. Respondents explained that they cannot 
easily escape the moneylender. He/she is always in the village observing clients with 
'beady eyes' (Bouman, 1977). He or she is also at the farm gate during harvest to collect 
payment and also allows repayment by instalments. 
About 18 per cent of RB customers reported that 'late disbursement of loans' 
was also another major reason for default. They explained that because most agricultural 
production functions such as ploughing and seeding are time-specific, late disbursement 
led to loans being diverted to other uses. According to the conclusion of the USAID 
evaluation study" which reviewed 50 rural credit projects funded by USAID between 
1973 and 1985 in LICs,, unsuccessful projects had default rates ranging from 10-75 per 
cent, with most falling between 25 and 50 per cent. The successful projects had default 
83 
see Table Chapter Four for details. 
84 USAM. 1985, p. 23. 
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rates of around 0- 15 per cent. The rates in partial-ly successful projects were around 20 
per cent. On the basis of this conclusion, none of the RBs studied can be judged 
successful. 
Default has several undesirable consequences for rural credit progranunes. Most 
important is that it graduafly destabilises the credit system (Von Pischke and Adams, 
1983). When defaulters are the big farmers the system becomes unjust inasmuch as they 
are subsidised by small farmers who repay. Since the cost of administration is high, 
default further pushes up lending costs without any corresponding increase in loan 
turnover. Defaults reduce the resource base for ftirther lending, weaken staff morale and 
affect the borrowers' confidence in the institution. The evidence we collected suggests 
that the major reason for low rates of default experienced by the moneylender is not 
coercion but considerable effort and resources invested in obtaining information about 
the credit worthiness of borrowers. Borrowers were carefully screened and information 
on defaulters pooled in the market, thereby reducing the risk of default. In contrast, RBs 
had very high default rates. While political pressure and borrowers' attitudes to 
repayment may have influenced default in RBs, our assessment is that the main factor 
was a sub-optimal level of screening by RBs among others. 
7.23. Interest Rates 
The issue of interest rate has been at the forefront of the debate on credit supply 
and savings mobilisation in LICs. The thesis of financial repression (McKinnon, 1973 1, 
Shaw, 1973) deals with both the supply and demand sides of the RFMs. It proposes that 
individual savers respond to the reward of holding financial assets conditional on the risk 
of holding these assets. The interest rate is the reward on savings and inflation is the risk. 
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This interest-elasticity approach prescribes, therefore, that high real interest rate and 
price elasticity are the main instruments for eliciting savings. In contrast, cheap credit 
stifles the growth of formal financial institutions. These two effects are products of 
interest rate ceilings which do not allow banks to increase their resources through 
savings mobilisation, Such institutions, therefore, depend on central banks' rediscount 
windows for loanable funds and become mere credit outlets. 
The above analysis tends to explain the operations of RBs in Sierra Leone. Table 
6.11,, shows savings rates in RBs from 1985-1993 which were 15 per cent from 1985- 
19903.20 per cent from 1991 to June, 1993 and 10 per cent as from July, 1993. In 
comparison, interest rates in CBs (Table 3.3), have been higher than RBs; and also below 
inflation which has been, on average, 90 per cent per annum between 1985-1993. 
Negative real interest rates have, therefore, been the norm for most of the period. 
Low interest rates have had adverse implications for the RBs. Gonzalez-Vegas 
(1984), Adams (1984), Von Pischke (1991) and many others have argued that, a low 
interest rates policy creates excess demand for loans, building up arbitrage pressure and 
necessitating non-price credit rationing. Interest rate policy of government has a vital 
role to play in the promotion of repayment. When the real rate is excessively low, as 
observed in RBs in Sierra Leone, borrowing and consumption will be much more 
profitable than savings and repayment. According to Padmandhan (1988, p, 40), rural 
people are rational and do take advantage of attractive interest incomes on deposits. An 
increase in the interest rate makes current consumption more expensive than future 
consumption. But it can also be argued that with a higher interest rate the amount of 
present savings necessary for a given level of future consumption would be less. 
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Although we do not have enough data to support the above statements, the evidence in 
South Korea and Taiwan supports the first assumption. When interest rates were 
increased in these countries,, financial institutions mobilised large rural savings. In 
countries where real deposit rates became negative due to inflation, such as that in Sierra 
Leone, savings mobilisation has been seriously constrained. Overall, it has been found 
that financial deposits respond more to real interest rates than national savings, due to 
the substitution of financial investment for other investments (Fry, 1984). The policy 
implication, therefore, is to allow interest rates to be determined by market forces. 
Although traditional literature associates variation in interest rates with 
fragmented markets and with the existence of barriers to entry, when it comes to credit 
markets, the view on rent-seeking takes a special form (Krueger, 1974). Government 
regulation often imposes, as in the case of Sierra Leone, barriers to entry with interest 
rate ceilings that are below market rates. The policy implication is deregulation and 
removal of barriers to entry. But the New Institutional Economics sees fragmentation as 
a natural outcome of the existence of non-zero transaction costs mostly observed in the 
informal credit market (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). 
7.24. Transaction Costs. 
Transaction costs in RBs include administrative overheads associated with 
lending and savings mobilisation. These costs covering staff salaries and allowances, 
establishment expenses, transportation and administrative expenses have been high in the 
four RBs studied. Transaction costs vary from Le 0.18 to Le 1.36 for each leone lent 
(Tables 6.19-6.22), or, on average, Le 0.54. Loans were granted by the banks at an 
average rate of interest of 38 per cent whereas inflation was, on average, 90 per cent 
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(1985-1993) (Table 3.3)- and with a default rate of over 36 per cent, coupled with a high 31 - 
loans to savings ratio, it is not surprising that to stay afloat, RBs depended on subsidies 
from the central bank (see Section 7.25 below). Neither is it surprising that one of the 
RBs, the MMRB,. was closed down at the end of 1994 due to the depletion of resources 
as the result of high default rates, low interest rates, ýnismanagement and the central 
bank's withdrawal of subsidies. High transaction costs are an obstacle to the 
development of a financial market and it, however, remains to be seen how long other 
D 13 
Rus will continue to operate in the face of this reduction of subsidies and continued 
interest rate restrictions. 
High transaction costs are not limited to RBs alone. Borrowers also incur high 
transaction costs when dealing with RBs. Table 6.18 provides typical transaction costs 
facing a customer residing 25 miles away from an RB, showing that cheap credit may not 
be so cheap after all. Such a borrower pays a real interest rate of 52 per cent compared 
to an average of 46 per cent when borrowing from a moneylender". Although nominal 
interest rates are low in RBs compared to those charged by moneylenders, the out-of- 
pocket expenses and opportunity costs of time incurred by borrowers in carrying out 
loan transactions are very high, This may be one of the reasons why rural residents tend 
to prefer moneylenders to RBs. It also suggests that the moneylender does not 
necessarily receive monopoly rent. The results of our regression analysis of the 
transaction costs of the moneylenders (Chapter Four) suggest that transaction costs, 
especially at the level of loans granted, are high. In particular, result of our regression 
analysis (Chapter Four) suggests that duration of loan and risk of default are positively 
85 Sm Chaptcr Four for dctads. 
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correlated to the level of interest rates charged and are significant at the 99 per cent 
level. 
Credit/market interlinkage provides certain advantages for the moneylender. It 
implies a better basis for observing clients and potential clients and it also helps to 
overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
Aleem, 1990). Interlinking credit with input and output marketing services also creates 
confidence and trust between the two parties in the credit contract. In a situation where 
marketing infrastructure is poor, and in some places non-existent, the moneylender 
performs valuable services in input supply and output marketing. Rural banks, in 
contrast, are not designed to handle input/output marketing. Credit/market interlinkage 
helps to solve the problem of information asymmetry and tends to serve as a substitute 
for the missing network of complex legal and market institutional infrastructure that are 
present in the developed countries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 198 1). 
These factors suggest that moneylenders are particularly effective channels of 
credit in the rural areas of Sierra Leone in comparison with formal sector financial 
institutions. Prohibitive costs in terms of time and inconvenience often make prospective 
clients shy away form using RBs for loans and deposits. It is important, therefore, for the 
RBs to reduce transaction costs by improving their techniques, mode, and scope of 
operations. All of these can combine to influence viability. 
7.25. Viability (SDI) 
It has been demonstrated in Chapter Six, using the Subsidy Dependence Index 
that RBs in Sierra Leone are not self-sufficient, i. e. that they are not viable in their 
present mode of operations. Rather, they depend heavily on subsidies from the central 
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bank. The volume of such subsidies to the four RBs studied are surnmarised in Table 71 
In total they amounted to Le 126.053 mil-lion (US$ 217,334.5 at 1993 pfices), 
representing 22 per cent of total loans extended or 34 per cent of total savings mobilised 
from 1985 to 1993 (Table 7.1). The subsidies include salaries and allowances of senior 
staff seconded to RBs from the central bank, acquisition of funds at below discount rates 
from the central bank, loan guarantees under the Credit Guarantee Scheme operated by 
the central bank and tax exemptions. It should be noted that the audited statements of 
accounts of these RBs do not reflect these subsidies. The use of the Subsidy Dependence 
Index analysis helps in isolating these costs and allows an analysis that provides a clearer 
picture of the level of subsidies and hence an understanding of policy that might be 
redirected to enhance viability. On the basis of such analysis, RBs in Sierra Leone were 
found to exhibit SDIs varying from 116 to 1,319 per cent. It also shows that for RBs to 
have been self-sustainable, they would have had to charge interest rates on loans ranging 
from 84 to 712 per cent (see Table 6.32). The main reasons for this high subsidy 
dependence are the high default rates and lending rates that are far below inflation. 
Table 7,1. Estimated Volume of Subsidies Received By R. Bs (Le million) 
Rural Bank Period Subsidy (Le Million) 
YRB 1985-1993 7.973 
NE"" 1988- 1993 42.235 
N4RB 1988-1993 17.253 
KRB 1987-1993 58.592 
Total 126.053 
Sourcu 
-Summed up 
from Row 9 of Tables 6.24,6.26,6.28 and 6.30. 
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A further factor which influenced the high dependence on subsidies relate to the 
defalcation of accounts reported in some of the RBS86 
On the basis of our outreach, default, interest rates, transaction costs and viability 
analysis, it has been shown that RBs in Sierra Leone have performed poorly and are not 
viable. Their poor performance also raises questions of the quality of internal 
management and the supervision of the RBs. Supervision of RBs is the responsibility of 
the central bank. But the latter also has considerable problems. Staffing is insufficient in 
quality and remuneration is low compared to that in commercial banks. The work of the 
supervising department is also constrained by the shortage of transport facilities to 
undertake on-site monitoring; such work, moreover, is often based on poor accounting 
systems and sketchy and meaningless prudential reports. The paperwork involved is 
often overwhelming and not enlightening to the supervisor. There is little use of 
computer or analytical methods for off-site surveillance, while on-site surveillance 
emphasises compliance of administrative regulations rather than the financial health of 
the institutions. 
Management in the RBs is itself plagued by problems of poor accounting 
procedures, low incentives, virtually no room for professional advancement, lack of 
adequate quality training and insufficient transport to carry out essential functions. The 
net result is low staff morale, a carefree attitude and high staff turn-over, all of which 
have conspired with other factors discussed earlier to produce low levels of outreach, 
high default rates and poor financial intermediation. The rural credit market is an integral 
part of the rural economy, closely linked with other markets. Thus any distortion in the 
86Sec Chapter Six for details. 
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credit market will spifl over into other markets and wifl influence both the pace and shape 
of the rural development. The next question therefore is, what can be done to arrest and 
improve the situation. 
7.30. Proposals for Improving Credit Supply 
and Rural Financial Intermediation. 
The objective of Sierra Leone public policy on rural credit has been to ensure 
cheap and plentiful credit to all rural households. The chosen instruments for these 
purposes have been first, the creation of special credit programmes, and second, the 
promotion of co-operatives followed by attempts to cajole the commercial banks and 
subsequently the creation of the NCDB, NDB and IADPs. Finally, about a decade ago, 
rural banks were established. But none of these strategies has enjoyed success. The 
moneylender still outperforms formal credit institutions in the provision of not only credit 
but essential services to rural residents, The reasons for the failure of government 
initiatives have already been discussed. It is in this context that public policy needs to be 
re-examined. This section of the thesis, therefore, draws on different features of the 
foregoing discussion to propose a model for credit supply, involving both the RBs and 
informal sector intermediaries to provide comprehensive and effective financial 
intermediation in the rural areas of Sierra Leone. 
7.3 1. Guidelines. 
A world-wide consensus is growing among researchers that formal financial 
markets are not meeting the needs of smaH farmers in LICs (Germidis, 1990; Yaron, 
1992b; Gurgand et al., 1994; Bouman, 1994; Adams, 1990). But policy makers are still 
searching for models and concepts to improve the supply of credit on a sustainable basis 
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and financial intermediation in rural areas of Sierra Leone. This study makes a modest 
attempt to propose a model for achieving such a goal. The findings and discussion in this 
study, suggest that four main aspects need to be addressed in order to achieve it. These 
are, accessibility, self-sufficiency, self-sustainability and a conducive economic 
environment. These factors are closely interrelated. What is important, therefore , is to 
achieve an optimum combination of them rather than prioritising one against the other. 
7.32 Accessibdity. 
Providing accessibility for the rural disadvantaged is usually an important 
criterion by which a credit programme can be judged. Several factors influence 
accessibility. Where banking outlets are situated far away from the clientele, it becomes 
difficult to forge an effective relationship with them (Abebe, 1994 and 1995). The 
relationship between the moneylenders and rural residents provides a stark contrast in 
this regard. Several alternatives are available to increase accessibility of RBs to rural 
residents. One is to permit RBs to employ private lenders to act as their agents. Under 
the 'one-man village banker' scheme in Pakistan, for example, a resident of the village is 
appointed as a banker by the financing institution and he or she is accessible to clients at 
his residence on a 24-hour basis (Padmanabhan, 1982). 
There are a number of well-documented cases of private lenders having been 
employed by institufional lenders to act as agents in extending and recovering loans. 
According to Wells (1980), the credit programme of the Agricultural Bank of Malaysia 
appointed co-operatives, farmers' organisations and private lenders, after screening, to 
act as agents of the bank. The bank sets the interest rate the agents could charge clients 
and the conm-iission they received. In the early 1970s, the interest rates were 9 and 6 per 
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cent for unsecured and secured loans, respectively, with a3 per cent commission, These 
arrangements gave farmers a choice of lenders and created an incentive for agents to 
compete for clients. Wells (1990) noted that the decision to admit private moneylenders 
into the scheme was controversial, but that their superior performance in utilising lines of 
credit from the bank and recovering loans vindicated the decision to include them. One 
problem with this alternative is that if the commission is based on lending alone, enough 
incentive may not be created to compete for good customers. A way of overcoming this 
is to base the commission on the rate of recovery of loans they extend and to offer a 
small salary or allowance to make the burden of the lender's risk tolerable (Mracle, 
1973). 
Another alternatives to achieving greater accessibility involve mobile banking and 
flexible hours. The first involves the use of vehicle or transport of some sort and the 
second relates to keeping the bank or its branch open on special days (market days etc. ) 
and for extended hours. The above alternatives should be determined on the basis of 
local custom and culture. In Sierra Leone, one or a combination of these alternatives can 
usefully be deployed to improve accessibility. In addition, lending procedures should be 
made simple for farmers to understand; and the provision of loans should not only cover 
production but also consumption needs. A smaH percentage, between 20 and 30 per 
cent, can be earmarked for the latter. Again one can recall that the moneylender's 
operations accommodate both production and consumption credit; and he or she is 
capable of achieving high repayment rates. Whatever alternative is preferred, frequent 
and effective monitoring procedures should be developed to discourage corruption 
which characterised formal credit institutions in the past. 
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7.33 Self-sufficiency 
Self-sufficiency in resources is very important to a credit institution. To achieve 
this objective three main actions are necessary namely, reducIng default rates, mobIllsing 
savings and guarding against inflation. Institutions that combine deposit mobillsation and 
lending become more familiar with their clients' cash flow, savings habits and wealth 
(Padmanbhan, 1988). This may be true especially for countries with low inflation and can 
provide positive real rates of return on savings with several savings options. In Sierra 
Leone, RBs and other formal financial institutions in rural areas do not have diversified 
savings options. Negative real interest rate returns on savings are more the norm. Thus, 
information about clients is not available to RBs. To overcome these problems, more 
savings options similar to the 'pigmy savings scheme' operated by the Syndicate Bank in 
India or the Grameen Bank's savings mobilisation schemes, which use both group and 
individual deposits collection procedures, could be deployed (Rahman and Samad, 1993, 
p. 41). In Cyprus and Mauritius, savings schemes have been introduced in schools to 
instil the habit of savings from a young age. The school savings scheme in Mauritius is 
sponsored by co-operatives and supported by government. Women's savings clubs like 
those in Zimbabwe; and Mobile banks and rural credit agents as known in Pakistan 
(Aleem, 1990), could also be used to tap the deposits at the doorsteps of rural residents. 
In this regard, one recalls the operations of the Mayter osusu in Sierra Leone 
(Chapter Five), and the methods utilised in mobilising savings of osusu members, 
especially of market women. These osusu clubs could also be linked with RBs through 
providing attractive savings options as is done in South Africa and Ghana (Burman and 
Lembete, 1995, pp. 25-26). Whatever combination of the above savings mobilisation 
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strategies is adopted, the procedures for depositing and withdrawal should be made less 
cumbersome. These formalities should be simplified for the illiterate clients so that their 
confidence in the formal institutions can be developed. Rural people are usually cautious 
about letting others know about or handling their money. Thus, the safety of their 
money, secrecy and continuity of the financial institution are some of the factors that can 
foster confidence. 
No interest rate is universally optimal. However, real interest rates should be 
positive and high enough to aflow lenders to cover operations costs and compensate 
them for risk. Varying interest rates with the movement in the level of prices in the 
economy is a useful policy option. This study has shown that the levels of default in RBs 
in Sierra Leone are very high, and therefore contribute to their lack of Viability. If self- 
sufficiency is to be restored, drastic reductions in default rates will have to be achieved. 
The first steps in achieving this objective include an improvement in loan appraisal 
procedures leading to financing good projects, providing transport facilities for field 
staff, eliminating cumbersome procedures in order to reduce delinquency, and 
introducing an incentive system for both borrowers and RB staff. The incentive to 
borrowers should emphasise larger subsequent loans after full repayment of the previous 
loan has been made and educating them about their responsibilities to the lending 
institution, about the effective use of credit and the adverse effects of default. For RB 
staff, incentives should be based on loan recovery performance rather than on achieving 
lending targets. Rural banks in Sierra Leone have not instituted any kind of incentive 
schemes for either staff or borrowers. It is,, therefore, worthwhile to consider the 
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experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 87 in this regard in order to reduce the 
default rates in RBs and other formal credit institutions in Sierra Leone. 
Rural banking policy should consider linking of credit to input supply and output 
marketing. Credit/market interfinkage, it should be recalled, enables moneylenders to 
collect more information about their clients. This puts the moneylender in a better 
position than RBs in reducing moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Interlinkage 
also enhances repayment collection performance because the lender is in a position to 
deduct repayment at source from transactions in another market (Floro and Yotopoulos, 
1991). Rural banks and most formal credit institutions in LICs are not structured to 
handle input/output marketing because of the specialist knowledge required and the need 
for additional staff. This problem can be solved by encouraging private entrepreneurs to 
set up input/output marketing outfits. But this caHs for a high degree of co-ordination 
between financing institutions and the input/output marketing outlets. Procedures 
relating to this should be made less cumbersome and clear to the borrowers. They should 
know how much they owe, when and how much to repay. Repayment in kind should also 
be considered. Finally, a sound accounting and management information systems is 
essential for better repayment procedures. The absence of sound bookkeeping has been a 
major cause of default in many credit institutions in LICs. According to Padmanabhan 
(1988), only when the institution knows how much is due, from whom and when due 
will it be in a position to follow-up loan repayments. 
87 See Atiur Rahman and Abdu Samad (1993), "Loan Recovery Performance of the Grameen Bank. " In 
Abu N, M. Wahid (ed. ), The Grameen Bank: Poverty Refiefin Bangladesh, pp. 175-190, for a full 
exposition of the incentive schemes. 
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7.34 Self-Sustainability. 
This research has also shown that RBs in Sierra Leone are highly subsidy- 
dependent and, therefore, not viable in the sense of being self- sustainable. To remedy this 
situation four main aspects need to be addressed. These are lending rates, borrowing 
rates, loan turnover and transaction costs. The fixing of lending rates for agricultural 
development is complex 88 . However, as we pointed out earlier, lending rates should be 
high enough to cover administrative costs, bad debts and to make a reasonable profit. 
They should also be positive in order to protect the institution's equity capital and 
maintain its efficiency in allocating scarce resources. In addition, lending rates should be 
differentiated and progressive to reflect short-term and long-term loans, as weH as, small 
and large loans. 
As Padmanabhan (1988) has pointed out, "higher margin with lower volume 
would be less profitable than lower margin with higher business in view of the high 
transaction costs". To increase turnover, 'saturation-lending' may be useful. This 
involves accommodating large number of clients in all categories, such as small, medium 
and large, as well as those involved in non-farm activities. 
A policy of allowing the financial institution to compete and pay the full cost for 
external funds should also be encouraged. It is not a bad policy to provide some subsidy 
for start-up costs. The payment of these should, however, be spread over a number of 
years to allow the institution to achieve viability within the shortest possible time 
(Boume and Graham, 1980 and 1983). The central bank cannot maintain subsidies in 
88 For a discussion of the fi. -Qng of lending rates, see the World Bank 0 975, pp. 45-5 1) 
See also Virmani (1982). one of the conclusions of this paper is that credit markets differ fundamentally 
from the market for goods. Therefore, analysing the loans market according to the theory applicable to 
the goods market can be misleading. 
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perpetuity. In other words, there is a limit to the amount and tenure of external sources 
of funds, particularly concessionary funds. Rural banks will, therefore, be unlikely to be 
viable and sustainable unless they can raise the bulk of their resources through deposit 
mobdisation on competitive terms. Most importantly, an aggressive savings mobilisation 
policy should be adopted in order to increase resources. A sound liquidity management 
policy should also be made a priority. In this regard, adequate training and refresher 
courses for RBs staff are very useful measures to be considered. Provision for incentives 
and professional advancement should also be created. This would help to improve staff 
morale. 
7.35. The Need for a Conducive Environment. 
This section is devoted to pragmatic issues relating to what can be done to 
improve the economic environment in order to sustain the supply of financial services to 
rural residents, as well as to how RBs can to be structured to enhance their financial 
intermediation role. In order to achieve these objectives, three steps are necessary. These 
are structural adjustment, financial sector reform and institution building. The Sierra 
Leone economy has already undergone substantial structural adjustment during the 
period 1992 to 1994 and the process is continuing under an IMF-sponsored Rights 
Accumulation Programme. This thesis concentrates on financial sector reforms and 
institution building. 
The macro-economic environment exerts a major influence on both the country's 
economic performance and on its financial system (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1995). 
Financial institutions find it hard to operate in the unfavourable economic environment 
that has characterised. many sub-Saharan Affican countries such as Sierra Leone (World 
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Development Report, 1989). The principal agencies which should initiate action to create 
a conducive economic environment are government, the central bank and international 
donor agencies. 
In particular, government should regard the rural financial market as an 
instrument for allocating scarce resources by instituting suitable macro-economic policies 
and the production of viable technologies through research should be encouraged. Credit 
can only play its legitimate role when there are opportunities generated in the economy 
through technology (Padmanabhan, 1988). But such technology should be appropriate 
and tested. Testing agricultural technology can be achieved by adaptive or on-farm 
research to make sure of its appropriateness to field conditions (Richards, 1982 and 
1986; Dahniya, 1993). In the Sierra Leone context, it has been recognised that the 
country has had a long research tradition and considerable appropriate technology has 
been generated such as new varieties of seed and tubers; but the link between research 
and the farmer has been weak because of excessive centralisation, poor logistical support 
and low incentives (Richards, 1986). The extension/farmer ratio'9 which was around 
1: 800 especially during the LADPs in 1979, dropped to around 1- 1,200 in 1990 (FAO, 
1992). But a high extension/farmer ratio does not guarantee success (Lele, 1975) and 
several factors are necessary to enhance extension services. These include farmers" 
acceptance of the technology, its profitability, extension staff s ability to handle and 
solve specific and related problems and the separation of credit from extension functions. 
Given their low levels of income and the vagaries of the weather, farmers' fear of trying 
89 This is the total number of extension officers to total number of farmers expressed as a ratio. 
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something new is reasonable although often not appreciated by extension workers and 
researchers. 
An appropriate legal framework is also required to protect the resources of the 
RFM and to recover outstanding loans. Government officials and politicians should 
refrain from making pronouncements that imply debt forgiveness or which makes credit 
appear as government handouts. According to Mbat (1982), the famous banking 
theorem that 'deposits create advances and advances create deposits' is true only when 
amounts advanced are My recovered. A kind of deposit insurance is therefore necessary 
to protect the resources of both lenders and savers. In addition, linking formal with 
informal lenders can help to strengthen enforcement, improve loan recovery and financial 
intermediation. 
Supporting services such as input supply, training and infrastructure are other 
aspects of reform. A poor marketing infrastructure contributes to high production costs 
and low profit margins (FAO, 1992). Along with the possibility of crop failure (Richards, 
1986), these add up to unacceptably high risks which lenders, such as commercial banks, 
understandably shy away from. Cheap credit cannot undo these deficiencies and many 
credit programmes operating in such environments meet with faure (World 
Development Report, 1989). It would not be unrealistic, therefore, to surmise that these 
deficiencies may have contributed to the poor performance of RBs in Sierra Leone. 
Some rural credit experts including those in the World Bank (World Bank, 1989. ) have 
recommended that these facets of rural development should be part of a single 
programme. Without feeder roads and efficient means of transport, farmers will find it 
difficult to get their produce to the market and reaching the RBs will involve additional 
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costs and time, thus increasing borrowers' transaction costs. With poor communication 
facilities, access to information becomes limited. It is therefore incumbent on government 
to devote more resources to improving the market infrastructure. More specificaily, 
existing feeder roads should be repaired and new ones constructed to link production 
areas. Market centres should also be constructed to facilitate the exchange of goods, 
services and information. This could improve producers' bargaining power. 
High transaction costs are an obstacle to developing financial markets. Monetary 
and other costs tend to limit the services financial intermediaries are able and wrilling to 
offer. Prohibitive costs in terms of time and inconvenience can cause prospective clients 
to shy away from using financial institutions. It is, therefore, important for the 
intermediary to reduce transaction costs by improving their techniques, mode, scale and 
scope of operations. Although there are moves towards instituting regulations and 
procedures to improve operations, little effort has been devoted to devising management 
information systems with a view to improving efficiency, probity and loan portfoho 
management. 
The liberalisation of interest rates and the removal of sectoral ceilings could 
enhance financial intermediation by channelling savings to higher yielding investments. 
The restructuring of financiafly distressed RBs, introduction of training programmes for 
their employees and improvement in supervision by the Bank of Sierra Leone can also 
enhance the soundness of future banking activities and increase confidence in the banking 
system. Ghana's financial sector reform and institution building programmes9o can serve 
as a model for Sierra Leone to improve its financial system. 
90 See S. Thillairajah (1993) for more details. 
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To achieve the above objectives, a detailed review of rural financial services, 
including those provided by the informal sector, should be undertaken as part of the 
country's financial sector reform. It is central to the argument pursued in this thesis that 
a better understanding of the informal financial system can provide insights into how to 
develop suitable formal financial services in rural areas. The informal financial sector 
already performs in a noteworthy fashion and should be encouraged to grow, diversify 
and integrate with the formal sector institutions. The long-term strategy for rural 
financial sector development should, however, be to improve and expand the formal 
financial system, concentrating on savings mobilisation which does not rely on external 
sources for long-term lending resources, and adopting a 'savings-deposit-led" strategy as 
opposed to the past 'I supply-led' approach. 
Much could be learned from the informal financial sector. It has been successful 
in the past in providing cost-effective and convenient savings/deposit facilities to rural 
residents, and has proved a dependable and ready source of loans without 
bankable/realisable collateral. Many of the services offered and some of the instruments 
used by this sector could be adopted, with modifications if need be, by RBs and other 
formal financial institutions. In this regard, Pattern and Rosengard (1992) have suggested 
that: 
dt emulation instead of elimination of the informal financial system, and complementing 
instead of supplementing should be the strategy for policy makers In efforts to develop 
the fbrmal financial sector". 
Emphasis should also be placed on the autonomy of financial institutions. This 
implies that the lender should have the right to say 'no' to risky loan requests, and to any 
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borrower whose debt repaying capacity is low. Non-agricultural loans and loans to 
small- and micro-enterprises for any viable income-earning activity should be 
incorporated into the loan portfolio, thus diversifying risk and facilitating rural 
development. 
7.36. Proposed Rural Banking Model 
On the basis of the findings of this study and the guidelines discussed above, the 
salient features of the proposed model for successful rural banking in Sierra Leone are 
outlined as follows: 
Rural banks should continue to operate as joint-stock companies. However, some 
changes are now necessary to enhance their operations, accessibility, self-sufficiency and 
viability. 
Organisation: 
There should be a 7-person Board of Directors constituted as follows., 
(i) 4 Members representing Indigenous shareholders (Class 'C' shares), 2 Members 
representing the Bank of Sierra Leone/Development institutions9', and I Member 
representing Rural Bank Agents (see paragraph C below). 
(ii) There should be a fair representation of women on the Board to reflect their 
increased participation in RBs and their good repayment record compared to male 
boffowers. 
(iii) The local loans conunittee should be replaced by a RB Agents Committee 92 
9' According to Bank of Sierra Leone (1984), Development institutions mean any institution - co- 
operative society. credit union, commercial bank, self-help organisation etc. - operating Nwhin the area 
serviced by an RB. 
92The RB Agents Committee will perform the function of the local loans committee because it will be is 
made up of local residents who live. know and work with clients of the RBs. They NNill. therefore. ha%-e 
more information about prospective clients. 
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(iv) The Bank of Sierra Leone should strengthen its supervisory role. It should sell off its 
shares as soon as the demand for them is established. This would mean giving up its veto 
powers and concentrating on supervision. 
(v) Names of shareholders should be published to discourage the use of 'proxies' for 
circumventing of the rule that limits the amount of shares one individual can hold in an 
RB. 
(B) Savings Mobilisation 
One of the major objectives of the RBs should be savings mobilisation. This 
should be achieved by an aggressive savings mobilisation policy through, 
(i) mobile banking to reach prospective clients living in remote areas. 
(H) school savings schemes to instil the habit of savings in school children. 
(iii) groups savings schemes on the lines of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 9' 
This measure should be aimed at linking osusus and other self-help groups with RBs. 
(iv) opening for extended hours and on special days such as market days and on 
festive occasions. 
(v) allowing some agents to mobilise savings. 
Provision of loans 
Accessibility should be of paramount concern to the RBs. 
(i) To improve accessibility, RBs should appoint agents resident in the villages after 
thorough screening and such agents should be shareholders in the RB. 
(H) Where they can be identified, moneylenders should be encouraged to become agents 
because of their superior knowledge of rural residents and their proven perfonnance. 
93 See M. Hossain (1988: pp. 33-34). 
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(iii) The number of agents should, however, depend on the size of the area and or the 
number of Chiefdoms serviced. 
(iv) There should be a fair number of women agents both because of the proportion 
patronising rural banks and because of their superior repayment record compared to 
men. 
(v) Agents should be represented on the Board of the RBS94 
(A) A salary and or a commission should be paid to an agent. This would serve as an 
incentive and compensation for the risk and services performed. The commission should, 
however, be based on recovery performance rather than on the quantum of loans 
extended. 
(vii) Agents should meet regularly to share experiences and receive new decisions and or 
directives from the Board through their representative. 
The use of agents has several benefits for RBs, the borrowers and the agents 
themselves, For the RB, dealing with agents would reduce administrative costs. The 
knowledge of the agents about their locality and its residents would also become 
available to RBs at minimum cost and this would help in selecting low credit risk 
borrowers. It would also help in the financing of good projects. Furthermore, agents 
would be in a better position to use socio-cultural methods to enforce repayment, 
thereby reducing default. Agents would have to compete for good borrowers. By having 
a seat on the Board, the institution would be able to haise with agents, share field 
problems with other Board members and assist in policy formulation to enhance rural 
bank operations. On the whole, administrative and monitoring costs could be reduced, 
94 The choice of the Agents' representative to the RB Board of Directors could be done either by the 
Agents themselves of by the RBs, using as a criterion, the recovery performance of Agents. 
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accessibility increased and financial intermediation improved. For the borrowers, 
accessi 1 ty would be improved and alternatives made available. Borrowers and agents 
would benefit from training programmes organised to teach simple record keeping skills. 
effective use of credit and the impact of default on the RB and the rural economy. 
Agents would also benefit from exposure to more sophisticated financial decisions. 
(viii) Saturation lending should be explored. Farm and non-farm enterprises, small and 
large loans, as well as, short, medium and long-term loans should be included in the RB's 
loan portfolio. It should however be noted that extension of medium, long-term and 
large loans9' should be handled by the RBs initially, until the performance of agents has 
been certified as satisfactory. 
(ix) Group lending should be encouraged because of its benefits in minimising moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, reducing default through joint and several 
liability peer monitoring and increasing accessibility to financial services. Groups should 
be kept small (five to ten members) to reduce group monitoring costs. 
(D) Need for a Rural Bankers Association 
Rural Banks should form an association as is the case in Ghana. This organisation 
should provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences related to problems in 
operations in rural banking in particular and commercial banking in general. In the 
medium to long-term the association could haise with other institutions and donor 
acrencies on behalf of RBs with a view to facilitating the exchange of ideas and 115 
information. 
9' Short-term loans have a duration of one year or less, Medium-term loans have a duration of between 
one and two years and Long-term loans are those with a duration of two to five years. 
Large loans are those exceeding Le 100,000 for an individual and Le 500,000 for groups. 
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(E) The Role of Government and the Central Bank 
The role of goverment has already been defined in Section 7.314. In general 
government should be a facilitator and should not be seen to intervene in how the market 
allocates resources. The central bank's role should be confined to monitoring and 
supervision. In addition, it should organise seminars to discuss issues related to rural 
financial markets and the operations of RBs. It should collect and disseminate 
information relating to relevant policy decisions affecting banking in general and rural 
banks in particular. 
(F) The Role of Donor Agencies96 and Non-Governmental Organisations. 
In this model, the role of International Donor Agencies (IDAs) and Non- 
Governmental organisations (NGOs) are limited to institution-building. This entails 
helping the RBs to improve operations by providing training in all aspects of credit 
operation for staff, technical assistance to improve management information systems and 
exchange visits to similar institutions in other countries. Rural bank Agents and 
borrowers could also benefit from such training provided by IDAs and NGOs. 
Figures 2 and 3 fllustrate the kinds of refonn required and the proposed rural 
banking model advocated for improving the effectiveness of RBs in financial 
intermediation. It must be emphasised that the proposed model demands a high level of 
co-ordination, monitoring and supervision of Agents to ensure that borrowers are not 
charged more than the interest rate recommended by the RB. This monitoring could be 
done during savings mobilisation drives or at meetings and training sessions with clients. 
It is envisaged that a successful restructuring and operations as outlined above would 
96IDAs refer to international banIcing institution and friendly goverrunents. 
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Figure 1. 
Economy 
Financial System 
Financial 
Institutions 
Economy, finance and institution-building: structure and refonn 
General economic reform 
Financial sector reform 
Institution-building 
j. F. Krahnen and R. H. Schrmdt (1995), p. 76 
Note: - The two halves of this schema represent on the left, the economy, the financial 
system and the financial institutions operating within it and on the nght, the type of 
measures necessary for creating a conducive environment for improving the operations 
of financial institutions. In Sierra Leone, for example, general economic reform is in 
progress under an IMF-sponsored SAP. In addition, we have recommended that the 
whole financial sector be examined with a view to identifying the kinds of institutions as 
well as the constraints and problems within which they operate and necessary reforms 
instituted. Moreover, the institutions themselves need to be strengthened (institution- 
building) through staff training, improving management information systems etc. , in 
order to improve their operations and the services they provide. 
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Figure 3 Proposed model for Rural Bank Financial Intermediation 
Bank of Sierra 
Leone 
RURAL 
BANKS 
I Groups I 
AGENTS 
Donor Acencies 
Osusus(ROSCAS) 
RURAL RESIDENTS (Fanners, Traders and all other Enterptises) 
ource: - Contelt. 1-99 
ICED Y: - 
Savings Mobilisation. 
Lending operations. 
Supenrislon and Institution- builcling 
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improve savings mobilisation, credit supply and financial intermediation on a viable and 
sustainable basis in the rural areas of Sierra Leone, 
7.40 Conclusions. 
The study has revealed that RBs have not achieved the objectives for which they 
were set up. Outreach in terms of the proportion of the population reached has been 
below five per cent for both savings mobilisation and lending. A larger proportion of the 
loans went to larger and wealthier rural residents, suggesting that the RBs have been 
engaged in credit rationing. Thus the analysis tends to support the Iron Law of Interest- 
rates Restrictions, which is a consequence of low and restrictive interest rates that are 
below the rate of inflation. The low proportion of clients mobilised and the high loans to 
savings ratio suggests that RBs do not have attractive savings options and that there is 
considerable room for increasing savings if more savings mobilisation drives with 
attractive interest rates were offered. 
The objective of spreading the ownership of RBs has not been achieved. Less 
than one percent of the rural residents own RB shares. It should be noted, moreover, 
that some of these shareholders are 'proxies' for wealthy and influential rural and urban 
residents, suggesting that the control of the RBs may have been in the hands of the latter. 
Viability of RBs has been low due mainly to low savings mobilisation, high 
default rates, and high operating costs. All of these factors made RBs to be highly 
subsidy-dependent. The overall poor performance of RBs has been caused by a variety of 
factors, chief among which are, the volatile economic climate, a restrictive interest rates 
policy, lack of mobility of RBs staff, political interference and the effects of the on-going 
c rebel' war. 
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In contrast, the informal financial sector (mainly moneylenders and osusu groups) 
has been performing relatively better. The default rates they experience are low mainly 
due to living in close proximity to their clients and the information they possess about 
rural residents which enables them to screen and eliminate bad risk borrowers. They are 
therefore, in a better situation than RBs to minimise the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Although non-final interest rates charged by them are higher than 
those of RBs, transaction costs incurred by RBs' clients in contracting loans is high, and 
when these costs are computed, they produce higher real interest rates than those 
charged by the moneylenders. This suggests that moneylenders do not necessarily reap 
monopoly profit. It can also help to explain why rural residents tend to prefer them to 
DU 
Rus. On the other hand, the provision of other services such as interlinking credit with 
input/output marketing gives moneylenders further opportunity to weed out bad credit 
risks and attract more customers. The discussion has also shown that osusu clubs are 
also effective financial intermediaries demonstrating relationships that are more 
conducive to the participation of the poor. 
Against the background of the findings of the study and the discussion, any 
restructuring of the formal financial market, particularly the of RBs, should involve not 
only the overall economic reform but also financial sector reform and a linking of the 
formal with the informal sectors in the RFM. While it must be acknowledged that the on- 
going 'rebel' war, militates against these changes being carried out in the immediate 
future, it must be stressed that if the restructuring is delayed, rural banks may be wiped 
out before too long. 
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Chapter VIII Conclusion: Recommendations and 
Suggestions for Further Research 
8.10 Conclusions 
What have we learned from the analysis of the operations of the RBs, 
moneylenders and the osusu about the RFM in Sierra Leone? The rural financial market 
in Sierra Leone is influenced by a complex interaction of socio-economic factors and to 
get a better understanding of it we have taken a simplified view of reality. In our 
simplified world, we have focused attention on the operations of rural banks, 
moneylenders and the osusu; and we have been able to support some theories relating to 
the operations of RFMs in LICs. We have also been priviledged to gain considerable 
insight into how RBs operate, why they have repeated some of the mistakes of past 
credit schemes and why they have not been able to fulfil their objectives in enhancing 
economic development. 
The macro-economic environment exercises a major influence on a country's 
economic performance and also has a significant impact on its financial system. In the 
last decade, the Sierra Leone economy has been volatile with high inflation, overvalued 
exchange rate, high budgetary deficits and lower than equilibrium administered interest 
rates on both savings and loans, leading to negative interest rate income. The market 
infrastructure is poor and in some places non-existent. Rural banks have been operating 
under this harsh economic regime since 1985. It is no wonder, therefore, that their levels 
of outreach have generally been low. It is also no wonder that RBs had to be heavily 
subsidy-dependent to in order stay afloat. 
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We are not advocating that govemment does not have a legitimate role to play as 
regards rural credit. But goverment's role should be a catalytic one, providing a 
conducive environment for the development of the financial sector, Rural banks have not 
fulfilled the objectives for which they were set up due partly to too much goverriment 
presence and the lack of its commitment to legislate and enforce repayment. The target 
population, mainly the small farmers, has not benefited from the explicit and implicit 
subsidies, which have rather benefited the affluent borrowers, mainly through larger 
loans and credit rationing. 
Profits reported in the profit and loss account of RBs are not necessarily 
indicative of their financial viability. We have demonstrated by using the Subsidy 
Dependence Index (SDI) that none of these RBs was viable. To achieve viability they 
would have had to charged interest rates in excess of 500 per cent for loans. The reasons 
for their high subsidy-dependence are many and interrelated. A financial intermediary's 
role is to provide credit, savings facilities and other financial services. By helping to 
transform the size and maturity of financial assets, it provides a medium of exchange 
between financial clients. It collects savings from many small depositors and makes the 
funds available to the borrowers who need loans to finance their investment. Rural and 
commercial banks and other formal financial institutions in Sierra Leone, however, have 
not been successful in reaching small borrowers or savers. A combination of effects, 
which is a result of interest rate ceilings, high transaction costs associated with lending 
small amounts of money to widely dispersed people who have no formal credit history, 
finýted collateral and high default rates has provided these lenders with little or no 
incentive to reach low-income clients. On the savings side, the mobilisation of small 
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deposits from rural clients has been administratively costly. Thus, for both demand and 
supply reasons, the result has been that RBs have not been able to serve the weaker 
section of the rural population. 
This weaker segment is made up of numerous small farmers who form the 
majority of the rural population. Their limited access to and distrust of formal financial 
institutions, including the RBs, has led them to rely on the informal sector, especially the 
moneylender. Our study has shown that the informal sector's mode of operation creates 
an ambience which accommodates the varied needs of this weaker segment of the rural 
population. The transaction costs incurred in dealing with the informal sector (e. g. in 
acquiring oans) is very low compared to that of dealing with RBs. The period of waiting 
to acquire a loan is also low in the informal sector compared with that of the RBs. 
Whereas in the former loans can be acquired vvithin a range of 1-3 days, with the latter it 
takes 3-4 weeks, Although nominal interest rate for loans in RBs is low compared to 
moneylenders, the real interest rate paid by a borrower residing, for example, 25 five 
miles from a RB is higher that the average interest rates observed for moneylenders. This 
is due mainly to the out-of-pocket expenses (transport costs, bribes, entertainment etc. ) 
and the opportunity cost of time incurred in contracting a loan. This partly explains why 
rural residents tend to prefer moneylenders to RBs for credit facilities in rural Sierra 
Leone. 
Against this background, our analysis seem to suggest that the cheap credit C7 
provided by RBs is not cheap after all. It also suggests that the moneylender does not 
seem to reap monopoly profits as the traditional assumptions suggest. Our analysis 
shows that the level of interest rates observed in the moneylenders' credit operations is 
299 
positively correlated with the cost of information collection about potential borrowers, 
his perception of default and the interlinking of credit with other markets such as the 
purchase and sale of other goods and services. It should be noted that the interest rate is 
also influenced by the harsh economic climate that prevailed throughout the 1980s and 
the instability caused mainly by the on-going 'rebel' war. 
The constraints and problems we identified though not insurmountable, have also 
created impediments for self-sustainable credit supply and financial intermediation. It 
appears, therefore, that the RBs were doomed to fail even before they started to operate 
because these obstacles were in place before the rural banking scheme was launched. In 
the absence of the kind of assessment that this study has undertaken, policy makers seem 
to have been unaware of the impact these obstacles have on the operations not only of 
the RBs but also of the rural financial market as a whole. 
It is therefore envisaged that this study can serve as a 'wake-up' call for policy 
makers to reassess rural banking and credit policies before the mistakes are replicated in 
the move to establish yet more RBs in the countryside. It is also expected that an 
awareness of the need to restructure the rural financial market can lead to the creation of 
a conducive economic environment which will nurture self-sustainable and viable RBs 
and other similar credit supply and savings mobilisation institutions beneficial to the rural 
sector and the economy as a whole. 
8.20 Recommendations 
On the basis of our analyses and the broader literature reviewed, we make the 
following unprioritised recommendations: 
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1. The macro-economic and financial environment should be reviewed and restructured 
to provide a conducive climate for efficient intermediation. Distortions generated by 
urban-biased policies should be removed in preference to compensating part of the 
agricultural sector indirectly with subsidised credit. 
2. Ceflings and restrictions on interest rate should be removed to allow RBs and other 
formal financial institutions to cover their high operating costs, adjust earnings to 
changes in inflation and progress towards achieving subsidy independence. 
3. Government intervention in the operation of RBs and other formal financial 
institutions should be avoided and their management allowed to implement sound 
banking practices. 
A significant amount of resources should be devoted to institution-building at all 
levels, emphasising training and the introduction of appropriate management information 
systems. 
5. The mobilisation of savings should be emphasised with a view to achieving self- 
sustainabifity. 
6. Group lending should be encouraged and adequately designed with a flexible delivery 
service. 
7. Support to women for income-generating activities should be part of the programme. 
This would help to capitalise on the positive features of women's behaviour with regard 
to finance, including their emphasis on savings, greater discipline in loan repayment and 
respect for group obligations. Women should therefore be encouraged to place their 
savings with RBs which would help them to build a banking relationship and financial 
history that would be useful in future. Those with very small savings should be 
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encouraged to join groups. The strength in numbers could be adopted in helping women 
to participate in group loans and joint liability schemes to improve their access to lending 
institutions. 
8. Incentives for borrowers, savers and staff should be adequately designed and 
objectively followed. 
9. New policies, methods and modes of operation should be evolved in respect to 
changes in the economy. 
10. Legal and enforcement frameworks should be introduced to enable RBs and other 
financial institutions to protect their resources as well as those of savers. 
11. Strict prudential regulations for rural banking activities should be enacted and 
enforced. In this regard the central bank has a huge role to play. It should only intervene 
at the central bank level and not at the borrower level and it should concentrate on 
supervision and providing training to improve the quality of services provided by RBs- 
The 'assumed' responsibility of managing RBs should be relinquished. The central bank 
as an institution is not designed to assume this responsibility. 
12. Support for private entrepreneurship and risk taking in the agricultural sector and 
micro-enterprise should be encouraged through sustainable credit operations which 
would help financial intermediaries reach a larger number of rural households, including 
farmers and women. Such operations should be undertaken in the context of financial 
sector reforms designed to improve the allocative efficiency of financial intermediation. 
13. Liberalisation of interest rates, reduction of credit rationing, strengthening of credit 
institutions and improvement of collection rates are objectives that should feature 
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prominently on the agenda, with a view to improving access for small borrowers and 
depositors in rural areas. 
In pursuing the above goals, caution should be exercised on stereotypical reform 
of the financial sector or the standardised, adoption of types of innovations from other 
settings; because a solution in one socio-econornic environment may not constitute the 
appropriate approach for providing financial services to the rural area of another 
environment. Thus, it is necessary to carry out thorough investigation to determine 
validity and appropriateness before introducing any new programme. 
8.30. Suggestions for Further Research 
This study has generated some findings relating to the present modes of 
operation of RBs and moneylenders. Most of the issues identified can, on their own,, 
become major topics of research. As a follow up action, however, we suggest that the 
following investigations be carried out in the immediate future to complement this study. 
(a) Review the existing banking laws, regulations, circulars and government policies 
affecting branch/unit banking operations to determine the incidence of their impact on 
different banking entities, thereby explaining the role of policy measures in the structure, 
conduct and performance of the banking system. 
(b) Review and evaluate the organisational structure and manpower needs of the 
financial sector as well as their adequacy in performance in the light of the 
recommendations of this study. 
(c) Assess training facilities, plans and programmes for staff as well as programmes for 
client development in all phases of branch/unit operations. 
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(d) Evaluate policies and procedures involved in bank planning, budgeting, promotion, 
banking services, technical services and community relations. 
(e) Assess the impact of the new regulatory environment that has resulted from the 
evolving deregulatory measures (the SAP) recently embarked upon by the central bank 
and the government 
(f) Identify and examine the role of supporting services and institutions (MAFF, etc. ) in 
providing a conducive environment for the successful operation of financial institutions 
as well as for institution-building. 
(g) Although RBs are not designed to handle input/output marketing, an evaluation of 
the impact this would have on financial intermediation should be carried out. This 
research should examine specifically what the impact would be if RBs were allowed to 
float their own input/output companies, conjointly, in their areas of operation through 
financing or encouraging private entrepreneurs to organise input/output marketing 
outfits. 
(h) Appraise the allocative efficiency role of the informal sector, i. e. moneylenders and 
other self-help financial groups (e. g. osusu clubs), their private and social productivity 
and in particular the extent to which they alleviate inefficiencies that stem 
from too 
tightly or inappropriately controlled credit allocation by the formal sector. 
(i) Quantify the volume of savings mobilised by osusu groups in the rural areas with a 
view to proposing appropriate measures for attracting such deposits into the rural 
banking system. 
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(j) Determine to what extent a change in the regulations governing RBs behaviour (e. g. 
allowing more portfolio diversification, different reporting systems etc. ) would allow 
them more freedom to act like commercial banks and improve their viability. 
While the above research questions are by no means exhaustive, they include 
some of the pertinent issues that need to be addressed in relation to the restructuring of 
the RFM in Sierra Leone. We are, however,, aware that because of the present conflict in 
Sierra Leone, a far-reaching restructuring of the sort recommended is unlikely to be 
carried out immediately. But if delayed, the rural banks may become yet again, another 
failed attempt at credit supply in the rural areas. 
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